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COMBINED REPORTS
ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

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SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
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ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
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CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE AMERICAS

INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

In January 1962, in response to the stepped-up Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere following Castro's takeover in Cuba, the Organization of American States established the Special Consultative Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism. It was made up of experts in the field of communist theory and practice who "advise member governments that, according to the circumstances, might require and request such assistance" on combatting Communist subversion within their respective countries.

Since its inception, the Consultative Committee has prepared four major reports, which, taken together, constitute the most thorough and objective study on Communist penetration in Latin America compiled to date. But these reports, unfortunately, were distributed in limited quantity, in mimeographed form, so that to this day only a handful of people are aware of their contents.

Because the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security considers these reports of such timely importance, we are reprinting them in this volume in the hope of drawing to them the attention they merit.

The first report is a study of the history of the international Communist movement in general, its objectives and methods, and the alternatives to communism offered by a free, democratic society.

The second report considers the techniques employed by Communist agents in recruiting, training, psychological penetration, and militarization in Latin America, and it described in great detail Castro's efforts at spreading subversion.

The third report broadens its coverage to Communist efforts in the whole of the Western Hemisphere, discusses the question of coexistence, and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The fourth report stresses the need for greater inter-American cooperation to overcome Communist penetration and considers the impact of the Sino-Soviet split is having on subversion in the Americas.

In the introduction to its first report, the Consultative Committee aptly summarizes the present scope of Communist activities in the Americas with these words:

Lacking sufficient numerical strength and without Soviet and Chinese Communist military forces close enough to this hemisphere to give them support, the Communists are dangerous only to the extent that they usurp the strength of others; that is, the students, the workers, rural workers, writers, and even political leaders. Since the great majority of the citizens of the Americas believe in the ideals of national independence and individual liberty, and reject intervention and dictatorship, the Communists can strengthen themselves, and even come into power, only through a *program of deceit* that assumes many and varied forms. Only thus can Communist subversion triumph.

I have underscored the phrase *program of deceit* because it is the underlying theme and the main message of these reports. Moreover, that phrase is the key to a proper understanding of the Communist offensive in the Americas.

Only by fraud and deception can the Communists hope to gain even momentary acceptance by the peoples of the Americas.

They camouflage their true objectives by supporting all popular causes and posing as the champions of human freedom and dignity.

Their immediate goal is to promote and sustain disorder; to impede progress by frustrating land and social reforms, and by sabotaging programs for economic development like the Alliance for Progress and efforts toward an effective Latin-American "common market." In short, to discredit and debilitate any scheme that shows promise of success.

In the long run, communism aims to subjugate the world, and we should not refrain from reminding ourselves that, by its own words and deeds, the international Communist movement is a world conspiracy. Their goal does not change. However, policies and techniques of subversion vary with regional, national, or local circumstances. This is what causes confusion in the West and the Free World.

Skillfully applying the economy-of-forces principle, as the Consultative Committee observes,

* * * the ambitious arm of Communist effort reaches out toward any place where prevailing circumstances will permit it to act to advantage. Thus, the Communists abandon their penetration of Europe in order to go into violent action in various regions and countries of Asia and Africa, and finally, America. The imperialist desire that motivates them neither weakens nor halts. It is sustained action, carried out with minute precision.

Therefore, classical political and strategic concepts are helpless, because, by the time the Free World has mobilized its efforts against communism in one area it has "already ceased in that place and reappeared in another."

As pointed out by the Consultative Committee, the Communist assault in the Western Hemisphere manifests itself in five major ways:

(a) Subversive activities (agitation, strikes, guerrilla warfare, etc.), which in some countries have reached the point of open insurrection;

(b) Acts of sabotage and sympathetic terrorism, carried out by small, but perfectly trained and equipped groups, following preestablished plans and intended to create a climate conducive to general insurrection;

(c) Infiltration into governmental spheres, including the armed forces, which endangers institutional stability itself;

(d) Penetration into information agencies and media (press, radio, and television) with personnel especially trained in Communist propaganda; and

(e) Growing participation in the educational field, particularly at the university level, seeking, among other things, to rapprochement workers, not for the purposes of trade union improvement but only to develop their own subversive activities.

It bears repeating that the Communists do not necessarily plan to succeed next week, although they would like to, but they are dedicated to constant, sustained subversion over any number of years.

At the time of this writing, the situation in the Dominican Republic is still precarious and the future of freedom in that country is uncertain. The initial unilateral intervention by the United States was at first called for to protect American and other foreign nationals in Santo Domingo, and, later, when it became clear that the Communists

had moved into command positions in the rebellion, to prevent disorder from degenerating into a Castro-style takeover.

This intervention has been criticized by the Communist press as an illegal invasion of the Dominican Republic's sovereignty and as an example of American "imperialism." Some observers in our own country characterized our action as an "American Hungary" or as a return to "Gunboat Diplomacy."

These criticisms and characterizations are simply not in line with the facts—facts cited not only by the United States Government but also by Latin-American governments themselves and their representatives in the OAS.

Because these facts have been beclouded by the rapid pace of events and by criticism at home and abroad, we have appended to this study, beginning at page 107 the First Report of the Special Committee set up by the Organization of American States to investigate the situation in Santo Domingo firsthand.

The First Report establishes beyond a doubt the need for prompt and decisive intervention by the United States, which is, after all, the only power of this hemisphere capable of enforcing peace quickly, efficiently, and effectively. According to the First Report, the action was necessary to prevent a bloodbath in the streets of Santo Domingo.

The Special Committee notes:

* * * the streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, including those selling food of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding bloody incidents in various parts of the city.

The Committee made the following observation on its interview with Camaano:

The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called "Constitutional Military Command" to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in loud voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you doing here?" The person replied: "I am Andre Riviere, my nationality is French, I fought in the French Army in Indochina, and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." While he took no part in the conversations, Riviere was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious.

The First Report also explains in detail the activities and discussions of the Special Committee with the various groups and individuals involved in the Dominican drama. The report clearly shows that the United States had to act in the interests of the Dominican people, in the interests of preventing the spread of communism in Latin America, and in the interests of its own security.

In the words of the Consultative Committee:

England, the United States, and France constitute three great examples of sacrifice; of political and social revolutions; of victory over the selfish tendency of

human nature; of respect for freedom, equality, and fraternity, not just as hollow words but as true and objective moral values. They are three examples of democratic nations, which in ceaseless struggle for the rights of man, have defended the inalienable prerogatives of the individual against humiliation and slavery.

Discussing some of the more optimistic factors for improvement in Latin America, they state:

For example, the standards set by the Catholic Church for reforming the social order and the condition of workers are clearly revolutionary. In particular, the programs of the Alliance for Progress, both in concept and scope, embody a profound economic and social revolution.

The reports which follow, prepared by the Organization of American States, by Latin Americans themselves, expose the international Communist movement for what it really is: a movement based on fraud and deceit, on violence and terror—a movement which, while it claims to be revolutionary and progressive, is the embodiment of everything reactionary and retrogressive.

THOMAS J. DODD, *Vice Chairman.*

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SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

INITIAL GENERAL REPORT, 1962

Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., General Secretariat of the Organization
of American States

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Special Consultative Committee on Security was created by Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962.¹ As it is pointed out in the preamble of Resolution II, international communism makes use of highly complex techniques of subversion, and in the task of opposing these methods certain states may benefit from mutual advice and support. Being firmly united for the common goal of fighting the subversive action of international communism and preserving democracy in the Americas, the American States further considered that for such purpose they can and should assist each other, particularly through the use of the institutional resources of the Organization of American States. It was deemed advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the Organization the services of an advisory body, made up of experts, the main purpose of which would be to advise member governments that, according to circumstances, might require and request such assistance.

Pursuant to Resolution II, the Council of the Organization, at its regular meeting on March 8, 1962, resolved to create the Committee, to be composed of seven members whom the Council would elect by secret ballot from a list that the Secretary General would prepare of candidates put forward by the Governments by March 15. The Committee was to hold its first meeting no later than April 2, in order that it might be able to submit to the Council the initial general report referred to in paragraph 2(c) of Resolution II.

At its regular meeting on March 21 the Council of the Organization elected the following persons to make up the Committee:

Mr. Manuel Campos Jiménez (Costa Rica).
Gen. Julio César Doig Sánchez (Peru).
Prof. Joaquim Canuto Mendes de Almeida (Brazil).
Lt. Col. Francisco Marcelo Ramírez (Argentina).
Lt. Col. Julio César Vadora Rozier (Uruguay).
Gen. Thomas D. White (United States).
Lt. Col. Joaquín Zaldívar (El Salvador).

The Committee held its first session at the headquarters of the Organization of American States during the period April 2-30, 1962, and elected Mr. Manuel Campos Jiménez Chairman and Gen. Julio César Doig Sánchez Vice Chairman. Dr. F. V. García-Amador

¹ The text of Resolution II is given in ap. 1.

acted as Technical Adviser to the Committee, Mr. Modesto Lucero as Administrative Secretary, and Miss Joan Hetzel as Assistant Secretary.

This initial general report has been prepared on the basis, among other factors, of a large volume of basic documentary information supplied by the General Secretariat of the Organization and by members of the Committee. The nature of these documents has led the Committee to the conclusion that they should remain at its disposal and that the confidential classification attached to them by their sources of origin should continue in force. This step has been taken until such time as the Council approves the regulations by which the Committee is to be governed in this respect.

The report contains five chapters. The first is an introduction, which points out certain incongruities noted in the attitude assumed by citizens of the free world with respect to the intentions, methods, and dangers of communism, as these were denounced by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este. Chapter II takes up the evolution of the direction of the international Communist movement and, especially, the way in which it has affected the American Hemisphere. Chapter II explains in detail the tactic of "deceit," on which both the objectives and the methods of communism are based; and chapter IV gives the democratic society's reply. Chapter V contains the recommendations made by the Committee in conformity with paragraph 2(c) of Resolution II.

I. INTRODUCTION

The instructions received from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of the Organization of American States with respect to this first report were brief, to the effect that the Committee should submit to the Council no later than May 1, 1962, "an initial general report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures that should be taken." In following these instructions, and in view of the vastness and complexity of Communist action, the first problem was to determine the type of report that would be most useful at this time.

As the problem was studied, the solution became clear. It emerged from the consideration of three ostensible incongruities that are at once revealed upon analyzing, first, Communist intentions; second, Communist methods; and third, the Communist danger.

With respect to Communist intention, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared at Punta del Este that they had been able "to verify that the subversive offensive of Communist governments, their agents, and the organizations that they control, has increased in intensity." They added that the purpose of this offensive is "the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers." Here the incongruity lies in the fact that citizens of free countries of this hemisphere tolerate, or are inclined to tolerate and support, known Communists.

With respect to Communist methods, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared that in order to " * * * hide their true intentions, the Communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population * * *" and that "with the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated, and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party." Nonetheless, citizens of free countries of this hemisphere cooperate, or are inclined to cooperate, with known Communists.

With respect to the magnitude of the Communist danger, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared that Communist subversion constitutes "one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries." Nevertheless, prominent persons in the hemisphere underestimate, or persist in underestimating, the Communist danger, maintaining that it is easy to control since the number of Communists in the hemisphere is still small.¹

It is appropriate to ask what causes these incongruities. The reply can be given in a single word: deceit. Lacking sufficient numerical strength and without Soviet and Chinese Communist military forces close enough to this hemisphere to give them support, the Communists are dangerous only to the extent that they usurp the strength of others; that is, the students, workers, rural workers, writers, and even political leaders. Since the great majority of the citizens of the Americas

¹ The complete text of Resolution I, on "Communist Offensive in America," is given in app. 2.

believe in the ideals of national independence and individual liberty, and reject intervention and dictatorship, the Communists can strengthen themselves, and even come into power, only through a program of deceit that assumes many and varied forms. Only thus can Communist subversion triumph.

The Committee believes that at this time it would best accomplish its mission by submitting an initial general report in which the various Communist techniques of deceit are described.

These Communist techniques deserve careful study. Therefore this report presents certain data and gives some examples that should help any genuinely patriotic and alert observer to analyze Communist words and action and to protect his country against them. It also offers some recommendations on measures that should be taken in order effectively to counter the subversive action of international communism and thus to strengthen the defense system of the hemisphere. In this connection, aware that many citizens and organizations of our hemisphere are zealously engaged in numerous activities designed to achieve social, economic, and political progress on the basis of national independence and respect for individual liberty, the members of this Committee have undertaken the task assigned to them with the hope that their contribution may be an important part of the total effort.

II. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Communism operates on a worldwide scale. Its methods and procedures are adapted to the local conditions that will most favor its development, and they vary from simple infiltration for subversive purposes to the use of violence, according to the objective, the direction of the action, and the resistance that may be encountered.

A. EVOLUTION OF THE DIRECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

To provide a better understanding of the objectives pursued by international communism and of its methods and modes of action, it is important to make a synthesis of the evolution that has occurred in the direction of the movement.

The forms and tactics employed have been many and varied, but it is interesting to point out that communism inexorably adheres to four fundamental principles: maintenance of the objective, economy of forces, sustained action, and the firm will to win.

It can be said that for more than 40 years the Marxist-Leninist movement has striven to extend Soviet totalitarianism throughout the world. There is no doubt that the attempts made in that direction, successfully at times and unsuccessfully at other times, have sprung from a purpose of achieving world dominion—a purpose that is always concealed and disguised by its leaders but is always real and nurtured as a permanent aspiration. Resorting to various methods with inconceivable craftiness, taking advantage or not of the help of occasional Western allies, or with the help of its present ally, Red China, the Soviet Union has kept its eager desire for world dominion alive and unchanged.

Circumstances have occurred in which for long periods of time the Soviet effort has not had any preponderant incidence in certain areas,

such as Latin America before 1958, or Western Europe after its recovery, to which the Marshall plan contributed so greatly. But this must not be looked upon as a lack of coherence or as disintegration in the planned strategy. On the contrary, the results obtained show perfectly well that the Soviet leaders have applied the principle of economy of forces.

To that end the ambitious arm of the Communist effort reaches out toward any place where prevailing circumstances will permit it to act to advantage. Thus, the Communists abandon their penetration of Europe in order to go into violent action in various regions and countries of Asia and Africa, and finally, America. The imperialist desire that motivates them neither weakens nor halts. It is an undertaking without hurry but without pause. It is sustained action, carried out with minute precision.

This apparent incoherence somewhat disconcerts the free world, which struggles against Marxism-Leninism according to classical political and strategic plans and concepts. Thus, the defense mechanism of the free world does not manage to finish preparing to act before it finds that the Communist action has already ceased in that place and reappeared in another.

Nothing is more useful to international communism than the new and peculiar form of action used since 1947, the so-called cold war. This is a deceitful, merciless struggle that ranges from psychological action and the peaceful winning of wills to guerrilla warfare and subversive war, using all kinds of action, even the most detestable, such as intimidation, sabotage, terrorism, espionage, and treason.

In order to create more confusion in the thinking of the free world, international communism falsely preaches a policy of "peaceful coexistence," just as it deceitfully distorts the traditional concepts of peace and democracy, or exploits the just aspirations of slowly developing nations for welfare and progress, inflaming their equally just nationalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist sentiments.

Certainly, Communist action is sustained. But what is still more serious, there is no room for doubt that the world is virtually at war—an atypical kind of war, which is being waged by international communism and suffered by the democracies. In this sense, it is undeniable that the Marxist dialectic has changed the saying of Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," to the assertion that "peace is only the continuation of war by other means."

Unfortunately, this present stage of affairs has found the free world inadequately prepared. Certain unbalances cause large areas and large sectors of population to live in despair if not in desperation. Furthermore, the structure of the democratic countries taken as a whole is not monolithic, in the same sense as that of the Communist world, whose unity of command has so far shown no rifts. Irrespective of whether the ideological dispute between the principal members of the Communist world is fictitious or real, the important thing is that any such dispute does not substantially affect the tactic of deceiving and upsetting the free world.

Their firm will to win is impelled by the aim to destroy everything that is not communism itself. The Marxist-Leninist concept of the world and of man places communism face to face with the alternative of winning the victory or disappearing.

B. BRIEF REFERENCES TO THE WORLD SITUATION OF COMMUNISM

The Soviet Union and now Communist China use diverse tactics to impose Marxist-Leninist domination on the world, ranging from internal or external subversion to direct or indirect military action, and from diplomatic maneuvers to carefully veiled and deceptive psychological action that finds expression in many forms and styles. One characteristic deception is the incorporation of Communists in genuine national movements for political, social, economic, and cultural reform, in order eventually to take control of them. This is a Communist tactic designed to seduce and win over most, if not all, of public opinion. Thus, it tries to overcome any popular resistance to the systematic diversion of those national movements toward the international Communist line dictated from abroad.

Direct or indirect military action was evident when the armies of the U.S.S.R., the so-called forces of liberation, did not confine themselves to liberating the people of the countries they occupied from the Nazi totalitarian yoke, but subjugated them to Communist totalitarianism and suppressed, with greater or lesser intensity, the self-determination and freedom of those peoples.

Military action, climaxing the psychological action of deceit, or both simultaneously, resulted in the collapse of China and of other countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam.

Communist China has made an effective contribution to the military action with its guerrilla technique. The methods developed by Mao Tse-tung in the war with the Japanese and nationalist China were used in Cuba by Castro, and in Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo. By means of these methods, the "war of liberation" is falsely presented as an internal revolution, once psychological action and subversion have laid the necessary groundwork. In that way communism uses military tactics to advance itself without any apparent manifestations of aggression from the outside; this also demonstrates the technique of deceit in the use of force to impede international defensive military action.

The psychological tactic of deceit—applied in the areas of just aspirations for national independence, self-determination, democracy, economic progress, cultural improvement, and social justice—is what in some cases in Asia, Africa, and America has deformed legitimate popular movements in respect to electoral policies, differences, and revolutionary or trade-union struggles. This is exactly what happened in Cuba in the just and heroic phase of the revolution, and what is happening or can happen in other countries of America.

Unhappily, in the ideological struggle for the supremacy of one of the two revolutionary currents—international communism, based on historic atheist materialism, and democracy, based on national philosophies—international communism meets with less resistance than does democratic revolution. Groups, classes, regions, and nations—conscious or unconscious of the aforementioned psychological attitude, more sentimental than rational, that takes hold in the disorderly and shapeless popular mind—put forth claims that international communism always tries to cement and coordinate according to specific strategic methods in support of its policy of world supremacy, which is aimed toward the prior destruction of all the postulates of democracy. On the other hand, the policy of democratic revolution, a policy of

constructive progress instead of the destruction of values, has to travel a rougher road. This is due to the fact that the feelings of rebellion among the despairing and discouraged sectors of the countries' populations are frequently based on the prevailing indifference to national problems and on a lack of faith in the political, social, and economic values of Western civilization.

International communism takes advantage of this state of mind, which is widespread in Latin America, and also in certain sectors of the United States, to develop its psychological campaign. It seeks to infiltrate and seize control of political parties by making use of demagogic opportunism; of labor groups by taking advantage of the absence of trade-union traditions; of groups of rural workers by making false promises; and of student groups by taking advantage of the idealism and enthusiasm characteristic of youth.

C. INCIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE

Always preserving its centralized direction, the international Communist movement plots its strategy and its tactics in accordance with the resolutions approved at the numerous congresses, meetings, and conferences of the Communist Party and its related bodies.

With respect to the American hemisphere, mention should be made of the Third International, or Comintern, created in 1919 for the purpose of assuming the general direction of the Communist movement. At its second congress (1920), the Third International established 21 conditions for affiliation of the Communist Parties of the entire world, including those in the Americas, thereby establishing their international character.² According to the second of these conditions:

Every organization desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labor movement (party organization, editorship, labor unions, parliamentary factions, cooperatives, municipalities, etc.) all reformists and followers of the centre and to have them replaced by Communists. * * *

The third condition stated that:

The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war. Under such conditions the Communists can have no confidence in bourgeois laws. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the decisive moment should be of assistance to the party to do its duty toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence of martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable to carry on their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work is absolutely necessary.

And in the seventh condition it was stated that:

Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the "centrists," and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party membership without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The Communist International demands unconditionally and preemptorily that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay.

At its sixth congress in 1928, Trotsky's opposition having been eliminated, the Third International decided to give greater attention to the Communist Parties of the Latin American countries, and through the executive committee of the Comintern it issued various

² The text of the 21 conditions for affiliation with the Third International is given in app. 3.

specific instructions, such as: to fight for a labor and farm labor government; to fight for a federation of proletarian republics; and to help the revolutionary bourgeois governments of small countries, without abandoning the Communist watchword themselves. This was due to the fact that between 1919 and 1928, Communist Parties, or parties inclined toward Communist ideology, inspired by the aforementioned 21 conditions, had been organized in various American countries, but without being formally subordinate to the Third International.

In 1929 a Latin American conference in Buenos Aires made evident the inefficacy and weakness of the Communist movement in Latin America. Consequently, the movement decided to take steps to strengthen itself by centralizing the Communist Parties under the direction of a secretariat responsive to Moscow. The activities of international communism in Latin America were already being coordinated as a whole by the Latin American Bureau and the Caribbean Bureau, which had been created between 1922 and 1928 to control the Communist and related parties of the hemisphere for the purpose of insuring their strict adherence to the line dictated from Moscow by the agents of the Comintern.

Another congress of the Third International was convened to meet in Moscow in 1934, but at the last moment it was changed into a Latin American Conference, in which delegates of the canceled congress participated. This conversion shows the importance of Latin America to the objectives of international communism, a circumstance that was expressly stressed during the conference:

The Latin American question is of major interest, for the policy we adopt there will serve as a precedent for other parts of the world.

The results of that conference in Latin America were a fruitless armed movement (Brazil, 1935) and electoral alliances that led to political upsets (Chile, 1938, and Cuba, 1940 and 1944).

The Seventh Congress of the Third International (1935), definitively establishing the thesis of Dimitrov, based on the intensive use of intellectuals, led to the creation of popular fronts to participate in the various kinds of electoral battles in the various countries.³ In its application to Latin America this thesis of the popular front was most successful in the labor groups.

Thus it was that the aim for unity in the international Communist movement, which led to the foundation in Montevideo in 1929 of the Latin American Trade-Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical Latinoamericana), which was affiliated to the Red Trade-Union International, had a decisive influence on the organization of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina, CTAL), which took place in Mexico in 1938. Through its various congresses (Mexico City, 1941; Cali, 1944; Mexico City, 1948; Santiago, Chile, 1953), as well as through the indecision and contradictions in its positions, the CTAL encouraged the adherence of the trade unions to international Communist leadership, a situation that culminated with the Soviet campaign "for peace" and in the conversion of the CTAL, for all practical purposes, into a subsidiary of the World Federation of Trade Unions, for the creation of which it had taken the initiative in 1945.

³ As opposed to the classist and insurrectional theory advanced by Mannilsky.

In that same year, Moscow, allied with the democratic countries, astutely dissolved the Comintern, supporting international understanding with a pretense of peaceful purposes. But unfortunately, when the integration of the aforementioned popular fronts was consolidated under the inspiration and directives of international communism, Moscow created front or facade organizations⁴ and installed the Cominform as the coordination and information office of the Communist Parties as well as an instrument of propaganda and reinforcement in the so-called cold war.

Since then the popular fronts and the local affiliates of the international front organizations have manifested themselves through Communist participation in the electoral campaigns in democratic countries; in opposition groups; in countries where dictatorships exist; in popular movements on behalf of various causes, and revolutionary movements that have been chiefly anti-imperialist in purpose; in infiltration in labor unions, particularly with a view to promoting strikes; in utilization and winning over of student and young people's groups, especially through the exploitation of nationalistic ideas; in systematic propaganda about the U.S.S.R. by all possible means, designed principally to awaken enthusiasm for international communism and stir up hatred for the democratic system; and in false campaigns in favor of free trade and pacifism.

Furthermore, the meeting of South American Communist Parties, convoked by the Cominform and held in Montevideo in 1950, was outstandingly important, as will be demonstrated later on; and a meeting of the heads of 61 Communist Parties throughout the world was followed by a high-level Conference of Latin American Communist Parties held in Moscow in 1957.

The 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., held in Moscow in 1956 and 1959, respectively, marked an about-face in Soviet policy, particularly with the proclaimed elimination of the cult of personality, which was apparently replaced by the concept of democratic centralism; "peaceful coexistence," which implies the apparent dissolution of the Cominform; the inclusion of America in the so-called "peace zones"; and the formation in the political field in each country of national democratic fronts (a blend of heterogeneous ideologies in which the Communist Parties do not show their identity). The directives comprehended party reorganization and reinforcement of the illegal apparatus.

The Latin American Conference in Mexico City in 1961 was convened under the slogan "For national sovereignty, economic emancipation, and peace," and reference will be made to it later in this report.

In September 1961 the Conference of Unaligned Countries was held in Belgrade, with 28 nations participating. The basic topic was the fight for national independence and support for the fight in Algeria, Angola, Tunisia, and the Congo. But no attention was paid to the fact that nations such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Tibet, among others, have the same yearning for independence. Harsh criticism was applied to the countries that international communism calls capitalist and imperialist, and disarmament and the easing of world tensions were endorsed. Nonetheless, no reference was made to the nuclear tests that the U.S.S.R. was carrying on during the week when the conference was meeting.

⁴ Organizations set up by communism under disguise, in which it denies participation, whereas its identity is preserved in the popular fronts.

On October 31, 1961, the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow. It approved the program of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. for the formation of the Communist society. The program's principal points dealt with the passage from capitalism to communism, and it laid down rules for the international working class movement and the struggle for peace and "peaceful coexistence."

In view of the foregoing statements, it is desirable to emphasize the following aspects, which are considered to be extremely important:

1. The meeting of South American Communist Parties, convened by the Cominform and held in Montevideo in 1950: Its objective was to examine the situation in the area concerned, for the purpose of implementing the appropriate strategy and coordinating the struggles in the regional areas involved.

Its declared purposes were to accelerate the gradual destruction of the forces of capitalism, democratic systems, and private enterprise, and to weaken and impair the standing of international capitalism and the enemies of the U.S.S.R.

Its recommendations, to be applied to each country according to the need, covered direct coalition of Communist groups with bourgeois governments; agitation to incite rebellion and to deceive the masses against those governments; revolutionary extremism and sabotage; a united front of Communist Parties and all forms of organizations of the masses; and social revolution in any country that was "prepared."

The following obligations were assumed: Recognition by the American Communist Parties of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. as the leader in the international Communist struggle, to which they owed obedience and loyalty; the granting of permission to the Latin American Communist Parties, for the first time, to determine their own objectives and suggest the strategy to be followed in their jurisdiction; adherence to the decisions of the Cominform, which, through its international front organizations, would provide resources of all kinds; and, in the event the Communist Parties gained control of the government, an oath of allegiance to the U.S.S.R.

Among the resolutions adopted for these purposes, the following deserves special note: A minority that is technically superior to the majority classes may govern and direct them, subject and control them, within the dictatorship of the proletariat. For this purpose it was provided that within the party ranks there would be a limited number of loyal, thoroughly indoctrinated, active, competent persons, expertly versed in the struggle; and a South Atlantic Committee was created in Montevideo to consolidate the leadership of the South Pacific Committee that is based in Santiago, Chile.

Taking into account the strategic position of the Caribbean area, in 1952 Moscow worked out a plan for Communist operations in that area. The features of this plan were as follows:

(a) Its realistic approach, since it took advantage of all conditions that would be favorable to its activities, such as the critical situation of the Latin American economy in the postwar period; economic, social, and cultural underdevelopment; class and racial differences; autocratic governments; the continued existence of foreign colonies; and, in general, all of the factors that foster latent discontent among the masses.

(b) Its prudence in transforming the Communist Parties into disguised instruments of what is really Red action, by creating organizations and movements that apparently have no connection with Communist leadership (fronts for anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, national liberation, peace, etc.).

(c) Its flexibility in utilizing a great variety of methods involving action that is sometimes "peaceful" and other times revolutionary, and ceaseless psychological action.

2. The second meeting of the heads of the 61 Communist Parties of the world, held in Moscow in 1957, and followed immediately by a high-level conference of the Latin American Communist Parties.

The more important aspects of these meetings were: Khrushchev's special mention of the Latin American representatives and his deliberate omission of any mention of the presence of certain countries, in order not to disturb the negotiations that were underway for the establishment of diplomatic relations; the reorganization of the executive apparatus of the International for Latin America; and the peace manifesto signed by all of the parties, without exception, the postulates of which may be summarized as ratification of the well-known watchwords (infiltration into all national parties, without exception; encouragement of nationalism; formation of national democratic and popular fronts; orientation of the struggle against imperialism, and so forth, and greater emphasis on the need for bringing the action of the Communist Parties adequately into line with regional, national, and local characteristics.

The results of these resolutions in the American Hemisphere have been as follows: the appointment of a greater number of Latin American representatives in international front organizations; meetings of the Communist Parties for the purpose of "exchanging experiences" and "forming new cadres"; change in operational tactics to avoid committing the Communist Parties to activities that are opposed to peaceful coexistence, and instead, carrying out revolutionary operations through agents who have infiltrated into non-Communist organizations; and intensification of psychological action through a cultural and artistic offensive among the higher social classes.

3. The Congress of Peiping in 1959, in which 20 prominent delegates from 9 Latin American countries participated. At that meeting the Chinese leaders recommended "insurrectional tactics against the advances of Yankee imperialism in Latin America" and stressed the urgency of creating an Afro-Asian-Latin American front. Consequently, China began an offensive in the American Hemisphere involving propagandistic, economic, subversive, cultural, and other aspects.

4. The Congress of the Communist Party of France in 1959, at which Soviet and Chinese representatives debated their differences and agreed to these compromises: division of zones of influence; acceptance of the Soviet thesis (peaceful coexistence), with the exception that the Chinese (insurrectional) method should be used in areas where conditions are favorable to it; and seizure of power by communism in those countries where national fronts led by the Communist Party already exist (as in the case of Cuba).

5. The Conference of representatives of the 81 Communist and Labor Parties that met in Moscow in 1960: This was by far the most

important of the meetings held recently by the Communist International and, practically speaking, it gave rise to a new Comintern. In it, the fundamental objectives, namely, "peaceful coexistence," support for "just wars," solidarity with Cuba, and the establishment of a "democratic" national front in every country, were not changed. However, with respect to Latin America, the meeting served to determine the strategy and tactics to cope with the situation and the objectives set, and it was decided that "Operation America" would henceforth be directed exclusively from Moscow.

The principal lines of the plan envisaged by the Conference were: The possibility of extending the field of action by creating another base of operations and exploiting the situation that existed in the so-called "soft zones"; preparation of subversion plans in case a new operational base was established; tactical changes in the Communist Parties, setting up the real direction of the movement in secret and using the old leaders merely as a cover, in order to distract the attention of the security agencies; and the operation of a network of secret radio transmitters, schools for agents and liaison personnel, workshops for the counterfeiting of documents and money, traffic in narcotics, etc.

6. The Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace, held in Mexico City in March 1961 under the auspices of the Latin American Office of the World Peace Council. Its real purpose seems to have been to determine what new steps to take in the hemisphere in favor of the extension of communism. The basic agreements, which were prepared by a small group of technicians, were included in a plan of action that may be summarized as follows: To pursue south of the Rio Grande, with the greatest possible animosity, the campaign against the United States; to develop a "plan of the Latin American nations for their economic emancipation," establishing agencies in each country to make the necessary studies and suggest the measures they deem appropriate (among these, the expansion of international trade without restrictions, and Ibero-American integration at the trade union, youth, educational, and other levels); to set up a single Latin American Central Labor Office, apparently divorced from the CTAL; to encourage the formation of the Afro-Asian-Latin American bloc; to consolidate the advance of the Cuban revolution; and to promote a "conference" of representatives of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The synthesis made in this chapter on the Communist movement enables us to draw some conclusions about its true nature and the strategy of destruction that it uses:

1. The Communist Parties of America are international in character and are subject to the directives that issue from Moscow. (See the 21 conditions in app. 3.) Direction of the movement is carried on in accordance with resolutions adopted at congresses, meetings, and conferences of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and related agencies and parties.

2. The Communist Parties of America and their members have pledged themselves not to fight in defense of their countries if they should be attacked by the U.S.S.R.

3. The directive body of the Communist apparatus began in 1952 to intensify its action with respect to the Communist Parties of America, assuming the direction and making plans for the offensive in the American Hemisphere. General action has become more intensive as a consequence of the events in Cuba.

4. In the leadership of the American Communist Parties, the tactic presently employed is that of keeping the principal leaders concealed and using as a front persons whose notoriety as Communists lessens their effectiveness. This tactic enables them to infiltrate agents into key positions in the political, economic, and social organizations of the American countries. This is an element of grave danger to the independence and democratic systems of these nations.

5. Since 1945 international communism has made very wide use of "frontism," based on front (or façade) organizations to promote action that will favor its aims. This action tends chiefly toward the creation of "fronts" that may cover various fields, such as "peace front," "labor front," or "student front," their outstanding characteristic being that they are regarded as non-Communist.

6. Communism exploits the logical desire of the peoples to seek solutions for their problems—problems that are evident and that, furthermore, stand in urgent need of solution. Through the tactics of deceit, communism takes advantage of social realities so that when the moment arrives in which governments are approaching solutions in the national interest, it creates obstacles to any measures which, precisely because they are suitable, would deprive it of its battle cry.

7. Communism adapts to the environment and creates conflicts or intensifies existing situations, seeking party members and "fellow travelers" (these latter being more numerous, influential, and listened to than the declared Communists).

8. Communism employs various strategies and trickeries, it uses legal and illegal procedures; it remains silent and conceals the truth; it acts alone, or jointly with any ally who may help achieve its purpose. Its final objective is to dominate the world.

9. Communist strategy has found a new route of approach, taking advantage of the peoples' yearning for independence and desire for peace, and of neutralism and the existence of neutralist blocs, whether or not these are developed under the direction of international communism, in order to attempt to reduce the potential of the free world.

III. DECEIT—BASIC TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

A. DECEIT IN COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

1. THE GREAT DECEIT OF COMMUNISM

The Communists' greatest deceit is in the way they mask their true objectives. Communist Parties exist in varying size and legal status in all the nations of this hemisphere and in each nation are composed chiefly of citizens of that nation. Four questions should be asked:

What objectives do these national Communist Parties profess publicly?

What objectives do they, in fact, pursue?

Who determines their real objectives?

Can national independence survive the Communists' attainment of their real objectives?

National Communist Parties in our hemisphere publicly profess ideals that are accepted by most people. Their statements constantly affirm Communist intentions to achieve power through peaceful means, to provide land to the peasants and homes for the workers, and to establish a government by the people. A prominent Communist in South America recently declared: "The majority of the people understand that we are fighting for democracy, and that we are most patriotic." However, as a good Communist, he concluded his speech by declaring that the Communist Party was an integral part of the international Communist movement.

2. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE: TRIUMPH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

After the 1960 meeting of 81 Communist and Labor Parties of the world in Moscow, Khrushchev declared, on January 6, 1961:

The unity of the ranks of every Communist Party and the unity of all Communist Parties constitutes the united international Communist movement directed at the achievement of our common goal: the triumph of communism throughout the world.

In referring to the same meeting, M. A. Suslov, a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., declared on January 18, 1961:

After this historic meeting, the ways of the international Communist movement became still clearer, the means of our common struggle still more reliable and true, our ranks still closer and our great goal—communism—still nearer.

Thus, Khrushchev and Suslov with blatant clarity affirmed that communism is aggressive. In so doing they have repeated the theme proclaimed by Communist leaders since the 1917 October revolution and which as long ago as 1922 Stalin himself had defined in unmistakable terms as "the amalgamation of the toilers of the whole world into a single world Socialist Soviet Republic."

3. DOMINATION OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OVER COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

As has been noted, the major meetings of the world Communist movement since 1917 have been held in Moscow and have been staged and dominated by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. The Second Congress of the Third Communist International, in the 16th of its 21 conditions, provided that the decisions of the Communist International would be binding on all parties belonging to it. This condition has meant in practice that every Communist Party must unreservedly support the U.S.S.R. The clearest verification of such support is to be found in the radical shifts that Communist Parties have had to make in the course of the years to adjust to the change in Soviet foreign policy. These readjustments have taken place irrespective of whether the world Communist movement called itself the Comintern, the Cominform or, as at present, had no formal name. In this way, the conduct of the Communists has shown the falseness of the argument that the national Communist Parties are autonomous, as well as of the idea that they adhere to the principles of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. only because, like the Marxist-Leninists

they are, they think in the same way and, therefore, share the same opinions.

This record also demonstrates that for all practical purposes, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is the Soviet Government. This makes it understandable that Khrushchev should be at the same time First Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and Premier of the Soviet Government.

The continuing direction of the world Communist movement by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is evident from the following. In the newspaper Pravda, its official organ, on June 12, 1960, it was stated that the platform of the international Communist movement "contains what represents, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, a creative generalization of the collective experience of the fraternal parties, and defines its objectives for the present period" (that is, basic laws applicable to all countries). The "platform" referred to in this Pravda article is set forth in the declaration of the Communist Parties issued in Moscow on November 21, 1957, which was signed only by the Communist Parties from the bloc countries. However, its text noted that it was drafted after the bloc parties had "consulted with representatives of the fraternal parties in the capitalist countries." In this conference it was declared that "all parties were bound by the unity of Marxist-Leninist ideology." After the issuance of that declaration the Communist Parties of the world publicly proclaimed that ideology to be their guide to action.

An example of the tight bonds between the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and national Communist Parties is the fact that the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. very recently praised one of the largest Communist Parties in our hemisphere⁴ for "its contribution to the strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist unity of the world Communist movement." The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. declared that it and that party were "immutably tied by bonds of solid friendship and conformity of views."

4. THE TRIUMPH OF COMMUNISM IS FATAL TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

As has been said, since World War II the Soviet Union has used national Communist Parties, usually taking advantage of the presence or threat of its own armies, to install subservient minority governments in countries in Eastern Europe. In Cuba the Soviet-directed Communist Party has managed, by capturing a successful internal revolution, to gain control of the national government and exercise power with Soviet military aid. In no country have the Communists, once they have gained power, permitted demonstrations of opposition to Soviet-directed policy, or any other form of national independence. The countries dominated by the Communists have transformed their political, economic, and social institutions to adjust them to the Soviet model. They have obediently voted in the same way as the Soviet Union on all major issues in the United Nations. Their press and radio subserviently parrot the daily propaganda line emanating from Moscow. In this way, Soviet domination through a national Communist Party is fatal to national independence.

⁴ Reference was made to the Chilean Communist Party.

B. DECEIT IN COMMUNIST METHODS

1. COMMUNISTS' NEED FOR DECEIT

Always operating as a subversive minority in free nations, and pursuing basic objectives incompatible with national independence, the Communists try to capture the strength of their fellow citizens through wide use of deceit.

In this connection, Lenin observed in March 1922:

Without an alliance with non-Communists in the most varied spheres of activity there can be no question of any successful Communist constructive work

And Khrushchev, in 1958, asserted:

If one is to speak of the role and place of non-Communist parties, it must first of all be stressed that under present circumstances collaboration of the Communist Party with other parties, for the Socialist transformation of society, is not only possible but essential.

The Communist Parties of the world acknowledged no ethical restraints on their methods. Thus, in 1920 Lenin declared:

At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and consummation of communism. That also is the basis of Communist training, education, and tuition.

Lenin instructed all Communists to "combine illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle."

Leaders of Communist movements that have succeeded in subjugating free nations have been surprisingly frank in recounting the deceitful tactics that allowed them to attain power. For example, statements made by Matyas Rakosi, Deputy Premier of Hungary in 1952 and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1948, both emphasize that the Communists deliberately deferred statements of their final aims during their struggle to obtain power. Rakosi mentions at that time "we did not discuss the problem before the people * * *" and J. Kosak, of Czechoslovakia, explains:

The necessity of a thorough explanation of political lines had to be coupled with caution lest necessary allies be alarmed; they were to be won over by practical politics and not by statements of final aims of the [Communist] party, which might dissuade them from cooperation with the Communists. * * *

The Cuban Communists also have pursued the standard Communist method of deceit. In answer to questions he had received from Jules Dubois in 1958, Fidel Castro declared the following, as quoted in *La Revolución Cubana* (Editorial Palestra, Buenos Aires, 1960):

I have never been and am not a Communist. If I were, I would have the courage to say so.

In answer to another question, Raúl Castro declared:

If I were a Communist, I would belong to that party and not to the 26th of July [movement].

On another occasion, in February 1959, Fidel Castro said:

Raul, Guevara, and all of them are men who are very much in agreement with my political way of thinking, which is not a Communist way of thinking.

Later, in his speech of December 2, 1961, he gave himself and all the above previous declarations the lie by declaring:

I believe absolutely in Marxism. Did I believe in it on January 1, 1959? I believed on January 1 * * * I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life.

A few days later, on December 20, 1961, Castro made it perfectly clear that his reasons for having deceived the Cuban people were essentially the same as the reasons for which Czech Communists and Hungarian Communists had deceived the Czech and Hungarian peoples. Castro told the National Congress of the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction:

Of course, if we stood on Turquino Peak at the time when we were "cuatro gatos," and said, we are Marxist-Leninists—from the top of Turquino Peak—we might possibly have been unable to descend to the plain below.

Communist subversive activities range from the narrowly covert (such as espionage), to hidden participation in legal organizations (such as labor unions), to open activity as an avowed Communist Party. All these activities are characterized by deceit in varying degree as to their ultimate objective—or as to their methods, or both. Therefore, they are not always easy to identify.

2. USE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES

Communism makes wide use of its diplomatic representatives as a means of carrying out espionage, in connivance with the members of the local Communist Parties.

In 1955 the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage released a highly instructive report, after a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy (Vladimir Petrov) had sought asylum and declared that two Soviet spy rings had been operating in Australia since 1953.

In 1960 the head of the Hungarian Trade Mission to Brazil (Gyorgi Lazar) requested asylum in Brazil and identified two members of his staff, Laszlo Dari and Janos Eredel, as personnel of the Hungarian Secret Service.

It is significant that the present Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Havana, Sergei Kudriatzev, has carried on significant espionage work, having been involved in the famous Gouzenko case in Canada.⁶ The report of the Royal Commission lists Kudriatzev as one of the members of the Soviet Embassy staff who engaged in espionage activities, and declares that: "So far as the evidence discloses, the first head of the military intelligence espionage system in Canada after the arrival of the Soviet Minister was Sergei Kudriatzev, whose official title was First Secretary of the Legation (later Embassy)."

There has come to light direct intervention and participation of diplomatic and consular agents of the present Cuban Government in the internal affairs of various Latin American countries. As the latest report of the Inter-American Peace Committee points out, these acts of intervention have, in many cases, caused those agents to be declared persona non grata or to be withdrawn by the Government of Cuba, in some cases at the request of the government to which they were accredited or, in other cases, as a result of the pressure of

⁶ It was Igor Gouzenko who revealed the existence in Canada of a widespread conspiracy to obtain secret official information. Gouzenko, who had been sent to Canada in June 1943, with the official title of "civilian employee" of the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, was the cipher clerk on the staff of the military attaché, Colonel Zabolotin.

public opinion. On several occasions, these situations have caused the breaking of diplomatic relations.⁷ Also, it is interesting to note that over the last 2 years a considerable number of Cuban diplomatic and consular officials have publicly resigned their positions rather than serve as agents of propaganda, espionage, and other subversive activities in the service of international communism.

3. USE OF WORDS

(a) *Nationalism*

The Communists recognize that the love of national independence is a powerful political force and they seek to identify themselves with it. They permit, in the areas under their domination, expressions of "national feelings," in limited forms, as in the use of national costumes, songs, and languages. They explain this tactic by saying that it is historically justified for the present. They thus acknowledge that their support for national independence is merely a temporary expedient. The element of deceit in their attitude is shown by the contrast between the following two quotations:

While opposing nationalism and national egoism, Communists at the same time always devote much attention to the national feelings of the masses. (Program of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., approved by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.)

Nationalism clears the road for open bourgeois, anti-Communist ideology. This conclusion applies not only in the international field. It is necessary for us to wage a resolute and determined struggle against the slightest nationalist manifestation, from wherever they may originate, whatever form they assume—whether economic, ideological, or cultural. (Report of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., broadcast by Radio Moscow on Dec. 27, 1961.)

(b) *"Peaceful coexistence"*

Far more interested in talking about "peace" than in achieving it, the Communists have made heavy play of the phrase "peaceful coexistence." Soviet propaganda has encouraged non-Communists to look upon "peaceful coexistence" as a desirable alternative to the "cold war." At the same time, however, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has carefully defined "peaceful coexistence" to Communist audiences not as an alternative to but as a part of the "cold war." In fact, "peaceful coexistence" is merely a modern name for the constant Communist attack against free nations, in which they employ all means short of general war. On October 10, 1959, Khrushchev affirmed:

* * * coexistence is the extension of the struggle of two social systems. * * * We should decisively and continuously struggle for our ideas, for our way of life, for our Socialist system.

(c) *Democracy*

The Communists speak deceitfully of democracy, always carefully defining it to mean a form of government that they can control. Khrushchev has said:

For us, democracy is the true power of the people; it is the all-round development of the spontaneous action and activity of the working masses, their self-government.

⁷ With regard to the specific cases described in the Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee, see document OEA/Ser.L/III, CIP/1/62.

Khrushchev, however, had made an emphatic distinction between "the peoples' democracy as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and what he referred to with scorn as the "so-called pure democracy."

For his part, Fidel Castro, speaking on March 26, 1962, on the Marxist-Leninist methods for selecting the leaders of the new state party in Cuba, said that the masses have "a great spirit of justice" but, sometimes, "choose someone who has a negative past." To clarify, he added: "* * * the mass is not going to elect the nucleus; the party is not an elected party; it is one of selection, with the selection to be organized through the principle of democratic centralism."

As shown in the ideas quoted, Khrushchev identifies democracy with dictatorship; and Castro shows how this works—by selection instead of election, selection by the Communist Party instead of election by the people. Democratic centralism thus practiced is by no means democratic, but it certainly is centralized. It is the Communists' disguise for Communist dictatorship.

In no country of the world have the Communists gained control of the national government through democracy. In no country under their domination have the Communists permitted their power to be challenged by freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the exercise of civil rights against oppression, or the holding of free elections.

(d) *Dictatorship*

Lenin repeatedly endorsed dictatorship. He declared in 1918:

The irrefutable experience of history has shown that in the history of revolutionary movements the dictatorship of the individual persons was very often the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes.

Khrushchev in 1957 criticized some "politicians who call themselves Communists" for being "in favor of socialism but without the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the leadership of public life on the part of the working class and its vanguard—the Communist Party—and without the implementation of the principles of proletariat internationalism." In this sense, in advocating the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Communists advocate a dictatorial regime. The Communists have no quarrel with dictatorship, provided they can control it through the Communist Party.

True to the Communist tactics of deceit, and well aware of the Western Hemisphere's aversion to dictatorship, Castro declared in a speech made on April 22, 1959, in Central Park, New York City, that his revolution practiced the democratic principles of "humanism," which meant "neither dictatorships of men, nor dictatorships of castes, nor oligarchy of classes: government of the people without dictatorships and without oligarchy. * * *" Nevertheless, he has installed in Cuba a dictatorship of the Communist Party supported and directed by the Soviet Union.

Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba (the Communist Party) and now a member of the directorate of the all-powerful Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (Integrated Revolutionary Organizations, ORI) wrote an article in Cuba Socialista in December 1961 in which he makes the following statements about the XXII Congress of the Communist Party, which had just taken place in Moscow:

The program approved by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has great importance for our country, as a country taking the first

steps in the construction of socialism, for the program summarizes and defines the fundamental lessons that are derived from the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union as well as in the countries of Europe and Asia that made their revolution after World War II. Furthermore, it demonstrates to our people, in clarity, where we are going, toward what achievements and conquests we have set our course. * * *

* * * The dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessary, but transitory, condition for constructing socialism and opening thereby the path toward communism. In order to guarantee the fullest liberty to each member of society, it has been necessary to have a period of dictatorship of the proletariat, to restrict certain liberties, to repress the enemies of the revolution, the enemies of socialism, the enemies of the working class and the farm laborers. * * *

In all of the countries dominated by communism, the so-called transitory dictatorship continues.

As can be seen, in order to maintain themselves in power, Communist dictatorships use and refine tyrannical methods. They have used these methods against citizens of all classes, including the proletariat, in whose name the Communist Party attempts to exercise its domination. Thousands of refugees from Communist-dominated Cuba and tens of thousands of refugees from Communist-dominated East Germany are members of the proletariat. An increasing number of refugees from Cuba have been fishermen, laborers, and peasants fleeing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

4. USE OF PEOPLE

(a) *Workers*

The Communists frequently make use of labor organizations and foment strikes, not to improve the workers' welfare but to achieve Communist domination over the workers' organizations. In Uruguay, the meatpacking company Establecimiento Frigorífico del Cerro, S.A. (EFCSA) is owned by its 4,000 workers. EFCSA is still independent of the Communists. In 1961 the Communist-dominated Federación Autónoma de la Carne (Meat Workers' Federation) made a determined and sustained attack on EFCSA, attempting to force EFCSA workers to go on strike and resorting openly to violence in the streets against EFCSA workers as well as against the workers of the other meatpacking plants who defied the strike order. These Communist tactics provoked a strong condemnation by Gremialismo Libre, the official organ of the non-Communist Confederación Sindical del Uruguay (Trade Union Federation of Uruguay), which declared that international communism had confessed by the mouth of a known native Communist, the bringing about of 16 political strikes in Uruguay.

The Communist zeal for using workers for their perverse ends is noticed throughout the hemisphere. Jornada, official organ of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (Workers' Confederation of Venezuela, CTV), made the following statement in its editorial entitled "La Fedepetrol" (Federation of Oil Workers), on April 6, 1962:

But throughout all its struggle, the Fedepetrol has had an important enemy. This is not the logical and natural enemy—the petroleum companies—against whom have been waged battles notable in sacrifice and heroism, to achieve victories and social claims. The irreconcilable enemy of the Fedepetrol, which, constantly, but without success, has tried to destroy it or subvert it from within, is the Communist Party that operates in Venezuela.

Outside of the Fedepetrol, the Communist Party has publicly announced its intent to found a parallel and divisionist organization.

The Fedepetrol will continue in its battle station, with and at the side of the people and its democracy. Meanwhile, the Communist Party, with its divisionist and parallel organization, if it succeeds in founding one, will continue to be, what it always has been, in the country's democratic and labor field: A divisive minority, which, because it has been unable to accept the reality of being a minority, has been led through desperation to falsify historic and socioeconomic realities and in the agony of frustration to make senseless attempts to spark another civil war to see if some stroke of fortune might smile on it in such a dangerous adventure.

(b) *Students*

The Communists make special efforts to use students, cynically trying to exploit their vitality, idealism, and capacity for leadership. In most student organizations the independent students far outnumber the Communists and have succeeded in maintaining control. But in some organizations the Communist minorities have taken advantage of divisions and apathy on the part of the majority to acquire positions from which they can dominate them.

One of the favorite tactics of the Communist Party is to use students to organize demonstrations on behalf of persons or positions that suit Moscow's objectives. The Communists call these demonstrations spontaneous. But everyone sees that they use the same slogans, occur at the same time in different countries, and generally follow shortly after an exhortation in Pravda.

As professional political agents, the Communist organizers tend to become "permanent students." The independent students are becoming increasingly aware of the Communists' deceptions and manipulations. In some countries in Latin America they have successfully fought them and thereby preserved the independence of the student organizations. This type of struggle characterized the Fourth Latin American Congress of Students (LACS) at Natal, Brazil, in October 1961. After blistering arguments, the delegates of some national student federations, abandoned the conference. The representatives of 10 anti-Communist federations issued a press statement that said, in part:

Ever since the world political situation adopted its present shape, that is, the conflict between two intrinsically antagonistic blocs for world domination, the Latin American student body has firmly stated its attitude of open struggle against the imperialist domination exerted by the United States over Latin America. It has also made it clear that it will not permit oppression by one great power to be replaced by the domination of another, the Soviet Union which already turns its ambitious eyes to Latin America with obvious voracity.

It is evident that to those who believe that Latin America should subject itself to the Soviet Union in particular and to the militaristic bloc of the so-called Socialist countries in general, such an independent attitude of the Latin American student body was a great eyesore, and they had to devote all their energies to combat it.

* * * * *

For the Fourth Latin American Congress of Students, the national unions controlled by elements which wanted to doom Latin America to a hateful pro-Soviet servility, were planning, perhaps, to make the sad attitude they support definitely triumphant. But the student mass was not long in taking action to return to its original independent and democratic attitude, and with the Fourth Latin American Congress of Students nearing it was evident that the revolutionary good faith of the majority of the national unions would not allow a continuation of the betrayal of their healthy principles of freedom for our people, the conception of this freedom being independence of all foreign powers.

(c) *The so-called reactionaries*

The Communists not only use leaders of students' and workers' groups but also collaborate with those whom they publicly call reactionaries. In a televised interview on January 8, 1961, shortly after his return from a trip behind the Iron Curtain, Ernesto Guevara interrupted one of his customary diatribes against the oligarchies to make an exception of Generalissimo Trujillo, whom he said "is now our friend."

In June of 1960, while Dominican groups that were later to form part of the government were still suffering under severe dictatorial repression, the movimiento Dominicano popular (Dominican popular movement, MPD), had been permitted to establish an office in Ciudad Trujillo. Even after the Dominican police had ostentatiously shut that office in August 1960, the MPD continued to operate in the country with considerable liberty. The MPD's leader gave an unmistakable indication of his party's basic character on January 22, 1962, when he described the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs at Punta del Este in the following terms:

The Punta del Este Conference, which begins tomorrow, is nothing but a meeting of all the servile governments, all the lackey governments serving U.S. imperialism, for the purpose of imposing sanctions on the only country that has a true democracy, a Socialist democracy (Cuba).

During that meeting, the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic declared:

We regard the Government of Cuba today as a constant threat, and it is absurdly paradoxical that it was not a threat for the Trujillo government.

Let me explain. When the Castro government still enjoyed hemisphere-wide prestige in the early months of his triumph it permitted the embarkation of an expedition against the Trujillo dictatorship, which arrived on Dominican soil on June 14. We thank him for it.

It was a sacrifice of a handful of heroes, as was the Luperón expedition 10 years before, in 1949. When the invading forces were exterminated, Trujillo made his peace with Castro, and months later there was already an understanding between the two governments, which was denounced for the first time in the press of the hemisphere early in January 1961.

Trujillo proclaimed his as the first Socialist government of America and together with Castro launched a violent campaign against Venezuela, the United States, and the Catholic Church, which had just censured him for the tortures and crimes he committed in his infernal dungeons.

Communism, with its campaign of penetration, hate, and subversion, represents a continuing threat to the new republic.

5. COMMUNIST USE OF PROMISES

(a) *Prosperity*

The Communists try to extend their power by making false promises. They tout their economic system as the only truly scientific and efficient system capable of assuring material prosperity, personal security, and social equality to the common man. On October 10, 1960, Khrushchev said:

Communism means quite real and concrete conditions of the people's life. It means a short working day, good housing, the world's lowest rent, good clothes, well-fed and nourished children * * * and the abolition of taxes so that in 5 years we shall have no taxes at all—such are the elements of communism in reality, in practical life.

Fidel Castro, on January 2, 1962, hailed the opening of the "Year of Planification" saying:

The "Year of Planification" * * * will mean that the advance will be more rapid, that it will be more secure * * * it signifies that the revolution has gained extraordinarily, that it is capable of developing its economy on a planned basis. The people know what this means; they know that our economy will develop without problems, that it will develop without crises; that there will be more employment; that there will be more means of production; that we will be able to have greater wealth; that we will achieve greater output; and that with the greater output a higher standard of living. * * *

The Communists promise a better life for the common man but the record shows that they have not been able to produce it. They strip the people of their civil liberties and rights under the pretext that the temporary sacrifice of personal freedom is essential to the achievement of the common welfare. They are unable to establish social equality because their system of totalitarian control makes it imperative that the vast state bureaucracy become a privileged oligarchy. They have failed to achieve material prosperity for the masses of the people because the insatiably power-hungry apparatus of the state places military and industrial requirements ahead of the needs of the individual.

Current Communist crises demonstrate the falsity of Communist promises. The production of food is not keeping pace with the growth of population in the Soviet Union. In Communist China the disastrous consequences that the Communist system has had on agricultural production has caused a drastic retrenchment in the execution of the government's industrial plans and serious widespread scarcities of food and clothing for the Chinese people. This is the significance of the "10 tasks for the readjustment of the national economy in 1962" put forward by Premier Chou En-lai at the recently held National People's Congress.

In Cuba Castro followed his New Year's promise of prosperity by imposing 2 months later a severe rationing of basic foodstuffs, and a few weeks later Ernesto Guevara, the Minister of Industry, dashed false promises of increasing agricultural production when he admitted that the all-important sugar crop had been "bad" and placed responsibility on "bad agricultural work and bad industrial work" which he described as "enormous inefficiency."

(b) *Land*

Perhaps the most tragic deceit practiced by the Communists is the false promise they make in response to man's natural desire to own his own land. The Communists promise that their revolution will make this hope come true. In *La Historia Me Absolverá* (History Will Absolve Me) in 1953, Castro said:

The second revolutionary law granted the unattachable and intransferable ownership of the land to all the tenant farmers, share croppers, and squatters who were occupying parcels of five or less caballerías (approximately 165 acres) of land, the state compensating the former owners on the basis of the income they would obtain on the said parcels in an average of 10 years.

On April 9, 1961, Ernesto Guevara echoed the same theme, in an issue of *Verde Olivo* (organ of the Revolutionary Armed Forces). He said:

Concretely, the soldier who belonged to our first guerrilla army of the farm-worker type comes from the portion of this social class that demonstrates most

aggressively its love for the land and its possession. That is, it demonstrates perfectly what can be classed as a petit bourgeois spirit; the peasant fights because he wants land; for himself, for his children, in order to work it, to sell it, and to enrich himself through his work.

However, on December 20, 1961, Castro did an about-face and denied the idea of private ownership of land. In his speech to the National Congress of the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction, he said:

* * * The idea of socialism is an idea that is the exact antithesis of private ownership.

In another part of the same speech he described another deceit practiced on the farmers, declaring,

* * * The term, for example, "the people's farm" has the advantage that the concept is included within the term itself; that is, an enterprise that belongs to the people. If we called a people's farm a sovjos, it is very probable that many people would be asking without knowing that it is a people's farm.

In the Communist system prevailing in Cuba a "people's farm" means the same thing as what Communists in other countries call a sovjos, that is, that the land does not belong to the man who works it.

However that may be, the important fact is that the Communists seek by every means to turn aside the rural workers from the constructive plans that are being prepared or carried out through democratic channels in the campaign for an equitable agrarian reform, in order to involve them in a hateful class conflict. Thus, they place agrarian reform at the service of international Communist agitation instead of placing at the service of the genuine interests of rural workers, as true democrats do, the sufficient technicians and resources for an effective rational exploitation of the land for the benefit of man.

6. COMMUNIST USE OF VIOLENCE

Obviously, violence plays an important role among Communist tactics and is by no means regarded by the Communists as inconsistent with peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev, in his speech to the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declared:

* * * And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or nonuse of violence in the transition of socialism, depends on the resistance of the exploiters. * * *

Speaking in Moscow, shortly after the December 1960 Congress of 81 Communist and Labor Parties had issued a statement containing a reaffirmation of the Sino-Soviet goal to communize the world, Ernesto Guevara declared: "We wholeheartedly support the declaration adopted by that Congress."

In connection with Communist intervention in Venezuelan affairs, on February 15, 1962, the Minister of the Interior of that country presented to the Committee of the National Congress a report that said, in part:

The National Government has in its power various documents emanating from the leadership of the Communist Party of Venezuela and of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Movement), as well as reports and statements about instructions for the political work, drawn up by their leaders, according to which those parties would assume responsibility for the direction and execution of the events of January and in which they maintain there is a need for a change of government by violent means, through permanent

activities of agitation and public disorders, even going so far as the use of armed violence and insurrectional propaganda within the national armed forces, all for the purpose of achieving, in what they describe as a short period of time, the overthrow of the present constitutional Government.

On February 14, 1962, President Betancourt, in his address on the occasion of the third anniversary of his administration, declared that his government "born of the direct popular will, has been attacked by two serious conspiracies—one of them, the one that attempted to put into the Government the one that was swept out on January 23, and the other, the one that endeavors to establish in Venezuela a branch of Cuba, which is in turn a branch of those who exercise the governmental power in Russia and in Communist China."

He added:

The Government is applying the same force it has used against the conspirators of those rash attempts who acted with the aim of establishing a dictatorship just like that overthrown on January 23, against the conspirators who receive arms and money from Communist Russia, through the branch office they have set up in Havana.

The Venezuelan Communists have requested aid from abroad against the Government of Venezuela. On April 10, 1962, the official organ of the Communist Party of the United States, the *Daily Worker*, published a letter from the Secretary for International Relations of the Communist Party of Venezuela, requesting the fraternal support of the Communist and Workers' Parties against "the policy of the Betancourt-Copei government of servile betrayal in favor of imperialism. * * *" There is no reason why the Venezuelan Communists should have any scruples about asking the U.S. Communists for help, since both are foreign agents of the same boss.

For reasons of space, the committee omits mention of other sources that, just as the foregoing do, clearly reveal the role violence plays in Communist tactics, as well as the degree to which it is used in the continuous intervention of international communism and its agents in the internal affairs of the American countries.

7. COMMUNIST OPPOSITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE REFORMS

Jealously attempting to monopolize for themselves all credit for any socially constructive measures, the Communists aggressively practice a "dog-in-the-manger" policy regarding any constructive measures proposed by others. In Bolivia the revolutionary MNR Government is attempting to revitalize the mining industry, including both private and nationalized mines, with the help of financing and technical assistance from West Germany and from the Inter-American Development Bank. The name of this mutual effort is "Operación Triangular" (triangular plan). Tin is by far Bolivia's more important export and the mines have vital importance directly to thousands of miners and indirectly to hundreds of thousands of Bolivian citizens. If the triangular plan fails all these people will suffer. If it succeeds, they will all benefit.

But the Communists are attempting, with notable use of the customarily rich language of Communist invective, to discredit the plan. They have called its technicians and consultants "agents of imperialism" and denounced the plan as evidence of the Government's intention "to deliver up the national wealth and the lungs of the working class to the voracity of the imperialists." On August 19,

1961, *La Nación*, official organ of the MNR, published a resolution of the MNR cell of the Chauffeurs Union of La Paz that stated:

The triangular plan is not only of interest to a certain group or sector of labor, but is of vital importance to the whole country.* * *

* * * In the face of the infiltration of Communist larvae in Bolivia, it is the duty of every citizen to speak out and fight openly against the Red tyrants of subversion.

On August 21, the same publication deplored the fact that:

The arguments that have been wielded to attack the triangular plan are based principally on political falsehoods that describe this operation as "proimperialist" and the revolutionary government as "antilabor" and "reactionary."

On August 28, 1961, President Paz Estenssoro declared:

The triangular plan is of national interest primarily because its results will be of benefit not only to the mine workers but to the working class of the country in general.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The Communist technique of deceit uses and abuses words and robs them of their legitimate meaning, replacing it with a Marxist-Leninist interpretation. The seduction which such words exercise over the popular mind furthers the purposes of Communist aggression against the Western World.

Democracy must itself not play the Communist game of misuse of words. In this respect, it should avoid applying the epithet "Communist" to persons who, with good intentions and not influenced by disruptive ideas, ask for reforms that are necessary or oppose procedures that, to serve personal interests, run counter to the interests of the community. To do so is to damage sound people who are motivated purely by patriotic ideals, giving the Communists free advertising and creating confusion from which only they benefit. This Committee uses the word "Communist" only to refer to the Marxist-Leninists, so as to request that anti-Communist measures be applied against them.

Bearing in mind that this report is general and initial, and prepared in a very short period of time, we have in this chapter tried to give primary emphasis to the basic characteristic of Communist subversion—deceit—without which it would fail in free countries. The Committee has illustrated this deceit with only a few examples, which are or have been in the public domain, although in some cases in a form distorted by the Communists. Communist subversion, of course, uses other methods and tactics that have been shown in concrete acts, and that have not been considered in this report because of its preliminary nature. Consequently, this study is considered initial and should be continued, amplified, and improved.

The Committee is convinced that the peoples of America, when they know the objectives, methods, and procedures of communism as these are exposed to the light of the truth, cannot tolerate known Communists, accept the existence of a national Communist Party, or much less allow communism to achieve its goal of world domination.

IV. REPLY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Throughout the course of this work various aspects of the international Communist movement were exposed and analyzed, including its development and the deceitfulness of its purposes and methods. Men in general, and particularly those who endure its tensions, will have asked themselves to what its development is due, in view of its destructive purpose and the falsity of its acts.

The Committee is firmly convinced that the Communist advance is due mainly to the lack of information regarding its true aims; to the fact that it takes possession of legitimate aspirations of the people, distorting these to its benefit, as has been said; and to the lack of faith in the institutions and leaders of democracy on the part of certain discouraged sectors.

Since everything referring to the aims and methods of communism has now been covered thoroughly, the Committee desires to contribute to a clarification of the truth by developing a few ideas in this chapter that would permit a consideration of the problem from a more appropriate point of view.

It is well to remember that close to a century before the Marxist philosophy made its appearance, respectable and important nations of the world were forging pages filled with heroism and glory in the struggle of peoples against oppression, inequality, and selfishness, which have served as a pattern and an example to other peoples. The French Revolution and the advent of the United States as an independent nation are outstanding examples of this, and they served as a source of inspiration for the movements of liberation of the Western Hemisphere. The respect for human rights that gave them impulse and characterized them is reflected in the political constitutions of the Latin American countries.

England, the United States, and France constitute three great examples of sacrifice; of political and social revolutions; of victory over the selfish tendency of human nature; of respect for freedom, equality, and fraternity, not just as hollow words but as true and objective moral values. They are three examples of democratic nations, which in ceaseless struggle for the rights of man, have defended the inalienable prerogatives of the individual against humiliation and slavery.

As may be seen, communism has no right to proclaim itself as defender of human rights. Modern democratic society, based upon rational philosophic doctrines of human and spiritual content, offers more guarantees than a society based upon a materialistic, atheistic philosophy that looks upon man as a means and not as an end in himself. But the sphere of action of modern democratic society is even more vast, because it contemplates and seeks a solution to the problems affecting peoples, principally those countries or population sectors of slower material and technical development.

Basing itself on its determinist philosophy, which teaches that man is at the service of the economy, the Communist movement deceitfully proclaims itself as the system that will solve the economic problems of the world, and attacks the most outstanding countries of modern democratic society, branding them as "capitalist." It is clear that when capitalism acts selfishly with no sense of social responsibility, it is fatal to the progress of peoples, and it is for this reason that the free countries fight against this type of capitalism in

order to prevent the deterioration of their own economies. But it must be pointed out that by referring to the most important nations of modern democratic society as "capitalistic," communism seeks only to discredit them, as an indispensable step toward destroying them.

It is also appropriate to consider the economic aspect, with regard to the actual achievements of both systems, always with the desire of demonstrating the truth.

Communism pretends to be a movement that will solve the economic problems of the world. Without undertaking a major analysis of their causes, it is enough to point to the acute food shortages suffered by the Cuban, Russian, and Chinese people. These are samples of the economic "well-being" promised by communism.

In contrast, it is well to recall the efforts exerted by modern democratic society to raise the standard of living of the people through economic aid administered through such far-reaching plans as the Marshall plan, the bilateral or multilateral economic agreements, encouragement of the formation of regional common markets (European Common Market and Latin American common markets), and the Alliance for Progress.

Relative to the success of regional markets, it is sufficient to point out that communism has tried to imitate the European Common Market by installing the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). However, it would be interesting to inquire of the impoverished peoples of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or the Baltic countries, regarding its results. Unfortunately, the only reply to such an inquiry would be one dictated by the Communist bosses, praising the "successes" of the "Red paradise."

In another line of thought, communism deceitfully gives assurance that its system will permit the social improvement of humanity. Clearly this will not be possible, since the materialistic philosophy in practice places man at the unconditional service of the state. It is certainly inadmissible that the enslavement of peoples means social betterment of the kind the world needs, save as justification for maintaining a "new class" in power.

In fact, the concept of caste prevailing in the selection of leaders of the Communist movement, which thus becomes autocratic and oligarchic, is quite well known. This excludes every possibility that it would give acceptance to the free play of democratic institutions that characterizes our society, in which every man may succeed in acquiring significance and representation in line with his aptitudes and qualifications. It is for this reason that communism considers our democratic electoral systems decadent and replaces them with the preeminence of a single despotic and cruel party.

Does communism consider that the human rights enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States lack validity because the "human rights" recognized in the Communist world are better? Does communism believe that the social and labor laws that are in effect in the countries of modern democratic society are so unsuited for social betterment that they must be replaced by Communist slavery?

Communism considers that the family and a society based thereon, essential elements in the structure of the democratic world, are antiquated and harmful. Should they be liquidated, as in Red China, by destroying the family tie and preventing the formation of contig-

uous social groups through the permanent displacement of the population throughout the country?

The deeply human basis on which the development of culture and science in the democratic countries rests permits the purest and freest creations of the mind and spirit. Must this be changed because subjugation to the state and to the party, the sole sources capable of creations such as those advocated by communism, is better?

Finally, does communism believe that the idea of God and the subjection of free man to his religion must disappear because religion "is the opiate of the people" and because man is only matter? *

The answer to the questions raised is clear and constitutes the reply of modern democratic society to the Communist world. It may be summarized by saying that communism's pretensions are false. But even if a certain amount of good faith were ascribed to its intentions, the solutions that modern democratic society has been seeking since before the appearance of communism are better in every field, basically because of their moral and human content. In contrast with communism, our society believes in man, in his capacity for creation and in his spiritual values, which enable him to improve his position.

It is clear that the world is undergoing an overall revolutionary process. Modern democratic society has, without ceasing, adopted systems of life in order that its peoples might enjoy greater well-being, receiving the benefits of technology while developing greater and greater respect for human rights and fundamental liberties. In this democratic revolution all sectors are actively participating (governments, intellectuals, students, workers, the rural population, businessmen, the armed forces, and churches), and this revolution reaches into every field of complex modern society as a consequence of the multifaceted activities of man.

International communism therefore has no right to arrogate to itself any claim to having initiated this social revolution, belonging as it does to the people, who with great effort and sacrifice are forging a better world. For example, the standards set by the Catholic Church for reforming the social order and the condition of workers are clearly revolutionary.⁸ In particular, the programs of the Alliance for Progress, both in concept and scope, embody a profound economic and social revolution.

This is the background of the revolutionary change that the Communists are exploiting. They are the vultures of this process of modernization. They believe that the unstable conditions that emerge during the course of this process of modernization are vulnerable to subversion, sabotage, and even guerrilla warfare. Despite their doctrine of "historic inevitability" they know that they have only a limited time in which to gain power in the underdeveloped areas. They recognize that their opportunities to gain power diminish in proportion to the speed with which progress becomes evident and

* On this point it is worthwhile copying the following paragraph from ch. V of "The Program of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.," approved at its XXII Congress:

"The party uses the method of educational influence to educate the people in the spirit of the scientific-materialist outlook and to overcome religious prejudice without insulting the feelings of the believers. It is necessary to explain patiently the inconsistency in religious beliefs which arose in the past from the subjection of people by the elemental forces of nature and social oppression, and from lack of knowledge of the true causes of natural and social phenomena. In this it is necessary to seek the support of the achievement of modern science, which gives a fuller picture of the world, increases man's power over nature, and leaves no place for the fantastic inventions of religion about supernatural forces."

⁸ See paper encyclicals "Quanta Cura," "Rerum Novarum," "Quadragesimo Anno," and "Mater et Magistra."

social problems find proper solution. Hence, their great emphasis on subverting existing institutions, and exploiting, the tensions, strains, and conflicts of interest that necessarily accompany so radical a change in the social system.

It should be asked, then, whether international communism, which pretends to be the chosen agency for achieving social progress in the world, is not actually the element that has been disturbing and retarding the revolution that modern democratic society has been carrying out.

It is necessary here to alert the people to the prejudicial action of certain elements in making the development of this revolutionary process more difficult, through indifference, selfishness, unbridled ambition for power, or systematic opposition to every measure they did not originate.

It is amazing, therefore, to see how persons who are responsible for the fate of political parties, unions, professional associations, organizations of students, intellectuals or artists, of manifest non-Communist orientation, tolerate the infiltration of known and even confessed Communists into the governing bodies of these organizations, thereby permitting the direction of their organizations to be wrested from their hands.

In the same way dictatorships and their adherents, whatever their orientations, by their acts reject democracy, which they oppress and quell in order that they will have no opposition to their ambition for power. They cause a weakening of democratic institutions and a loss of faith in the national destiny, thereby creating a favorable atmosphere in which Communism, with international support, can emerge as the spokesman for a return to constitutional government, with a view eventually to installing its own dictatorship.

At the same time those who systematically oppose reform, by their selfishness and deliberate disregard for reality, obstruct and weaken all measures for improvement, making it possible for international communism to strengthen its position by championing reform and using the attitude of those who oppose change as an example of the inadequacy of the democratic system.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the committee is fully aware of the negative effect which two well-known factors have, or can have, on efforts to form a united front against communism in various countries. These factors are: what has become known as "McCarthyism," that is, a deformation of the action that was advocated by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy of the United States; and the existence of persons and organizations who make a "business" of anti-Communist sentiment and action. Both elements, working at the official and the private level, and conscious or not of the damage they are doing, follow a hard line of action against persons, organizations, or governments, accusing them indiscriminately of being Communist. Besides frequently causing unjust injury to the persons, organizations, and governments accused, this line of action provides free propaganda for communism and, what is still more serious, detracts from the solution of the real problems facing the people.

It is essential that any split appearing in the ranks of democratic men and nations should disappear. It is necessary to close ranks against the common enemy. The moment for decision has arrived. All men of good will who recognize and accept the need for a demo-

cratic social revolution must put aside inertia, selfishness, and indifference, in order to win a better world, which they and future generations may enjoy in freedom.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security is in agreement with the foregoing and, in its initial effort, has wished to direct the revealing light of truth against the basic tactic of Communist subversion, deceit, demonstrating it by means of verifiable facts. It is convinced that Communist subversion is carried out by national Communists, within their national frontiers. Therefore the right to combat this subversion lies in the hands of governments and patriotic citizens. Joining forces with all of those who are dedicated to the struggle against Communist subversion, the Committee presents this initial general report as a contribution to that noble cause.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations set forth below are the recommendations that the Committee, in this first stage of its work, has considered pertinent with respect to Resolution II, 2(c) of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The first recommendations are restricted to the measures that the American States should take to counteract the subversive action of international communism; the second, to other aspects of the problem contemplated in Resolution II of Punta del Este.

A. MEASURES TO COUNTERACT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. According to Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation, the Committee is to submit to the Council of the Organization in this report any general recommendations it considers pertinent in this initial stage of its work regarding measures that should be taken with respect to the subversive action of international communism. To that end, the Committee carefully examined the efforts that have been made in the past to combat and to eradicate from this hemisphere subversive activities directed, assisted, or instigated by extracontinental powers, designed to replace our democratic institutions with totalitarian ideologies and forms of government.

2. This almost uninterrupted struggle against subversive action has now entered its third decade. When the activities of the Axis agents were involved, the system of security against subversion functioned satisfactorily and gave satisfactory results. The first three meetings of consultation recommended the various kinds of internal measures that each state should take to prevent and punish espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and the other subversive activities, and those that should be taken to ensure the degree of international cooperation required for the effective operation of the system. The earnestness with which the governments adopted measures and cooperated with each other made it possible to check Nazi-Fascist subversive action in the Western Hemisphere effectively.

3. Unfortunately, the situation has been, and continues to be, entirely different in the matter of the fight against the subversive action of the international Communist movement. It cannot be denied that not only have the results obtained in World War II not been obtained in this matter, but the Sino-Soviet powers have been

able to carry on their offensive largely unimpeded in several countries, and a beachhead has been established in American territory, which constitutes a very grave threat to the security of the hemisphere. This development of the Communist offensive is contrary to the objectives and decisions that have appeared in resolutions adopted by the inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation since 1948. For purposes of the recommendations stated below, the Committee deems it advisable to pause here in order to quote the pertinent sections of the above-mentioned resolutions.

4. When the problem of the preservation and defense of democracy against the threat of subversive action by international communism was presented for the first time at the Conference of Bogotá (1948), the American Republics resolved—

1. To reaffirm their decision to maintain and further an effective social and economic policy for the purpose of raising the standard of living of their peoples; and their conviction that only under a system founded upon a guarantee of the essential freedoms and rights of the individual is it possible to attain this goal.

2. To condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine.

3. To adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities, directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations.

4. To proceed with a full exchange of information concerning any of the aforementioned activities that are carried on within their respective jurisdictions.

5. The fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1951), convoked specifically because "the growing threat of international Communist aggression has demonstrated the urgent necessity that the free nations of the world determine the most effective methods for preserving their freedom and independence," and "the need for adopting measures to insure the economic, political, and military defense of this hemisphere is urgent and of common interest to the American Republics," resolved:

(1) To recommend to the governments of the American States—

(a) That, mindful of their unity of purpose and taking account of the contents of Resolution VI of the second meeting of consultation in Havana and Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, each American republic examine its respective laws and regulations and adopt such changes as it may consider necessary to assure that the subversive activities of the agents of international communism directed against any of them, may be adequately prevented and punished;

(b) That, in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, they enact measures necessary to regulate in the countries of America transit across international boundaries of those foreigners who there is reason to expect will attempt to carry out subversive acts against the defense of the American Continent; and

(c) That, in the application of this resolution, they bear in mind the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the

rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American republics.

For the purpose of facilitating the fulfillment of the objectives of this resolution, it was recommended that the Pan American Union prepare technical studies on certain aspects of subversive action. In accordance with the recommendation, the Department of Legal Affairs prepared a report on "Strengthening of Internal Security," which was submitted to the governments and published in 1953.

6. In the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism," the 10th Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954), again insisted on the need to adopt and carry out measures to counteract the subversive activities of the international Communist movement, recommending that the American governments, without prejudice to such other measures as they might consider desirable, should give special attention to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting such activities within their respective jurisdictions:

(a) Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international Communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf; and

(b) The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the inter-American conferences and meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding international communism.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Committee has not considered it necessary, in this initial stage of its work, to examine the measures intended to counteract subversive activities. It considers that, at least for the moment, it has the vast experience acquired through the measures adopted during World War II. However, the Committee does consider it desirable—and an unavoidable duty—owing to the nature and scope of its terms of reference, to point out to the Council of the Organization the urgent need for each and every one of the American governments to give the greatest possible application to the measures that have been adopted since 1948 by the inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation. As stated above, in the fight against the subversive action of international communism, the American governments in general have not, unfortunately, demonstrated the same zeal and earnestness that they manifested during World War II in fighting Nazi-Fascist subversive action, and perhaps this is one of the reasons for the degree of development of Sino-Soviet and Castro activities in these past few years.

8. In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that in Resolution VIII, the Fourth Meeting of Consultation (1951) explicitly stated:

Since the said subversive action recognizes no boundaries, the present situation requires, in addition to adequate internal measures, a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics, looking to the eradication of any threat of subversive activity which may endanger democracy and the free way of life in the American Republics.

It is obvious, therefore, that owing to the methods employed by international communism, the lack of cooperation of one state can render inoperative the measures adopted by a contiguous state; and when several states fail to cooperate, the system for defense against subversion as a whole becomes ineffective. The interdependence of the measures to counteract subversive action is such that if any government fails to apply them, the system is weakened and its entire effectiveness is undermined. This is the impression one receives from surveying the American scene over the past few years.

9. Along the same line of thought, the Committee would also like to recommend that, in adopting and applying internal measures, the governments act with the necessary vigor which is required to combat subversive action. In making this recommendation, the Committee has kept in mind especially two fundamental considerations: The first is that the agents of international communism, as the Fourth Meeting of Consultation stated, are attempting to destroy the democratic institutions, "utilizing for this purpose the exploitation and the abuse of these selfsame democratic liberties"; and secondly, that the measures adopted by the competent authorities to counteract the subversive action, whatever its nature and scope, are not, by any means, inconsistent with the internal and international obligation of the state to respect human rights and fundamental liberties.

10. In connection with this second consideration, the Committee wishes to add that the subversive action of international communism presupposes the performance of acts directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign powers or governments, and that therefore, they constitute grave acts against the public order and the security of the state, especially when the agent carrying out the subversive action is a national or citizen of that state. Under the laws of all the countries of the world, and the international instruments governing the matter, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties is subject to the limitations and restrictions that the state is expressly authorized to impose for reasons of internal security or other reasons that are considered vital to the welfare of the nation. It can be easily understood, therefore, what a legal and political mistake it would be to tolerate subversive activity or fail to combat it adequately, out of fear that human rights and fundamental liberties would not be respected.

11. The above recommendations and considerations, therefore, are completely consistent with the aim, already expressed in Resolution VIII repeatedly quoted, that in applying the measures referred to, the states should bear in mind "the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics." On this point, the above-mentioned Pan American Union report states that in its conclusions care was taken to guard "against the possibility that such ways and means be used to obstruct or suppress genuinely democratic expressions of opinion, activities, or political aspirations, completely foreign to international communism." The same legitimate concern appears again in Resolution I, 4(c) of

the Eighth Meeting of Consultation as one of the basic political principles set forth in that resolution:

The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of isolating or combating communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and cultural and political movements with Communist subversion.

B. VIGILANCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF WARNING AGAINST ACTS OF AGGRESSION, SUBVERSION, OR OTHER DANGERS TO PEACE AND SECURITY, AND SELF-DEFENSE

In establishing this Committee, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation resolved:

"1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto."

In the preamble to Resolution II, it is stated "it is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the Organization of American States a body of an advisory nature * * *." In this connection, the Committee takes the liberty of offering its technical services to the Council for the purposes outlined in the paragraph cited above. To this effect, the Committee also takes the liberty of submitting to the Council for consideration its recommendation that the member states be invited to furnish the Council with any information that they may exchange between themselves, pursuant to the resolutions mentioned above, as well as any evidence they obtain regarding Communist deception that can be added to the evidence contained in this report. This information would be examined by the Committee from the purely technical standpoint, in accordance with whatever directives the Council might issue to it, in order that general studies and pertinent recommendations might be submitted to the Council for consideration.

The Committee makes this recommendation having in mind the fact that Communist deception and techniques vary constantly, and that only by studying them in a determined, continuous and comparative manner, can conclusions be reached and suggestions made that would be of great utility in more effectively combating communism. In all this, the Committee is fully aware that it is the governments and peoples of America who have the right, capacity, and interest to counteract the subversive action of the international Communist movement.

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation also resolved:

3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

In view of the nature and scope of this paragraph of Resolution II the Committee considers that it would be highly desirable for the General Secretariat to prepare a study of the background of the exercise of individual and collective self-defense, especially with reference to the threats and acts referred to in the said paragraph.

The Committee also deems that it would be very useful to the general objectives of Resolution II if the General Secretariat would issue a new, up-to-date edition of the report on "Strengthening of Internal Security," published in 1953.

APRIL 30, 1962.

MANUEL CAMPOS JIMÉNEZ,
Chairman of the Committee.

JULIO CÉSAR DOIG SÁNCHEZ,
Vice Chairman of the Committee.

FRANCISCO MARCELO RAMÍREZ.

THOMAS D. WHITE.

JOAQUIM CANUTO MENDES DE ALMEIDA

JULIO CÉSAR VADORA ROZIER.

JOAQUÍN ZALDÍVAR.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

RESOLUTION II OF THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Whereas international communism makes use of highly complex techniques of subversion in opposing, and in the task of counteracting such techniques which certain states may benefit from mutual advice and support;

The American states are firmly united for the common goal of fighting the subversive action of international communism and for the preservation of democracy in the Americas, as expressed in Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States, held in Bogotá, in 1948, and that for such purpose they can and should assist each other, mainly through the use of the institutional resources of the Organization of American States; and

It is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the Organization of American States a body of an advisory nature, made up of experts, the main purpose of which would be to advise the member governments which, as the case may be, require and request such assistance,

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as organ of consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Resolves:

1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto.

2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish a Special Consultative Committee on Security, composed of experts on security matters, for the purpose of advising the member states that may desire and request such assistance, the following procedures being observed:

(a) The Council of the Organization shall select the membership of the Special Consultative Committee on Security from a list of candidates presented by the governments, and shall define immediately terms of reference for the Committee with a view to achieving the full purposes of this resolution.

(b) The Committee shall submit reports to such member states as may request its assistance; however, it shall not publish

these reports without obtaining express authorization from the state dealt with in the report.

(c) The Special Consultative Committee on Security shall submit to the Council of the Organization, no later than May 1, 1962, an initial general report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures which should be taken.

(d) The Committee shall function at the Pan American Union, which shall extend to it the technical, administrative, and financial facilities required for the work of the Committee.

(e) The Committee shall function for the period deemed advisable by the Council of the Organization.

3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

APPENDIX 2

RESOLUTION I OF THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN AMERICA

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consultation, declare that the continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.

The Ministers have been able to verify that the subversive offensive of Communist governments, their agents and the organizations which they control, has increased in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international Communist movement, that one of its principal objectives is the establishment of Communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the Communist powers.

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions, the Communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population and the just national aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party. Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they try to establish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism which

subordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and aggressive interests of extracontinental powers. By maliciously utilizing the very principles of the inter-American system, they attempt to undermine democratic institutions and to strengthen and protect political penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of Communist governments and their agents constitute one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive offensive of Communist governments, their agents, and the organizations that they control and to the tactics and methods that they employ and also warn them of the dangers this situation represents to representative democracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determination of peoples.

The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system.

4. Convinced that the integrity of the democratic revolution of the American states can and must be preserved in the face of the subversive offensive of communism, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs proclaim the following basic political principles:

(a) The faith of the American peoples in human rights, liberty, and national independence as a fundamental reason for their existence, as conceived by the Founding Fathers who destroyed colonialism and brought the American Republics into being;

(b) The principle of nonintervention and the right of peoples to organize their way of life freely in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, expressing their will through free elections, without foreign interference. The fallacies of Communist propaganda cannot and should not obscure or hide the difference in philosophy which these principles represent when they are expressed by a democratic American country, and when Communist governments and their agents attempt to utilize them for their own benefit;

(c) The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of isolating or combating communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and cultural and political movements with Communist subversion;

(d) The affirmation that communism is not the way to achieve economic development and the elimination of social injustice in America. On the contrary, a democratic regime can encompass all the efforts for economic advancement and all of the measures for improvement and social progress without sacrificing the fundamental values of the human being. The mission of the peoples and governments of the hemisphere during the present generation is to achieve an accelerated development of their economies and to put an end to poverty, injustice, illness, and ignorance as was agreed in the Charter of Punta del Este; and

(e) The most essential contribution of each American state in the collective effort to protect the inter-American system against communism is a steadily greater respect for human rights, improvement in democratic institutions and practices, and the

adoption of measures that truly express the impulse for a revolutionary change in the economic and social structures of the American Republics.

APPENDIX 3

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO THE III COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

(Approved by the Second Congress of the III International,
Moscow, 1920)

The Second Congress of the Communist International rules that the conditions for joining the Communist International shall be as follows:

1. The general propaganda and agitation should bear a really Communist character, and should correspond to the program and decisions of the Third International. The entire party press should be edited by reliable Communists who have proved their loyalty to the cause of the proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat should not be spoken of simply as a current hackneyed formula, it should be advocated in such a way that its necessity should be apparent to every rank-and-file workingman and workingwoman, to each soldier and peasant, and should emanate from everyday facts, systematically recorded by our press day by day.

All periodical and other publications, as well as all party publications and editions, are subject to the control of the presidium of the party, independently of whether the party is legal or illegal. It should in no way be permitted that the publishers abuse their autonomy and carry on a policy not fully corresponding to the policy of the party.

Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labor unions, or cooperatives, it is indispensable for them not only to denounce the bourgeoisie, but also its assistants and agents, reformists of every color and shade.

2. Every organization desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labor movement (party organization, editorship, labor unions, parliamentary factions, cooperatives, municipalities, etc., all reformists and followers of the "centre," and to have them replaced by Communists, even at the cost of replacing at the beginning "experienced" opportunists by rank-and-file workingmen.

3. The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war. Under such conditions the Communists can have no confidence in bourgeois laws. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the decisive moment should be of assistance to the party to do its duty toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence of martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable to carry on their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work is absolutely necessary.

4. Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in

every military organization. Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause, and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.

5. A systematic and regular propaganda is necessary in the rural districts. The working class can gain no victory unless it possesses the sympathy and support of at least part of the rural workers and of the poor peasants, and unless other sections of the population are equally utilized. Communist work in the rural districts is acquiring a predominant importance during the present period. It should be carried on through Communist workmen of both city and country who have connections with the rural districts. To refuse to do this work, or to transfer such work to untrustworthy half reformists, is equal to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

6. Every party desirous of affiliating to the Third International should renounce not only avowed social patriotism, but also the falsehood and the hypocrisy of social pacifism: It should systematically demonstrate to the workers that without a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international arbitration, no talk of disarmament, no democratic reorganization of the League of Nations will be capable of saving mankind from new imperialist wars.

7. Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the "centrists," and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party membership, without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The Communist International demands unconditionally and peremptorily that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. The Communist International cannot reconcile itself to the fact that such avowed reformists as for instance Turatti, Modigliani, Kautsky, Hilferding, Hillquit, Longuet, Macdonald, and others should be entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. This would make the Third International resemble the Second International.

8. In the colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities, there is necessary an especially distinct and clear line of conduct of the parties of countries where the bourgeoisie possesses such colonies or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of its own imperialists in the colonies, supporting not in words only but practically a movement of liberation in the colonies. It should demand the expulsion of its own imperialists from such colonies, and cultivate among the workmen of its own country a truly fraternal attitude toward the working population of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, and carry on a systematic agitation in its own army against every kind of oppression of the colonial population.

9. Every party desirous of belonging to the Communist International should be bound to carry on systematic and persistent Communist work in the labor unions, cooperatives, and other organizations of working masses. It is necessary to form Communist nuclei within these organizations, which by persistent and lasting work should win over labor unions to communism. These nuclei should constantly

denounce the treachery of the social patriots and of the fluctuations of the center. These Communist nuclei should be completely subordinated to the party in general.

10. Any party belonging to the Communist International is bound to carry on a stubborn struggle against the Amsterdam "International" of the yellow labor unions. It should propagate insistently amongst the organized workers the necessity of a rupture with the yellow Amsterdam International. It should support by all means in its power the International Unification of Red Labor Unions joining to the Communist International.

11. Parties desirous of joining the Third International shall be bound to inspect the personnel of their parliamentary factions, to remove all unreliable elements therefrom, to control such factions, not only verbally but in reality, to subordinate them to the Central Committee of the party, and to demand from each Communist representative in parliament to subject his entire activity to the interests of real revolutionary propaganda, and agitation.

12. All the parties belonging to the Communist International should be formed on the basis of the principle of democratic centralization. At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to do its duty when it is organized in a sufficiently centralized manner; when it possesses an iron discipline and when its party center enjoys the confidence of the party membership and is endowed with complete power, authority, and ample rights.

13. The Communist parties of those countries where the Communist activity is legal should clean out their members from time to time, as well as those of the party organizations, in order to systematically free the party from the petty bourgeois elements which penetrate into it.

14. Each party desirous of affiliating to the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counterrevolutionary forces. The Communist Parties should carry on a precise and definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any kind of military equipment intended for fighting against the Soviet Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on a propaganda amongst the troops sent against the workers' republics, etc.

15. All those parties which up to the present moment have stood upon the old social democratic programs should within the shortest time possible draw up a new Communist program in conformity with the special conditions of their country, and in accordance with the resolutions of the Communist International. As a rule the program of each party belonging to the Communist International should be confirmed by the next congress of the Communist International or its Executive Committee. In the event of the failure of the program of any party being confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the said party shall be entitled to appeal to the congress of the Communist International.

16. All the resolutions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the resolutions of the Executive Committee are binding for all parties joining the Communist International. The Communist International, operating under the conditions of most acute civil warfare, should be centralized in a better manner than the Second International. At the same time, the Communist Inter-

national and the Executive Committee are naturally bound in every form of their activity to consider the variety of conditions under which the different parties have to work and struggle, and generally binding resolutions should be passed only on such questions upon which such resolutions are possible.

17. In connection with the above, all parties desiring to join the Communist International should alter their names. Each party desirous of joining the Communist International should bear the following name: Communist Party of such and such a country, section of the Third Communist International. The question of the party name is not only a formal one, but is a political question of great importance. The Communist International has declared a decisive war against the entire bourgeois world, and all the yellow Social Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every rank-and-file worker should be able clearly to distinguish between the Communist Parties and the old official Social-Democratic or Socialist Parties, which have betrayed the cause of the working class.

18. All the leading organs of the press of every party are bound to publish all the most important documents of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

19. All parties which have joined the Communist International as well as those which have expressed a desire to do so are obliged in as short a space of time as possible, and in no case later than 4 months after the Second Congress of the Communist International, to convene an extraordinary congress in order to discuss these conditions. In addition to this, the central committees of these parties should take care to acquaint all its local organizations with the regulations of the second congress.

20. All those parties which at the present time are willing to join the Third International, but have so far not changed their tactics in any radical manner, should, prior to their joining the Third International, take care that not less than two-thirds of their committee members and of all their central institutions should be composed of comrades who have made an open and definite declaration prior to the convening of the second congress, as to their desire that the party should affiliate to the Third International. Exceptions are permitted only with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International has the right to make an exception also for the representatives of the center as mentioned in paragraph 7.

21. Those members of the party who reject in principle the conditions and the theses of the Third International are liable to be excluded from the party.

This applies also to the delegates at the special congresses of the party.

**PAPER PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ENTRUSTED WITH THE STUDY OF THE
TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES, THE FLOW OF SUBVERSIVE
PROPAGANDA AND THE UTILIZATION OF CUBA AS A BASE
FOR TRAINING IN SUBVERSIVE TECHNIQUES**

The Secretary of the Council of the Organization of American States, in accordance with the decision reached at the last meeting of the Special Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and in compliance with its instructions, reports that in making this study public it should be clearly understood that it is a technical advisory document prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security, whose members act in an individual capacity. This document will be at the service of the Special Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as an element of judgment in preparing the report and recommendations it will submit to the Council of the Organization in compliance with the mandate entrusted to it at the meeting held by the Council on October 24, 1962.

FEBRUARY 20, 1963.

INTRODUCTION

The Council of the Organization of American States, at the meeting held on October 24, 1962, agreed "to entrust to the Committee to study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs an urgent study of the transfer of funds to the American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques, presenting to the Council the pertinent reports and recommendations. In carrying out this task, the Committee could make use of the advice of the Special Consultative Committee on Security * * *."

Availing itself of this permission, the first-mentioned Committee, in a note from its Chairman dated November 1, 1962, requested from the Special Consultative Committee on Security "technical advice in carrying out its study of the three aspects set forth above."

With a view to providing this advice, the Committee has been meeting at the Pan American Union since January 7 of this year. Initially only the following members attended: Mr. Manuel Campos Jiménez, chairman of the committee; Gen. Julio César Doig Sánchez, vice chairman; Prof. Joaquim Canuto Mendes de Almeida; Lt. Col. Julio César Vadora Rozier; and Lt. Col. Joaquín Zaldívar.

Owing to the resignations presented by Gen. Thomas D. White and Lt. Col. Francisco Marcelo Ramírez, the Council of the Organization, at the meeting held on January 16, 1963, elected Mr. Paul C. Daniels and Col. Carlos María Luna as new members, and they joined the Committee on January 21 and 26, respectively.

At the first sessions, the Committee considered its plan of work, which was presented to the Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation at the joint session held on January 15, 1963.

In accordance with that plan of work, the Committee has prepared the study requested of it and wishes to make the following explanation with regard thereto:

(a) Owing to the short time the Committee has had to complete its work, it has not been possible to study all the problems included in the three general aspects that the Council's Committee is to examine. Consequently, this Committee has limited itself to presenting ideas and suggesting recommendations on those problems it considers of greatest urgency.

(b) The information from official sources that has been made available to this Committee by the Council's Committee has been most valuable in carrying out the study. However, this information was for the most part not only of a very general nature, but only that provided by five countries reached the Committee, and it has therefore been obliged to use information from other sources.

(c) The initial general report, prepared by the Committee in April 1962, already presents several aspects of Communist subversive activity and may be used by the Council's Committee in the study it is to make and in preparing the reports and recommendations that are to be presented to the Council of the Organization. This should also be pointed out with respect to the studies and resolutions of the Emergency Advisory Committee for the Political Defense of the Continent (Montevideo, 1942-48) and the document, "Strengthening of Internal Security," published by the Pan American Union in 1953.

(d) The specific recommendations the Committee suggests in this study do not refer to any particular country. They include the adoption of certain measures that, in the abstract and without prejudice to other measures that may be better adapted to circumstances within each country, are considered technically necessary to counteract, at least in part, the subversive activity that international communism is carrying out in the Western Hemisphere, especially through Cuba.

It also presents them with complete awareness that the Governments and peoples of the Americas have the right, the capacity, and the interest to confront the subversive action of international communism, and that if these recommendations are adopted, they will be applied taking into account the statements made in the initial general report, chapter V.A. 9, 10, and 11.

(e) The appendix to this study illustrates, with specific cases, the techniques of subversive activity employed by communism in America and to which reference is made herein.

The facts and situations noted were compiled from information presented by the governments that replied to the request of the Council's Committee; from public statements of authorities of various countries, including Communist countries, especially Cuba; and from other sources, since these facts are well known and generally accepted.

These facts and situations are noted without any attempt to pass judgment upon or to qualify the information and statements received from the governments and other sources.

(f) The Committee, in its initial general report, stated that Communist techniques vary constantly and only by studying them continuously and comparatively is it possible to come to any conclusions and to formulate suggestions according to the circumstances. Consequently, this study should be considered only as the first step of an examination that requires continuity.

I. COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In its initial general report the Committee stated:

Communism operates on a worldwide scale. Its methods and procedures are adapted to the local conditions that will most favor its development, and they vary from simple infiltration for subversive purposes to the use of violence, according to the objective, the direction of the action, and the resistance that may be encountered.

A chapter of the report was devoted to one of the basic techniques of Communist subversion, deceit.

In this report the Committee wishes to present, in summary form, other techniques employed by Communist subversion, which will make it possible to analyze better the subversive action that international communism is carrying out through Cuba and also to assess the degree of danger that it represents to the member states of the Organization of American States.

In the initial general report it was also stated that:

* * * The world is virtually at war—an atypical kind of war, which is being waged by international communism and suffered by the democracies. In this sense it is undeniable that the Marxist dialectic has changed the saying of Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," to the assertion that "peace is only the continuation of war by other means."

In a speech delivered January 6, 1961, Khrushchev pointed out three kinds of war: "world wars, local wars, and wars of liberation or popular insurrections." He said that this classification made it "necessary to devise tactics that are correct for each of these types of wars." With respect to world war he declared that "Communists are the strongest opponents of such wars" and that "we can prevent the conflagration of a world war." He said that it was possible that in the future local wars could flare up, but that they would be extinguished "because they might turn into wars with thermonuclear missiles."

With respect to the "war of liberation" or "popular uprising" he said: "they will come about as long as imperialism exists * * * such wars are not only acceptable but inevitable. * * * We accept such wars. We are supporting and we will support the peoples in their struggle for independence."

Khrushchev then continued by asking and answering a series of questions about this kind of war. "Can wars of this kind break out in the future? Yes, they can. Can there be this kind of uprising? There can be. * * * In other words, can conditions be created that will stir a people to lose patience and take up arms? Yes, they can be. What is the Marxist position on these uprisings? It is one of strongest support. * * * Then, after a description of the horrors of thermonuclear war, Khrushchev came to a very significant conclu-

sion: "The victory of communism throughout the world is close at hand," but "war among states is not necessary to gain this victory."

Thus, the leader of communism declares that a world war is dangerous as a means of spreading his doctrine, but at the same time maintains the threat of a thermonuclear war as a means of intimidation and a type of blackmail to keep the free world from resisting Communist invasion. What Khrushchev describes as a "war of liberation" or "popular uprising" is really hidden aggression: subversion.

Exploiting the desire of the democracies to avoid war, particularly under present circumstances, in which arms of great destructive power might be used, the design of Communist expansion finds in subversion the least costly way of acquiring peoples and territories without exaggerated risk.

Subversion, the techniques of which vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention, is conceived, developed, and perfected by the leaders of communism, who utilize it to carry forward their world revolution. Its aim is to replace the political, economic, and social order existing in a country by a new order, which presupposes the complete physical and moral control of the people.

That control is achieved by progressively gaining possession of bodies and minds, using appropriate techniques of subversion that combine psychological, political, social, and economic actions, and even military operations, if this is necessary.

B. SOME TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED

1. Recruitment and training

In 1900, Lenin wrote:

We must train men and women who will dedicate not only their free afternoons to the revolution, but their entire lives.

I. J. Peters, in his *Organization Manual of the Communist Party*, explaining what Lenin meant by a professional revolutionary, said that such a person is a highly skilled comrade, trained in the theory and practice of revolution, tested in battle, who gives his whole life to the struggle for the interests of his own class. A professional of the revolution, he said, is ready to go wherever and whenever the party orders him and, if the class struggle requires it, he must leave his family for months or even years.

Communism, through an appropriate system of selection, chooses the most capable individuals for the ends it seeks. Then, in schools or training centers, these individuals are prepared as activists of all kinds: leaders, orators, and propagandists; experts in sabotage, espionage, and terrorism in all its forms; specialists in the handling of arms and radio equipment, in guerrilla warfare, et cetera. Recruitment is carried on preferably among students, teachers, workers, artists, and writers.

The chief objective in training personnel selected to serve the ends of communism is to instill in them a mystique, subordinated, naturally, to the interests and decisions of the party. This training begins with primary courses, which are established and operated in all countries in which the party is organized, whether or not their existence is authorized.

After a selection, made according to individual circumstances and the results obtained in the primary courses, the individual is sent to

an advanced school, where courses lasting a maximum of 3 years are given. These schools operate principally in Communist countries, and their aim is to train party members in all the techniques of subversion, as well as to occupy administrative posts in the party, or in unions or institutions of various kinds. This is apart from the existence in non-Communist countries of underground schools, where the same instruction is given.

At an even higher level, special academies operate in the Soviet Union and in other countries within the Communist orbit. These, such as the social science academy in Moscow, are devoted chiefly to training personnel in the higher echelons, who will occupy key posts in the party or in allied agencies.

2. Infiltration

Through this technique, activists are infiltrated into previously selected organizations and institutions in order, progressively and methodically, to gain absolute direction and control of them. To do this, the activist studies the problems of the group and takes advantage of those that are sources of agitation, exploiting them in such a way as to gain the group's adherence to party interests. In other words, the activist avails himself of all circumstances enabling him to attract non-Communists in the vicinity.

His next step is to establish contact with and to attract those persons whom he may use as a cover for gaining his ends; that is, he takes advantage of "useful fools," working freely through them, and thus insuring his own safety.

He carries out his work of agitation through conversations with various elements of the group, to whom he explains the need to fight for the objective and aim being sought. He takes advantage of these conversations to introduce disguised Communist propaganda and techniques and tries progressively to carry on such discussions in the midst of small groups.

Infiltration is undertaken in any social class, in government agencies, social and cultural centers, student groups, labor unions, and even in the armed forces. The priority and magnitude of that infiltration will depend upon the facilities found, the environment in which action is taken, and the aim being sought.

3. Psychological impregnation

The individual action of the activists is complemented by well planned and developed psychological action. An effort is made to attract and convert indifferent people by exploiting the contradictions present in every organized society and the justified longings to resolve them. For this purpose, attractive material, easily accessible to the masses, is drawn up or prepared.

This tactic is called "psychological impregnation," and is carried out through the constant utterance and repetition of slogans adapted to the situation, as well as of affirmations and of carefully chosen topics. For this purpose, every means of dissemination is used.

International communism makes extensive use of all the techniques of psychological action. Propaganda, one of the most effective techniques and one that continues to be used, will be studied a little further on.

4. Dislocation

The object of dislocation is to weaken the social structure. Just as with psychological impregnation, dislocation skillfully exploits existing contradictions, student or labor conflicts, religious or social differences, and so forth for the purpose of creating disorder and provoking violence. Thus, the people's discontent and justified aspirations are taken advantage of by the Communists to serve as a useful, and in some cases, highly effective means of creating disorder and driving the authorities to rigorous law enforcement and the consequent use of police measures. Freedom to congregate, the right to strike, and other liberties granted by democracy are abused; laws are labeled as antidemocratic or dictatorial, and the authorities are criticized and attacked as being solely responsible for the situation. With disorder thus stirred up, all kinds of arms are employed and offenses are perpetrated against individuals and also against public and private property, thereby inciting violent action on the part of the police, which serves the Communists' ulterior ends. If necessary, the Communists themselves eliminate some of the demonstrators, in order to present them as "victims of brutal repression" and "heroes of the fight for liberation of the people."

In a parallel way, by means of the propaganda available to them, they undertake a campaign to misrepresent and discredit the government, the authorities, and all non-Communist individuals of any influence in society.

Finally, an effort is made to hinder or paralyze the development of trade and the national economy; to put to the test lawful means of internal security and to invent new actions to frustrate them; in short, to create uncertainty and chaos, in order to demonstrate the inefficiency of the power controlling the situation through lawful procedures. A propitious atmosphere is thereby created for total subversion.

5. Process of militarization

Through a process of proper organization, a military apparatus of growing complexity is created.

First, action or shock teams are created. These are small in number and are usually used for hand fighting, sabotage, or acts of terrorism.

When properly trained and prepared military groups are available, with a sufficient number of people acquainted with the use of arms and explosives and having the necessary equipment, local bands are organized. To put these into action, areas are chosen that, because of their geographic situation, offer facilities for hiding, moving, and supplying these bands, and at the same time present difficulties for action by the forces of order. The support of the people of these areas is sought, either voluntarily or by intimidation. The type of operations carried on is called guerrilla warfare.

When the area selected has been totally conquered and the people converted or vanquished, militia groups are organized to control and defend the area.

The personnel of the militia, chosen for their combat experience and proven ideology, are strategically quartered to make up regional units, which, according to the way in which the revolution progresses, are converted into regular units, organized along more or less classic lines. These will constitute communism's army or principal force.

II. CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION IN AMERICA

A. CUBA AS A TRAINING CENTER

The different media of information often describe subversive activities in different American countries and point to Cuba as center for training in the techniques of Communist subversion. Such reports are being furnished or corroborated at the present time by several governments that have experienced most directly and intensely the impact of subversive action.

An effort will be made in the following pages to present concrete data that will make it possible to reach conclusions on this subject.

1. *Training centers*

There can be no doubt that the creation and maintenance of a Communist government in Cuba facilitates to an extraordinary degree the subversive action of international communism in America. This is true not only with respect to the spread of the Communist ideology, but also—what is more dangerous—because it constitutes a center quite nearby for training agents of every kind whose function it is to develop subversion in the countries of the hemisphere.

It is an obvious fact that as the Communist regime became consolidated in Cuba, a series of schools and centers of training in the techniques of Communist subversion were organized, in which instruction is being given not only to Cubans but to many other Latin Americans for carrying on subversive activities in various countries of the hemisphere.

Among the many training centers that now function in Cuba, mention may be made of the following:

Blas Roca School, in Los Pinos, Havana Province.

Marcelo Salado School, in the Luyanó section of Havana.

El Cortijo School, in Pinar del Río Province, especially for military personnel.

La Cabaña Fort, in Havana, especially for young people.

Minas Río Frío School, for training guerrillas.

San Lorenzo School, in the Sierra Maestra, Oriente Province, for training guerrillas.

Ciudad Libertad School, in Marianao, Havana Province, under Russian instructors.

Boca Chica School, in Tarará, Havana Province, Director General Alberto Bayo.

Julio Antonio Mella School, in Mar Bella, Havana Province, for training and instructing leaders of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria (CTCR) (Federation of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba).

A large number of Latin Americans attend these training centers, where they receive instruction not only in Marxist-Leninist theory, but also in propaganda techniques, the use of arms and explosives, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and so on.

It should be pointed out that the corps of instructors in these schools is made up not only of Cubans or other Latin Americans, but also of instructors from other Communist countries; these speak Spanish.

The fellowship program announced by Fidel Castro in his speech of June 9, 1961, which included the granting of 1,000 fellowships for

students of the various American countries, gives an idea of how, from its very first years, the Cuban Communist regime gave primary importance to the indoctrination and training of American youths in Communist techniques. By means of this and other programs, hundreds of American young people have received that kind of instruction.

2. Organizations devoted to the spread of subversion in America

In addition to the training centers, there are in Cuba some organizations whose purpose it is to carry subversion to America. There is knowledge that the following are functioning:

Junta de Liberación para Centro América y el Caribe (Board of Liberation for Central America and the Caribbean). Plans subversive acts and controls the sending of agents to that region of the Americas.

Junta de Liberación para América del Sur (Board of Liberation for South America). Has the same purpose as the foregoing organization; its action is planned for South America.

Organización Latinoamericana de la Juventud (Latin American Youth Organization). Its principal aim is to organize and train young people in subversive tactics.

Asociación "Latinoamérica Libre" ("Free Latin America" Association). Its aim is to place obstacles in the way of trade with the United States and to encourage trade with the Communist bloc.

Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples). Its chief aim is to organize meetings and conferences of various kinds and to facilitate travel to Cuba for the purpose of giving instruction to students, workers, professional people, etc.

3. Congresses and meetings

Concurrently with the systematic preparation of Communist subversive agents a series of meetings, conferences, congresses, and so on are being held in Cuba, attended by the Communist elements of America and by sympathizers, the real purpose of which is to discuss plans, fix objectives, and issue directives that must be observed by the different groups, with respect to Communist subversive action of every form.

These congresses, conferences and meetings bring together persons linked to the different fields of human activity: workers, students, intellectuals, athletes, etc.

In order to illustrate the foregoing it might be of interest to list in chronological order the various international meetings that took place in Cuba between January 1961 and January 1963:

Latin American Conference of Plantation Workers, March 1961, Havana.

Celebration of Latin American Solidarity Day, April 1961, in San Antonio de los Baños. Participating were Latin American and European delegates who attended the Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and World Peace, held in Mexico City from March 5 to 8, 1961.

Congress of Central American Students, May 1961, Havana.

Seventh Congress of the International Students' Union, May 1961, Havana. Topic: "Latin America Against Yankee Imperialism."

International meeting of voluntary workers, June 1961, Havana; sponsored by the International Students' Union.

International seminar on illiteracy, June 1961, Havana; sponsored by the International Students' Union.

Meeting of Latin American trade union leaders, July 1961, Havana; to exchange ideas regarding the World Trade Union Federation Congress, which was scheduled for December 1961, in Moscow.

Meeting to plan for the Congress of Women of the Americas scheduled for July 1962, July 1961, Havana.

Second meeting of Construction Workers of Latin America, August 1961, Havana.

Congress of Writers and Artists, August 1961, Havana.

Fifth Congress of the World Trade Union Federation, November 1961, Havana.

Fifth Congress of the International Newspapermen's Organization, January 1962, Havana.

Latin American Cultural Congress, January 1962, Havana.

Conference of Peoples (coincided with the Conference at Punta del Este), January 1962, Havana.

Congress of Women of America, July 1962, Havana.

Latin American University games, and seminar on sports in Latin America, October 1962, Havana.

First National Congress of the Cuban Federation of Women, October 1962, Havana.

Latin American music festival, October 1962, Havana.

Solidarity with Venezuela Week, November 1962, Havana.

Congress of Women of America, January 1963, Havana.

Mention should also be made of the numerous meetings held by the Cuban Government to celebrate this or that national event, to which delegations from the Latin American countries are also invited. In this connection, mention may be made of ceremonies held in celebration of January 1, May 1, and July 26.

4. Conclusions

It is clear that Cuba is being used as a base for training in communism and its spread in America.

That activity of international communism, and particularly on the part of the Cuban Government, is greatly facilitated by the lack of suitable measures, and of cooperation among the American countries, to check the constant and heavy stream of travelers to and from Cuba. The importance of this problem makes it necessary to devote a special section to it.

B. CONTROL OF TRAVEL

1. General considerations

The nations that maintain normal and friendly relations recognize that it is desirable and even necessary to facilitate travel by their nationals across their borders as a means of strengthening cultural and economic ties, becoming better known, and becoming qualified and ready to support one another in the solution of their problems.

For this reason the documents necessary for crossing international borders have become less in number, the period of validity of entry and departure permits has been extended, procedures for obtaining passports and other travel documents have been simplified, the obliga-

tion to secure visas has been removed, the securing of foreign exchange has been facilitated, and so on.

These facilities are used by communism so that its agents may circulate freely and in this way introduce propaganda and move the money needed in planning, encouraging, and carrying on subversion. It has already been pointed out in this connection that it is of public knowledge that many individuals of antinational and communistic tendencies travel to Cuba for various reasons connected with subversion. Cuba is also utilized as the point of departure for trips to the Communist countries of Europe or Asia for the same reasons.

The need for guaranteeing national security in the face of this threat has obliged some governments to place controls upon the travel of their nationals to certain countries with which they do not maintain diplomatic relations, and in which, due to the lack of their diplomatic representatives, they cannot provide the usual protection or assistance, or to which they travel for reasons that might endanger the security of the country.

The nature, degree, and effectiveness of this control vary from country to country, and it is influenced very greatly by the degree of cooperation between countries in carrying it out. Many States have no control over travel to Cuba; in others such control has been attempted, but the means adopted are not effective; while in others control is limited to declaring travel illegal. Many control measures lose their effectiveness through lack of suitable equipment, deficient technical preparation, and the negligence or complicity of the personnel in charge of their execution.

No matter what degree of control may be attempted, this can become null when the national crosses the border of his country and remains outside of its territorial jurisdiction. Hence the importance of international agreements and mutual cooperation between countries, so that the laws on travel of a country are not flouted by its nationals when they enter another.

How are control measures flouted?

The majority of Communist agents who enter a non-Communist country use false passports and documents in order to hide their identity as well as the purpose of their trip.

The nationals of a country who wish to travel to Cuba request travel documents to be sent to another country, where they make contact with the Cuban Ambassadors or special agents, who provide them with identification documents and permits to travel to Cuba, either to remain there or to go to another Communist country. In this way they avoid the marking of their passports with visas or notations referring to their trip.

In brief, the lack or ineffectiveness of control is due to legal causes, deficiencies in the administration of, or compliance with, control measures, and the lack of international agreements for extending this control beyond national borders.

2. Recommendations

The effective control of travel to Cuba must include both national and international procedures.

(a) National procedures

1. Make provision for every person who crosses an international border to have in his possession some travel document—whether a

passport, safe conduct, or migration card—and enforce control over such documentation.

2. Prohibit travel to Cuba, as a general rule, and regulate the same so that only those persons may go who have valid reasons, such as those of a humanitarian nature. It would be well, in the corresponding stipulations, to consider the following aspects, among others:

(a) To limit the use of passports or other travel documents by means of an inscription stating that these are not valid for travel to Cuba.

(b) To declare any trip not authorized by the terms of the travel document to be an infraction of the law.

(c) To provide that every person desiring to travel to Cuba present a request to that effect at the passport office, and prove that he has a valid reason for making the trip. Permits should not be issued on the basis of such casual reasons as vacation, study, etc.

(d) To give wide publicity to the laws and regulations of each country in relation to travel to Cuba, and to send copies of them to the travel agencies and transport companies for due compliance.

3. Provide the immigration officers at the ports, border crossings, and airports with a list of persons known to be agents or members of the Communist Party, and of those who have traveled to Cuba, for such control action as they deem necessary. For this purpose close cooperation is required between police and immigration authorities.

4. Make a note in the passports or other travel documents authorized by the government of the traveler the date of departure, date of entry, destination, and place of origin.

(b) International procedures

1. Study must be given to the best form of procedure to bring about close intergovernmental cooperation in order to exercise effective control over travel within the Western Hemisphere. To this end the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements could be encouraged. It would be well to consider the following aspects in such agreements:

(a) Each government must observe the limitations imposed upon travel by the other governments. For example, country "A" must take the steps necessary to prevent the departure for Cuba of a national of country "B" whose documentation specifies that it is not valid for making such trip.

(b) Each government must inform the other governments, especially those of countries that are used regularly for travel to Cuba, regarding its laws and regulations on travel, in order that such laws and regulations may not be violated.

(c) When the government of country "A" refuses to allow the departure for Cuba of a traveler from country "B", it must so inform the diplomatic or consular authorities of the latter country.

(d) The officials responsible for controlling the entry and departure of travelers must examine minutely all of the travel documents in order to prevent violations of the terms of those documents.

2. A system for the exchange of information on known Communists, subversive agents, and persons who travel to Cuba must exist between the governments.

III. TRANSMISSION OF SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Considering the primary importance of propaganda or publicity in the lives of nations, and the development it has now attained, it is advisable to point out that this means of so directly influencing the people is very effectively used by international communism.

This Committee, in its initial general report, fully pointed out the need for the democratic peoples to fight against the techniques of Communist deceit, a deceit that is practiced intensively through propaganda. It is therefore necessary to deal again in a general way with this subject, in order to point out the danger propaganda involves and to prompt the American governments to take urgently needed measures to cancel out or weaken its effects.

Pursuing this line of thought, it is desirable, in the first place, to point out the forms and the instruments that propaganda uses, in order to determine what measures could be recommended for counter-acting it.

Obviously, the international Communist movement is constantly endeavoring to increase its propaganda. That increase and the danger represented by such propaganda can be measured, in part, by the number of organizations that are at its service; the circulation of newspapers and magazines, books, pamphlets, leaflets, posters, and, in general, all kinds of publications presenting Communist ideology; the number of radio broadcasts and showings of motion pictures; the organization of an attendance at festivals, congresses, meetings, lectures, and so on; the establishment and operation of training and indoctrination schools; trips to or from the Communist countries; and so on.

The degree of this danger can also be measured by the resources that international communism invests to maintain the propaganda apparatus in the Western countries. But what best gives a true measure of it is the fact that the Communists themselves consider propaganda as one of the essential means of prime importance to the success of their political action.

The aim of this propaganda is to provoke social and economic chaos, weaken the governments, and bring the masses of the people into a prerevolutionary situation from which the Communists can launch their attack on the seats of power. Each Communist Party, through its agitation and propaganda section, sows hate, doubt, and confusion, which carry with them the seeds of political and economic decay. Through these agitation and propaganda sections, the members receive, from the international headquarters or from the executive or central committee in their respective countries, precise instructions on the general topics they should develop. Then they adapt them to the local or national situation and exploit them, making use of all known media of dissemination of information.

Thus, the propaganda activities are carried on by groups of activists who are disciplined to the maximum degree and work tirelessly to influence the decisions of the governments; of the political parties; of the labor unions and farmworkers' organizations; of the student, women, and youth groups; of the intellectual, cultural, and sport centers; of centers representing racial minorities; in short, to influence

all manifestations of the life of a country, capitalizing on legitimate national aspirations.

The tactics frequently change, but the objective remains unchanging: To dissolve or undo the democratic system in order to replace it with the dictatorship of the Communist Party.

B. SUBJECTS OF THE PROPAGANDA

The subjects of the Communist propaganda in America vary from country to country and from region to region, according to circumstances. Nevertheless, this variation is more one of form than of substance, since in all cases the particular approach is in accordance with the general program of Communist propaganda for America planned from abroad.

During the last few years the Communist propaganda has emphasized subjects of a general nature applicable throughout the world, such as disarmament, "peaceful coexistence," the ending of colonialism, and the material and scientific progress made by the Soviet Union; and special topics applicable to the specific conditions in the American countries, such as agrarian reform, local economic and social conditions, nationalization, "Yanqui imperialism," "the example of Cuba," "national liberation," and others.

In dealing with all these subjects, Communist propaganda uses the well-known method of deceit as a major element, especially the use of words stripped of their legitimate meaning.

C. INSTRUMENTS OF PROPAGANDA

1. *Diplomatic and consular missions*

The informational activity carried on by countries through their diplomatic and consular missions is well known and accepted. However, the use of these missions for purposes of political and ideological propaganda as a means of favoring subversion is relatively new.

To develop their subversive campaign, the Soviet Union and its satellites abuse, in ever more alarming fashion, the prerogatives that the countries grant to diplomatic missions.

Connivance with local Communist Party members and the intervention and direct participation of diplomatic and consular agents of the Communist bloc and of Cuba in the internal affairs of the American countries have been publicly revealed on many occasions.

This Committee, in its initial general report, fully pointed out this problem, citing examples that clearly demonstrate the improper use of Communist diplomatic missions. The Inter-American Peace Committee has also called attention to this subversive activity and its consequences.¹

2. *Trade and technical assistance missions*

Just as in the case of their diplomatic and consular missions, the Communists make use of their trade and technical assistance missions that have been established in certain American countries as one more instrument for spreading their subversive propaganda. Through these missions, the countries of the Communist bloc introduce techniques for sabotage, agitation, and propaganda in various countries.

¹ Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January 1962, Punta del Este, Uruguay, Document OEA/Ser.L/III, CIP/1/62.

In this connection, we should mention the formation of bodies or agencies to promote cultural exchange with the countries of the Communist bloc, most of which constitute centers of subversion and of infiltration of activists.

3. Binational centers and associations for friendship or culture

Since 1945, international communism has employed a great profusion of front organizations to promote actions favoring its efforts and as a means of infiltrating democratic society. Among these we may mention the binational centers and associations for friendship or culture, which currently make a practice of organizing activities such as film festivals, artistic performances of various kinds, trips, lectures, congresses of writers and intellectuals, and so on, all of which serve the ends of Communist propaganda.

4. Radio.

Radio is one of the means commonly used for the dissemination of Communist propaganda not only because of its effectiveness but also because it is inexpensive in relation to the number of people it is able to reach.

One of the means that could be used to block radio propaganda would be interference. This is done with equipment known as "jammers," which interfere with the transmission by means of noises transmitted at the same time on the same frequency (or wavelength) from points equidistant from the offending transmitter and from the listeners, with power equal to or greater than that of the offending transmitter.

Now, the cost of such interference is approximately 10 times the cost of the transmission. In addition, it is only partially effective, as is shown by the well-known fact that the Soviet countries, the only ones that use this system, only manage to intercept 50 percent of the transmissions, at the most. Moreover, the interference not only affects the transmitter it is intended to interfere with but also others that are within its radius of effect.

The above considerations indicate that for technical and economic reasons this system is not an effective obstacle to the Communist propaganda that is spread by means of radio.

(a) Local broadcasts

The use of longwave (broadcast band) transmission for broadcasts of this sort makes it possible for the programs to be received on the ordinary sort of receivers that most of the people have. In regions or places where the literacy rate is low, this constitutes the most effective propaganda medium.

It is obvious that with these advantages local broadcasts become the most appropriate instrument for spreading subversive propaganda. Their use makes possible the establishment of a large radio audience over which the broadcasts can exercise an influence on their morals as well as their opinions and in which, thereby, it can give circulation to the rumors or theories that best suit the Communist tactics.

Equipment of amateur radio operators and clandestine stations are also used for purposes of Communist propaganda.

(b) Transmissions from abroad

The shortwave bands are usually used for this kind of transmissions, sometimes in prearranged combination as a network with longwave

stations. Although the reception conditions are usually poor, from a technical point of view, the use of shortwave radio receivers has become common in the Americas.

On May 1, 1961, Cuba officially inaugurated its international broadcast service known as Radio Havana, Cuba, with intensive propaganda programs in Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French. The large number of hours that both this station and those of the other Communist countries devote to Communist propaganda for the Americas is a matter of common knowledge.

(c) *Telecommunications*

Telecommunications are frequently used by the Communists to transmit directives and instructions or as a valuable source of non-secret information.

It may be mentioned by way of information, in connection with the utilization of these services, that all the communications companies that extended telegraph and telephone services to Cuba prior to 1961 are still maintaining those services, which permits that country to use those means for its subversive purposes throughout the Americas, as well as to obtain valuable information.

Because of its geographical position, Cuba is a center for telegraphic communications from the United States to the Caribbean region, and Central and South America. A cable message via Western Union Telegraph Co. for San Juan, P.R., is sent from Miami to Havana, whence it is automatically transmitted to the lines of Cable & Wireless, Ltd. That company can transmit the message either by land lines via Batabanó to Santiago, Cuba, or by submarine cable from Batabanó to Santiago via Cienfuegos, and from Santiago the message goes by submarine cable of Cable & Wireless, Ltd., to Kingston, Jamaica, whence it is automatically transmitted, once more by cable, to San Juan or Ponce, P.R.

5. *Printed propaganda*

Printed propaganda is one of the media most often utilized by the Communists to spread their doctrine and carry on their subversive activities. For these purposes they make use of both foreign and local publications.

(a) *Foreign publications*

This kind of propaganda is spread through news services, mail, travelers, diplomatic, consular, and commercial missions, and by clandestine means.

The introduction of these publications by travelers is another method commonly used by the Communists to disseminate their propaganda. While it is difficult for ordinary travelers to transport large amounts of propaganda of this sort, this is not true of those who travel under the protection of official or diplomatic passports, and this is an important channel for the entry of subversive propaganda.

The introduction of propaganda by taking advantage of diplomatic and consular privileges is the major method of introducing printed propaganda to the American countries.

The entry of propaganda by clandestine methods is accomplished in the most varied ways. Since it is a form of contraband, it is necessary to maintain extreme police and customs vigilance with respect to it.

Communist activity in the field of printed propaganda is constantly increasing. Publications of the Sino-Soviet bloc, as well as Cuban ones, are distributed in enormous quantities in the Americas. Their entry is facilitated by the diplomatic relations that some American countries maintain with Cuba and other Communist countries.

Communist publications are often freely sold in various American countries. More than 100 periodicals of the Sino-Soviet bloc circulate in America, most of them printed in Spanish, some in French, Portuguese, English, and Eastern European languages. In addition, many publications of international Communist front organizations circulate. Translations and editions of many books of Communist propaganda are printed in Communist publishing houses that exist in certain American countries. Most of them now are published by the National Press of Cuba, from which country they are distributed to the rest of America. In addition, it is pertinent to point out, in 1961 alone Cuba imported 250,000 copies of works of Mao Tse-tung in Spanish, and these, as well as the books "Guerra de Guerrillas" ("Guerrilla Warfare") by Ernesto Guevara and "Ciento Cincuenta Preguntas a un Guerrillero" ("One Hundred and Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla Fighter") by Gen. Alberto Bayo, circulate extensively in America.

The Cuban news service Prensa Latina, which maintains direct contact with all the news services of the Communist countries, operates legally or illegally in several American countries.

(b) Local publications

In the majority of the American countries, local Communist publications are published clandestinely and can be reproduced without formal printing equipment, which makes control of them more difficult. This propaganda takes the form of pamphlets, bulletins, leaflets, weeklies, posters, and so on, which are distributed in large volume at moments that the Communists consider most opportune.

Their effectiveness and danger are greater because they exploit local topics and problems immediately, endeavoring to stir up the feelings of the people in order to provoke disorders and incite revolts.

6. Motion pictures and television

Motion pictures and television are utilized as a very valuable instrument for spreading Communist propaganda, since the combination of the visual and the auditory stimulus assures a degree of concentration of attention not achieved by other media. Films produced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, almost all of them propagandistic in nature, are constantly being shown in the Americas, as are film stories and documentaries on the Cuban revolution, produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry, which contain propaganda clearly intended to exploit the topic of the "example of Cuba." This type of propaganda, which is usually of a concealed variety, shows deceitful images of the Communist regime, presenting accomplishments and ways of life intended to attract adepts from among gullible spectators.

Mention should also be made of the Communists' use of the resources of art in general. The theater, particularly, serves the ends of their propaganda in an outstanding way by bringing together a large number of national artists of the American countries who sometimes unknowingly become active propagandists by performing Communist

works. The so-called "free theaters" are a typical example of this kind of activity.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The Communist propaganda from Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc is constantly increasing and radiates to all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, taking maximum advantage of all means of dissemination. Essentially, the aim of this propaganda is to destroy the foundations of democracy, fomenting and exploiting for its own benefit the social, religious, political, economic, and racial problems that exist, to a greater or lesser degree, in the American countries.

Communist propaganda constitutes a form of subversive action that is just as dangerous to the internal security of the American nations as any other form subversion takes, and, likewise, represents a serious threat to the peace and security of America.

It must be recognized that, so far, there is no real awareness in the American countries of the danger to their security that lies in adopting a passive attitude toward the activity of Communist propaganda.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

This Committee submits the following recommendations (on action to be taken by the governments) for consideration by the Committee of the Council:

In general, that each American country should have the agencies needed to enable it to plan, direct, and carry on the psychological action (propaganda and counterpropaganda) to counteract, weaken, or cancel out the Communist propaganda that is carried on through any medium.

In particular, with regard to the use of the various instruments, and in the order in which they have been dealt with in the preceding pages:

1. Diplomatic and consular missions

(a) The governments of the American countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and Cuba should establish, with respect to the members of the missions of those countries, the same limitations that are imposed on the members of their own missions in the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly as regards their movement and circulation and the exercise of privileges. It would likewise be advisable to take measures to limit the number of officials making up the missions of those countries.

2. Trade and technical assistance

(a) To establish strict supervision of the trade and technical missions of the countries of the Communist bloc.

(b) To keep careful watch over the national organizations for trade with the Communist countries.

3. Binational centers and friendship and culture societies

(a) To exercise control over the various entities of this nature whose programs or activities tend to carry on propaganda or subversion of a Communist nature.

(b) To limit all activities (lectures, festivals, art and sport missions, congresses, dramas, exhibitions, et cetera) that tend to favor Communist propaganda.

4. Radio propaganda

(a) To exercise strict control over the broadcasts of the legally established radio stations for the purpose of severely punishing those guilty of carrying on propaganda activities of a Communist nature.

(b) To locate and suppress clandestine transmitters, punishing the owners.

(c) To regulate the activities of amateur radio operators and to exercise strict control over their transmissions by appropriate technical means.

(d) To regulate the importation, purchase, and installation of radio transmitter equipment and supplies.

5. Telecommunications

(a) To control and reduce to a minimum the traffic conducted from and to the countries of the Communist bloc.

(b) As regards telecommunications that must be made via Cuba, it would be advisable for technical experts in the subject to make a study of means to reroute the traffic that now goes that way.

6. Printed propaganda

(a) To proceed to exercise control and seizure of printed propaganda of a subversive nature coming from abroad. For this purpose, to establish a postal control of printed matter entering or leaving a country and to exercise stricter vigilance over travelers.

(b) With regard to the propaganda that is introduced through the diplomatic and consular missions of the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and Cuba, measures should be taken to prevent this practice from being continued.

(c) Circulation of any publication containing subversive propaganda of a Communist nature should be prohibited.

(d) The interested governments should request the countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and Cuba to exercise the necessary control in order to prevent the propaganda that enters through Communist embassies from being sent to their territory.

7. Motion pictures and television

(a) To prohibit the showing of films produced in the countries of the Communist bloc and those others produced in other countries which, in the judgment of the governments, favor Communist propaganda.

(b) To exercise control over television programs that favor Communist propaganda.

IV. TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is an indisputable fact that Communist or pro-Communist groups in the American countries must necessarily have a large amount of money to carry on their subversive activities.

If it is considered that these groups, in addition to being a minority in their respective countries, are mainly composed of individuals of limited economic resources, it may be concluded that they do not have the means for financing themselves. Since it is public knowledge

that they are actually spending large sums of money every year, it is not difficult to understand that a large portion of their expenditures are financed from abroad.

Among the aspects to be mentioned that best support this assertion, the following may be cited:

Communist Parties have a large quantity of equipment and material available to print their propaganda;

Their prominent leaders, accompanied by some delegations, make frequent trips to Cuba, the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries, spending large sums of money in travel and living expenses;

Many Communist leaders, although they have no known means of work, are able to live without financial worries;

The American Communist Parties finance, with no major problems, the expenses arising from the manifold activities they carry out, both inside and outside their respective countries.

Financial aid for the subversive purposes of communism is very difficult to verify, owing to the secretive and disguised manner in which it is practiced. Nevertheless, according to information supplied by some American countries and news that has appeared in news organs of proved seriousness it can be affirmed that it is the present Cuban Government that is responsible for providing, directly or indirectly, a large portion of the financial support received by the Communist Parties in the other American Republics.

Cuba, when the Castro-Communist government was first installed in Havana, gave its moral, material, and financial support to a series of invasions, organized within its territory, into different countries in the Caribbean region. Since 1959 this form of activity was suspended through fear that these flagrant acts of intervention would give rise to a collective inter-American action. This did not mean that Castro-Communist interference in the affairs of the Americas had ceased to exist; on the contrary, her subversive activity was intensified in many other ways, among them, through abundant and continual financial aid.

B. OBTAINING OF FUNDS

The American Communist Parties, in order to obtain the necessary funds for their subversive purposes, have two main sources available: the collection of funds in their respective countries and the receipt of funds coming from abroad.

1. *Funds collected in each country*

They are obtained through the following procedures:

(a) Organization of periodic campaigns by the party and collateral and front organizations to collect funds by means of such social activities as banquets, balls, bazaars, festivals, and the like.

(b) Through compulsory contributions from all the members of the party and sympathizers;

(c) Sales of all kinds of Communist publications, printed especially for this purpose in clandestine printing offices, and compulsory subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals, or weeklies published by the party;

(d) Receipt of profits derived from artistic, cultural, and athletic events for the general public, utilizing national or foreign groups hired for this purpose.

(e) Contraband in general, particularly in narcotics;

(f) In those countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with the Communist countries, the diplomatic representatives of the latter take advantage of the exemptions they enjoy to bring in articles that are later sold to national consumers.

(g) Organization and operation of different kinds of commercial entities.

2. *Funds received from abroad*

These funds constitute the major part of the income of the Communist Parties. The instrument most frequently used to receive and distribute such funds is the Communist diplomatic mission in those countries with which their countries maintain relations. They receive the quantities assigned to the national Communist groups and those of the other countries, and from their respective headquarters they distribute financial aid to the addressees through their agents, the postal service, and the banks.

In some cases the remittances are made in person. For example, a Communist agent of country A travels to Cuba and receives a certain amount of money in cash. On his way back through country B, he converts the money received, either into a bank draft to be sent by mail to a given addressee or into travelers' checks to be carried personally or by other agents.

Mention should also be made here of transfers of funds intended for imaginary or real business concerns, which are utilized in subversive Communist activity once they have been brought into the country.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The movement of funds from Communist countries to the American Republics for use in subversive activities is extremely difficult to control, not only because of the different methods used to carry it out, but owing to the facilities that exist for making transfers of money.

There is complete evidence that this transfer of funds is being carried out intensively from Cuba and from other countries of the Communist bloc to the American Republics.

As long as there are diplomatic relations between some of the American countries and the Communist nations, particularly Cuba, and as long as the movement of travelers to and from the latter country is permitted, the transfer of funds for subversive purposes will continue to be even more difficult to control.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the recommendations already given in the chapter about Cuba as a base for subversion in the Americas, particularly with reference to travel control, the Committee presents to the Council's Committee, for consideration, the following measures that might control the transfer of funds to a certain degree—

(1) To inspect Communist entities and persons, as well as Communist suspects, in the different countries in order to de-

termine the origin of the funds that permit them to develop Communist subversive activities.

(2) To control contraband, particularly of narcotics, which, as is known, is one of the most effective means employed by communism to obtain funds.

(3) To consider the possibility that experts in the matter, within the respective legal systems of the American countries, might study the means that would make it possible to control the entry of money or securities that it is believed are intended to serve the ends of Communist subversion.

(4) To exercise strict control over the national procedures used by Communists to obtain funds, as pointed out in this chapter.

With respect to the effectiveness of these measures, it is worth repeating the comment that as long as there are diplomatic relations between the American Republics and the countries of the Communist bloc, particularly Cuba, these countries will continue to avail themselves, as they have done up to now, of their diplomatic representations to introduce funds into the American countries, intended for Communist subversion.

V. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the analysis made in this study, the Special Consultative Committee on Security makes the following general recommendations:

1. To repeat in full the recommendations contained in its initial general report of April 30, 1962. In this respect, the Committee considers it advisable that the Council of the Organization of American States, pursuant to Resolution II.1 of the eighth meeting of consultation, urge the Governments of the member states to implement the recommendations that have been adopted repeatedly since 1948 at the different inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation; and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, to bring up to date and supplement their legislation so as to make the various recommendations set forth in the preceding chapters of this study applicable, provided they are adopted.

2. That the American Governments be asked to devote particular attention to their intelligence services, creating or improving them, in order that they may have the means that will enable them to plan, coordinate and carry out effective action against Communist subversion; and, likewise, to organize, equip and train their security forces so that they may be in proper condition to repress the subversive activities of international communism.

3. Along the same lines, and in order to establish real and effective collaboration among the services or organizations in charge of action against Communist subversion in the different American countries, it is considered advisable to recommend that a specialized conference be held that will be attended by the heads of the security and intelligence services or organizations. The Special Consultative Committee on Security could at the proper time prepare the draft agenda for such meeting.

4. That the American Governments be urged to provide the Special Consultative Committee on Security with all the information on subversive acts that take place in their respective countries, in order

that the Committee may give appropriate and timely advice when it is so requested.

VI. FINAL CONSIDERATION

Since the time of its initial general report, the Committee has observed that the establishment of a beachhead on American territory, achieved by the Communist offensive, "poses a threat of the utmost gravity to the security of the hemisphere." The events that have taken place since that time, particularly the military strengthening of Cuba by the Soviet Union, by greatly increasing the capacity of the Cuban Government to send arms into neighboring countries and to intensify other subversive activities, render the threat to hemispheric security much more serious, a threat that assumes an urgent character with respect to the security of the countries of the Caribbean region. This has become evident, sometimes in a dramatic manner, in the recent wave of terrorism, sabotage, and other subversive activities that Castro communism has unleashed in some of the Latin American countries.

Without wishing to detract importance from the measures that have been recommended during the course of this study, the Committee believes that present circumstances demand that such measures be supplemented with others of greater scope. The degree of development attained by the political-military apparatus that has been established in Cuba is rendering the system of security against subversion increasingly inadequate and ineffective, based solely on the isolated measures that each country might adopt. Holding this conviction, the Committee has wished to assume responsibility for expressing it, in view of the present state of events, in order that the American governments may effectively confront the subversive action of Castro communism.

Under these circumstances, the Committee believes that the situation justifies consideration by the American governments in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In the opinion of the Committee, recent events, particularly the repeated statements by the principal Cuban leaders of their intention to subvert the American governments by violence, constitute a situation of such gravity and urgency that it can be adequately and effectively dealt with only by adopting the measures provided for in the treaty.

In this respect, it is also pertinent to recall the urgent recommendation made by the eighth meeting of consultation to the governments of the member states "to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." To this effect, the Committee believes that because of the increasing gravity of the subversive threat posed by Castro communism, recourse to such measures of

individual and collective self-defense as are considered necessary to remove it, may not be postponed.

MANUEL CAMPOS JIMÉNES,
Chairman of the Committee.

JULIO CÉSAR DOIG SÁNCHEZ,
Vice Chairman of the Committee.

PAUL C. DANIELS.

JOAQUIM CANUTO MENDES DE ALMEIDA.

CARLOS MARIA LUNA.

JOAQUIN ZALDIVAR.

JULIO CÉSAR VADORA ROZIER.

FEBRUARY 8, 1963.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY ON THE WORK DONE DURING ITS FIRST REGULAR MEETING

September 24 to October 18, 1963

I. INTRODUCTION

The Special Consultative Committee on Security, in accordance with article 10 of the statutes approved by the Council of the Organization of American States on April 23, 1963, decided to hold its first regular meeting at the headquarters of the Pan American Union during the period from September 24 to October 18, 1963.

This first meeting was attended by the following members: Gen. Julio César Doig Sánchez, of Peru; Dr. Carlos Angulo Rueda, of Colombia; Col. Carlos María Luna, of Argentina; Col. Rodolfo Herrera Pinto, of Costa Rica; Mr. Paul C. Daniels, of the United States; and Lt. Col. Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho, of Uruguay. Lt. Col. Joaquín Zaldívar, of El Salvador, was unable to attend.

At the first session, the Committee elected Gen. Julio César Doig Sánchez as its Chairman and Dr. Carlos Angulo Rueda as Vice Chairman.

The principal work accomplished by the Committee during this meeting was the following:

- (1) It drew up and adopted its regulations, in accordance with the provisions of article 14 of the statutes;
- (2) It began to prepare the general work program that it is proposed to carry out at future regular meetings; and
- (3) In the light of prior reports, especially the initial general report, it made a brief analysis of the present situation in the hemisphere in relation to the subversive activities of international communism.

In the belief that it has a duty to report on its activities, the Committee has prepared this document in order to give an account of the work done at the present meeting, and has requested the General Secretariat to distribute it among the members of the Council of the Organization of American States for their information.

II. WORK DONE PREVIOUSLY BY THE COMMITTEE

INITIAL GENERAL REPORT

Inasmuch as a year and a half has passed since the Special Consultative Committee on Security was installed, it is well to analyze briefly the activities carried out, in order to draw some conclusions with respect to progress made in the fight against the action of international communism in the Americas.

In the period from April 2 to 30, 1962, the Committee held its first meeting in order to prepare the initial general report referred to in

paragraph 2(c) of Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation. That report was submitted to the Council of the Organization on April 30, 1962.

The said report included a short statement on the international Communist movement and its incidence in the American Hemisphere, an analysis of deceit as the basis of the objectives and methods of communism and some recommendations of a general nature.

On that occasion, after analyzing the measures agreed upon in the inter-American system from 1948 up to the date of the report, the Committee stated that it "has not considered it necessary, in this initial stage of its work, to examine the measures intended to counteract subversive activities. It considers that, at least for the moment, it has the vast experience acquired through the measures adopted during World War II. However, the Committee does consider it desirable—and an unavoidable duty—owing to the nature and scope of its terms of reference, to point out to the Council of the Organization the urgent need for each and every one of the American governments to give the greatest possible application to the measures that have been adopted since 1948 by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation."

In relation to subversive activities, it referred to:

(a) The Bogotá Conference (1948), at which the American republics resolved:

3. To adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities, directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations.

4. To proceed with a full exchange of information concerning any of the aforementioned activities that are carried on within their respective jurisdictions.

(b) The fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1951), convoked specifically because "the growing threat of international Communist aggression has demonstrated the urgent necessity, that the free nations of the world determine the most effective methods for preserving their freedom and independence," where it was decided:

1. To recommend to the Governments of the American States:

(a) That, mindful of their unity of purpose and taking account of the contents of Resolution VI of the second meeting of consultation in Havana and Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, each American Republic examine its respective laws and regulations and adopt such changes as it may consider necessary to assure that the subversive activities of the agents of international communism, directed against any of them, may be adequately prevented and punished;

(b) That, in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, they enact measures necessary to regulate in the countries of America transit across international boundaries of those foreigners who there is reason to expect will attempt to carry out subversive acts against the defense of the American Continent; and

(c) That, in the application of this resolution, they bear in mind the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics.

(c) The 10th Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954) which insisted on the need to adopt and carry out measures to counteract the subversive activities of the international Communist movement, recommending that the American governments, without prejudice to such other measures as they might consider desirable, give special attention to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting such activities within their respective jurisdictions:

1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international Communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf.

(2) The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding international communism.

After listing the resolutions and agreements referred to and recommending their applications, the Committee stated the following:

9. Along the same line of thought, the Committee would also like to recommend that, in adopting and applying internal measures, the governments act with the necessary vigor which is required to combat subversive action. In making this recommendation, the Committee has kept in mind especially two fundamental considerations: the first is that the agents of international communism, as the fourth meeting of consultation stated, are attempting to destroy the democratic institutions, "utilizing for this purpose the exploitation and the abuse of these self-same democratic liberties"; and, secondly, that the measures adopted by the competent authorities to counteract the subversive action, whatever its nature and scope, are not by any means inconsistent with the internal and international obligation of the state to respect human rights and fundamental liberties.

10. In connection with this second consideration, the Committee wishes to add that the subversive action of international communism presupposes the performance of acts directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign powers or governments, and that therefore, they constitute grave acts against the public order and the security of the state, especially when the agent carrying out the subversive action is a national or citizen of that state. Under the laws of all the countries of the world, and the international instruments governing the matter, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties is subject to the limitations and restrictions that the state is expressly authorized to impose for reasons of internal security or other reasons that are considered vital to the welfare of the nation. It can be easily understood, therefore, what a legal and political mistake it would be to tolerate subversive activity or fail to combat it adequately, out of fear that human rights and fundamental liberties would not be respected.

This initial general report was submitted to the governments of the member states of the Organization, and communications were received from the Governments of the United States and Argentina stressing the importance of the report and the advantages of giving it wide distribution.

The General Secretariat ordered the report to be published in Spanish (50,000 copies), English (4,500 copies), and Portuguese (10,000 copies), and distributed it throughout the member countries of the Organization through the Pan American Union Offices.

Some of the recommendations contained in the initial general report have already been carried out by some of the member countries of the

Organization, and this constitutes a step forward in the fight against the subversive action of international communism. However, one of the recommendations on which it is necessary to insist is that referring to the exchange of information among the American countries. In fact, this exchange is of vital importance in the struggle in which these countries are engaged, since no matter how great the individual efforts being exerted, they will not have the desired effect unless there is the necessary coordination and cooperation in carrying out the measures that are adopted.

REPORT PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

On July 31, 1962, the Government of the Dominican Republic informed the Council of the Organization about the existence of a situation in which it was sought to subvert order in the Dominican Republic through a typical action of international communism, and denounced the campaign of propaganda, directives, and watchwords being carried out for this purpose by the present Government of Cuba over radio broadcasting stations operating in Cuban territory. The Dominican Government also requested the Special Consultative Committee on Security to provide such advisory services as might be necessary under the circumstances.

In response to this request from the Dominican Government, the Committee met in Washington, D.C., on September 4, 1962, and on the 28th of that month presented its report on the matter to the Government of the Dominican Republic. According to paragraph 2b of Resolution II of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the aforementioned report may not be distributed without the express authorization of the Government of the Dominican Republic.

STUDY PRESENTED ON FEBRUARY 8, 1963

This work was prepared at the request of the Special Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to which the Council of the Organization entrusted "an urgent study of the transfer of funds to the American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques, presenting to the Council the pertinent reports and recommendations." The Council agreed also that "in carrying out this task the Committee could make use of the advice of the Special Consultative Committee on Security. * * *"

Availing itself of this authorization, the first-mentioned Committee, in a note dated November 1, 1962, requested from the Special Consultative Committee on Security "technical advice in carrying out its study of the three aspects set forth above."

The Security Committee met at the headquarters of the Pan American Union beginning on January 7 and presented the study requested on February 8, 1963. In the introduction to this study, the Committee stated the following:

The specific recommendations the Committee suggests in this study do not refer to any particular country. They include the adoption of certain measures

that, in the abstract and without prejudice to other measures that may be better adapted to circumstances within each country, are considered technically necessary to counteract, at least in part, the subversive activity that international communism is carrying out in the Western Hemisphere, especially through Cuba.

In addition, chapter V contained the general recommendations, which the Committee considers it of interest to transcribe, as follows:

1. To repeat in full the recommendations contained in its initial general report of April 30, 1962. In this respect, the Committee considers it advisable that the Council of the Organization of American States, pursuant to Resolution II.1 of the eighth meeting of consultation, urge the governments of the member states to implement the recommendations that have been adopted repeatedly since 1948 at the different inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation; and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, to bring up to date and supplement their legislation so as to make the various recommendations set forth in the preceding chapters of this study applicable, provided they are adopted.

2. That the American governments be asked to devote particular attention to their intelligence services, creating or improving them, in order that they may have the means that will enable them to plan, coordinate, and carry out effective action against Communist subversion; and, likewise, to organize, equip, and train their security forces so that they may be in proper condition to repress the subversive activities of international communism.

3. Along the same lines, and in order to establish real and effective collaboration among the services or organizations in charge of action against Communist subversion in the different American countries, it is considered advisable to recommend that a specialized conference be held that will be attended by the heads of the security and intelligence services or organizations. The Special Consultative Committee on Security could at the proper time prepare the draft agenda for such meeting.

4. That the American governments be urged to provide the Special Consultative Committee on Security with all the information on subversive acts that take place in their respective countries, in order that the Committee may give appropriate and timely advice when it is so requested.

On the basis of this document the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs prepared its report of June 4, 1963, and submitted it to the Council of the Organization.

The study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security received special consideration in the U.S. Senate, whose Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws published it, recommending it as an important reference document for the Members of Congress and all others interested in the Communist threat to the United States through the Caribbean area.

The recommendations contained in this study were considered by the Ministers of Government, Security, and Interior of Central America, Panama, and the United States when they met in Managua, Nicaragua, April 3 and 4, 1963, and several of them were included among the resolutions they approved. Likewise, the governments of other member states of the Organization have adopted measures aimed at controlling the movement of Communist propaganda, of agents of international communism, and of persons traveling to Cuba to receive training in the techniques of subversion.

The Committee repeats that for the greater success of the measures that are adopted it is essential that there be proper coordination and exchange of ideas regarding them. For this reason it will insist later upon the need for holding a specialized conference of the heads of the security and intelligence services or organizations of the member states of the Organization.

III. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A. GENERAL PANORAMA

1. *Present situation*

The Special Consultative Committee on Security is of the opinion that, since the date of its last report (February 8, 1963), the subversive activities of international communism in the American states have continued to such an alarming degree that measures must be taken immediately to end this danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

2. *Principal manifestations*

The present line of conduct being followed by the Communists in carrying out their strategic plan for achieving their ultimate objectives primarily takes the form of—

(a) Subversive activities (agitation, strikes, guerrilla warfare, et cetera), which in some countries have reached the point of open insurrection;

(b) Acts of sabotage and systematic terrorism, carried out by small, but perfectly trained and equipped groups, following pre-established plans and intended to create a climate conducive to general insurrection;

(c) Infiltration into governmental spheres, including the armed forces, which endangers institutional stability itself;

(d) Penetration into information agencies and media (press, radio, and television) with personnel especially trained in Communist propaganda; and

(e) Growing participation in the educational field, particularly at the university level, seeking, among other things, to create a rapprochement between professional people, students, and workers, not for purposes of trade union improvement but only to develop their own subversive activities.

The following sections will deal with the matters mentioned in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e), since they are considered to be of most current significance.

3. *Infiltration into governmental spheres*

Communist infiltration into governmental spheres, particularly in public administration or civil service, has increased considerably of late. In some American countries such infiltration is made easier by laws governing the hiring, tenure in office, and job security of the employee. These laws, whose purpose is to protect competent and honest employees, should be of such nature as to preclude that under their protection Communist elements infiltrate and maintain themselves in office, thereby making a mockery of the purpose of these laws and threatening the very democratic essence of the state.

It should also be pointed out that in some cases this infiltration has even affected the armed forces, and its consequences have threatened the very stability of the established government.

4. *Information media*

Another manifestation of the activities of Soviet imperialism that the Special Consultative Committee on Security feels it should mention is the use of important organs of the press, through Communist agents and puppet writers, to express Communist ideas.

Needless to say, freedom of the press is a basic principle in democratic countries. In defense of that principle, then, it is important to point out that organs of the press must exercise strict vigilance to make certain that this freedom is not used by communism for the purpose of destroying it.

Similar observation and vigilance are recommended for the other information media, since they are essential in the development of the propaganda activity of Communist imperialism.

5. *The problem in the universities*

This aspect deserves special consideration, in view of the important role of the university in preparing the leaders of a country.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security believes that the degree to which communism has infiltrated various university institutions in the American States is of the utmost seriousness. This is being done mainly in the following ways:

By attempting to gain teaching and administrative control of the universities;

By appointing Communist or pro-Communist professors for activities connected with teaching;

By using university funds for Communist propaganda activities;

By organizing university federations, associations, or committees, fostered and directed by Communists, or by taking advantage of existing ones; and

By promoting public functions, lectures, demonstrations, etc., in support of Communist regimes and leaders and the ideas advanced by them.

6. *International communism and Castroism*

Subversive activities in the American Hemisphere are typical of international communism, although in some instances it waves the flag of the Castro regime in Cuba, presenting it as if it were a regional or an American movement. Actually, Castroism is nothing more than a collateral movement that obeys extracontinental instructions and directives and is used principally for the purpose of confusing public opinion.

By any concept, Castroism is a movement completely alien and contrary to the values traditionally accepted by the peoples of the Americas. Furthermore, its subversive activities are in flagrant violation of the principle of nonintervention. In this connection, it is of interest to quote the following statement made by Fidel Castro last July 26:

We know by experience and by conviction that every people who do what the Cuban people have done will have the decided support of the Soviet Union and of all the Socialist camp.

In his turn the Minister of Industries, Ernesto Guevara, in a statement to the press in Algeria on July 23 of this year, declared:

Cuba must assist the peoples of Latin America * * * in their struggle for liberation * * * and we are helping them with all the means at our disposal.

At this moment one can say that there are two countries in Latin America where the revolutionary fight has assumed a strength which already assures its development toward a revolution which will take over power and which will bring about great changes in the political and social structure of these countries: they are Venezuela and Guatemala. A wall of silence surrounds the activities of

Venezuelan and Guatemalan patriots but this does not change the fact that they exist. In Guatemala there are four columns of guerrillas, two or three different movements which are fighting together, and, despite the latest coup d'etat, Government forces are not able to control the situation, and one can say that things are going well.

7. "Coexistence"

The Special Consultative Committee on Security believes that in the fight against Communist activities throughout the hemisphere it is of basic importance that the American people not allow themselves to be deceived by the frequent use of the word "coexistence."

It repeats that in no case is it possible to accept "coexistence," particularly so long as there persists a policy of intervention and aggression on the part of Communist imperialism. It is evident that at the same time the Soviet leaders speak of "coexistence," they are actively pursuing their efforts to substitute Communist dictatorship for the institutional order in our countries. Nor is it possible to accept conformity with the philosophical and ideological principles of communism, which are totally foreign to and incompatible with American ideals.

In this connection, the Committee points to the tremendous danger of accepting "coexistence" as though it represented a lessening of the continuous efforts of communism to achieve world domination.

8. *The Sino-Soviet conflict*

Recently the schism between Chinese and Soviet communism has been publicly displayed and admitted by both parties.

It is too early to come to any conclusion regarding the influence of this conflict upon the conduct and development of Communist activities in the Americas. For the time being, what can be said is that these activities are still largely inspired by Soviet imperialism and are in the hands of leaders who obey its dictates.

This conflict is being used by some leaders fighting for power within the party by seeking to displace the leaders of the other persuasion.

In any case, it is interesting to note that the conflict has not affected the action of international communism in the Americas, since, as has already been observed, its activities are incessant and become more serious every day.

B. CONSIDERATIONS

In summary, it is necessary to stress the need—

(1) To keep close watch on the development of Communist action in the universities and other educational centers.

(2) To pass suitable legislation for keeping Communists out of Government agencies and the Armed Forces.

(3) To conduct a suitable information campaign on the methods and techniques of deceit employed by Communist propaganda, particularly in connection with its use of the pretended example of the Castro revolution and of the terms "nationalism" and "coexistence."

(4) To seek the cooperation of information organs in the task of combating and counteracting Communist propaganda.

IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the facts and background information set forth in the preceding sections of this report, the Special Consultative Committee on Security wishes to express the following conclusions:

(a) The recommendations contained in its first report (April 30, 1962) and in the third report (February 8, 1963) should continue to be considered by the American Governments.

(b) As an aid to improving antisubversive legislation, the Committee reiterates that, if possible, the General Secretariat should bring up to date the publication entitled "Strengthening of Internal Security," published in 1953.

(c) It is still essential to coordinate the measures adopted or that may be adopted in the various American countries to meet the subversive activities of international communism. In this connection, the Committee repeats that it would be advisable to hold a meeting of chiefs of intelligence or security services, as mentioned in its report of February 8, 1963.

(d) The activities of international communism in the Americas continue on an intensive scale and become increasingly violent and serious. The Special Consultative Committee on Security therefore believes that, in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in the applicable inter-American instruments, the efforts to eliminate this open and undisguised intervention by extracontinental powers in the hemisphere should be continued and intensified.

OCTOBER 18, 1963.

JULIO CÉSAR DOIG SÁNCHEZ,
Chairman of the Committee.

CARLOS ANGULO RUEDA,
Vice Chairman of the Committee.

LUIS W. CICALESE ZIGNAGHO.

PAUL C. DANIELS.

RODOLFO HERRERA PINTO.

CARLOS MARÍA LUNA.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY ON THE WORK DONE DURING ITS THIRD REGULAR MEETING

November 16 to December 11, 1964

I. MEETING

The Special Consultative Committee on Security held its third regular meeting from November 16 to December 11, 1964.

Since the Committee had accepted the kind invitation of the Government of Costa Rica, it met initially in San José and remained there until November 27, 1964. Subsequently, the Committee traveled to its permanent headquarters at the Pan American Union to continue its work.

II. PARTICIPANTS

The entire Committee, composed of the following members, attended the meeting:

Carlos Angulo Rueda, Chairman.
Rodolfo Herrera Pinto, Vice Chairman.
Tomás Berenguel Burgos.
Luis W. Cicalese Zignagho.
Paul C. Daniels.
Carlos María Luna.
Joaquín Zaldívar.

III. ACTIVITIES

The following activities were carried out in accordance with the work plan previously drawn up by the Committee:

Meeting with the chiefs of Central American security agencies;
Study of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its influence on Communist activities in the Americas;
Study of the desirability of strengthening inter-American co-ordination aimed at the more effective control of Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere;
Setting the date and preparing the draft agenda for the fourth regular meeting;
Election of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

A. MEETING WITH THE CHIEFS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY AGENCIES

Since part of the third regular meeting was held in San José, Costa Rica, the Committee was able to establish personal contact with some of the chiefs of Central American security agencies.

The discussions were held in accordance with the following agenda:
Activities of international communism in each Central American country;

Measures of coordination taken by the Central American countries and Panama and their effectiveness;

Influence of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Communist activity in each country;

Other problems related to communism presented by the chiefs of security agencies.

The aforesaid discussions made it possible for the Committee to—

1. Confirm and extend the studies carried out previously in connection with the matters under discussion.

2. Gain a more thorough and detailed knowledge of the measures of coordination taken by the governments of Central America and Panama to meet the threat of international communism, and of the effectiveness of such measures.

In this respect, the Committee considers it appropriate to express its satisfaction with the results obtained up to now in the region and, to this effect, maintains the statement made in its report of June 18, 1964, regarding the advisability that "this joint attitude of the Central American countries and Panama should be imitated insofar as possible by the other countries of the hemisphere."

3. Confirm the need for the American governments to have security and intelligence services, especially trained in anti-Communist action, which in the opinion of the Committee should be organized along the following lines:

(a) Their organization and functioning should be provided for in specific and adequate legislation;

(b) They should have sufficient status to enable them to act with authority and promptness and, insofar as possible, under the direct supervision of the chief of state;

(c) They should be at the exclusive service of the government, and refrain from involvement in the party politics of the country;

(d) They should be staffed by specialized technical and non-political personnel; and

(e) They should be organized, equipped, and provided with the necessary means to develop their inherent activities, such as those involving information, security, psychological action, intelligence, planning, and coordination.

To this effect, the Committee wishes to express its firm belief that, in principle, effective cooperation and coordination between the American countries in their fight against the activities of international communism can be hoped for only on the basis of well organized security services.

B. STUDY OF THE DESIRABILITY OF STRENGTHENING INTER-AMERICAN COORDINATION AIMED AT THE MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS

At various inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, the American governments have expressed their intention to adopt joint measures to counteract the activities of international communism.

The Committee considers that, up to the present time, these expressions have been limited in scope and, in practice, have resulted only in total or partial compliance by some governments with the recommendations made in this regard.

Therefore, and in view of the increased activities of communism in the hemisphere, the Committee considers that the time has come to adopt or strengthen effective measures of coordination between all the American countries, and has prepared a study with this purpose in mind (app. I).

C. STUDY OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS

A great deal has been said and written about the apparent or real causes of the aforesaid conflict, but very little on its effects, particularly in reference to its influence on the activities of international communism in the Americas.

The form of presentation of the dispute, which, briefly, consists in the choice of means "to bury the free world"—whether through the application of so-called "peaceful coexistence" on the part of Russia, or through the "use of force" on the part of Communist China—may have created a falsely optimistic concept of its consequences for the Americas.

The influence that the Sino-Soviet conflict may have had, is having, or may have on Communist subversive activities in the Americas has been a constant source of concern to the Special Consultative Committee on Security. For this reason it was considered necessary and opportune to make a study of the problem, which is attached hereto as appendix II.

D. DATE AND AGENDA OF THE FOURTH REGULAR MEETING

The Committee set May 3, 1965, as the tentative date for the opening of its fourth regular meeting.

The following provisional agenda was drawn up:

1. Recent Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere.
2. Legislation in the American countries to limit or curb Communist action.
3. Study of the causes for the development of communism in the hemisphere.
4. Possibility of proposing amendments to the statutes of the Committee in order to improve the performance of its function.
5. Practical results of the various studies and recommendations made by the Committee since it was created.

E. ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN

At the final session, the Committee reelected Dr. Carlos Angulo Rueda and Col. Rodolfo Herrera Pinto as Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively.

CARLOS ANGULO RUEDA,
Chairman of the Committee.
RODOLFO HERRERA PINTO,
Vice Chairman of the Committee.
LUIS W. CICALESE ZIGNAGHO.
CARLOS MARÍA LUNA.
TOMÁS BERENGUEL BURGOS.
PAUL C. DANIELS.
JOAQUÍN ZALDÍVAR.

APPENDIX I

DESIRABILITY OF STRENGTHENING INTER-AMERICAN COORDINATION AIMED AT THE MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CONTENTS

- I. Object of the study.
 - II. International cooperation and coordination.
 - A. Means.
 - B. Methods.
 - III. The organization of American States and the Communist problem.
 - IV. The Organization of American States and cooperation among the member states.
 - V. Conclusion.
- Appendix: Resolution I of the ninth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, "Application of Measures to the Present Government of Cuba."

I. OBJECT OF THE STUDY

At the ninth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in July 1964, important decisions were made in connection with the request by the Government of Venezuela that, in accordance with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the organ of consultation considered measures that should be taken to deal with acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba against the Republic of Venezuela.

In brief, the aforesaid meeting adopted a series of measures tending to isolate the Cuban regime in order to nullify or attenuate its influence as a center for the dissemination of communism in the hemisphere (appendix). These resolutions brought to completion another stage in the defensive action of the American countries against the subversive activities of the present Cuban regime. Nevertheless, the Communist danger having been fully recognized by the American nations, it should be understood that self-defense action against subversion—whether it emanates from Cuba, Moscow, or Peiping—does not end with the measures taken up to now, and that it is necessary to continue in permanent capability to fight against international communism.

Each American country, aware of the need to defend itself, has adopted a series of measures ranging from the creation or improvement of intelligence and security agencies to the passing of laws to counteract or nullify Communist activity.

It is important for the purposes of this study to recall that communism, owing to its international character, does not act in an isolated manner in each country, but involves a network, regulated and conducted from a central point, which is revealed through connections that go beyond national boundaries. Consequently, any action taken locally by the governments against Communist subversion

cannot be made more effective until there is close collaboration and cooperation among them.

It is of interest to note that in an attempt to protect themselves against the activities of organized crime, the various American countries cooperate with the International Police organization, "Interpol," created to combat such activities. However, in the fight against communism—whose subversive activity is equally or more dangerous—the American countries have not yet adopted a coordinated action, even though their respective governments have recognized, since the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), that communism represents a danger to the hemisphere and that measures must be taken to counteract it.

Since the need for such measures of cooperation and coordination has been determined, the purpose of this study is to analyze the means and methods that could be used to implement them, as well as the role the Organization of American States should play in achieving this goal.

II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

A. MEANS

When the various governments wish to coordinate any given mutual activity of an economic, cultural, military, or other nature, they usually avail themselves of the national agencies that are responsible for the development of such an activity. In the fight against international communism, the specific agencies are the security and intelligence services, which are generally regulated and coordinated by a central organ in charge of the overall action. Consequently, it is logical that these are the agencies that should cooperate with one another at an international level.

Unfortunately, these specialized agencies have not yet been created in some countries, while in others their structure and operation are deficient, thereby hampering seriously effective coordination among states.

B. METHODS

Some of the methods for achieving international cooperation in anti-Communist action are the following: bilateral, multilateral, and overall coordination.

Bilateral cooperation consists of agreement by two countries to approach Communist activities jointly. This is the simplest method and it can be the first step toward agreements of wider scope.

The multilateral method presupposes the concurrence of three or more countries that, like the above, succeed in coordinating their efforts for the same ends. As a rule, this method is feasible because of the special characteristics that are common to the countries involved, and it can in practice be regional. It should be noted in this respect that although communism is a common enemy of the hemisphere, its tactics vary from one country to another and from one region to another, according to the various socioeconomic factors.

There can be no doubt that the multilateral method is better adapted than the bilateral for counteracting Communist activities, since action on a broader scope results from coordinating the individual efforts of a larger number of countries.

An example of its application is furnished in the case of the countries of the Central American isthmus, which were forced by the direct threat of Castro communism to coordinate their efforts in order to meet it promptly and appropriately.

The overall method assumes the participation of all the countries affected by the same problem, and in the case of the Americas this includes all the countries of the hemisphere. Generally, when this method is adopted it is advisable, in view of the number of entities that must be coordinated, to centralize the functions of the system under the direction of one organ that coordinates the technical and specialized services of each country.

In order to have a better understanding of the importance of this procedure, it should be remembered that communism succeeds in the world because, among other reasons, it is based on a centralized action, its strategy and tactics resulting from decisions taken at various congresses, meetings, and conferences that give rise to the directives that channel its activities.

An enemy that conducts itself in this manner can only be effectively combated by a coordinated front, in an overall manner, ranging from an exchange of information to planned joint action. Such a front has not yet been presented in the Americas owing to several factors, among which mention can be made of the countries' zeal for their autonomy and their natural nationalistic sentiment.

At the present time action against the Communist danger cannot be delayed, and it is therefore necessary for the American countries to confront it and, as they have done in the case of socioeconomic and cultural problems, create the technical organ that is capable of providing overall coordination to anti-Communist action in the hemisphere.

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE COMMUNIST PROBLEM

The Organization of American States was created as the expression of a feeling of continental solidarity, in the understanding that the welfare of all the countries, as well as their contribution to the progress and the civilization of the world, would increasingly require "intensive continental cooperation" in order, as the Charter of the Organization states, " * * * to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence."

Within those basic principles and with a view to facing the fight against communism, the Organization of American States has developed an action that was first determined at the Ninth International Conference of American States (Bogotá, 1948). That Conference declared "That, by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism * * * is incompatible with the concept of American freedom * * *."

The 10th Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954), in Resolution XCIII, condemned the activities of the international Communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs and, among other things, recommended "the exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the inter-American conferences and meetings of ministers of foreign affairs regarding international communism."

Some years later, in August 1960, at the seventh meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the delegation of Argentina presented a draft resolution that contained the following request:

To convoke, through the Council of the Organization of American States and within a period of 90 days, a specialized conference of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of drafting and signing a treaty that would determine—

(a) the rights and duties of states participating in the struggle against communism; and

(b) the methods best suited for the prevention and eradication of the Communist movement in the hemisphere, creating, if it should be deemed necessary, an inter-American specialized organization.

By the terms of Resolution VI of that meeting, the above draft resolution was transmitted to the Council of the Organization of American States; however, no measures have been taken up to now in this respect.

In January 1962, the eighth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Resolution II, agreed upon the following:

1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto.

2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish a Special Consultative Committee on Security, composed of experts on security matters, for the purpose of advising the member states that may desire and request such assistance * * *.

In short, the American countries expressed their concern over the Communist problem by directing the Council of the Organization of American States to create a technical organ—the Special Consultative Committee on Security; however, they limited its functions to providing advisory services to the member states or to the Council of the Organization, and only at their request.

Subsequently, a Special Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was set up and entrusted by the Council of the Organization of American States with a study of the transfer of funds to the American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in techniques of subversion. That Committee, in collaboration with the Special Consultative Committee on Security, prepared the required study (Doc. OEA/SerG/IV/C-i-605, Rev. 3), which was sent to the various American governments by the Council of the Organization.

In reference to this study, it is important to stress the following conclusions contained in recommendation 6:

To urge the governments of the member states in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the declaratory part of Resolution VI of the eighth meeting of consultation, to provide information on Communist subversive activities on a continuing basis, in order that the Council of the Organization may effectively discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it in Resolution II.1, of the same meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

It is important to point out that, up to the present, the aforesaid recommendation has not been properly carried out.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND COOPERATION AMONG THE MEMBER STATES

The present status of cooperation among the American States in their fight against international communism is as follows:

1. The Organization of American States, at various inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, has repeatedly made recommendations regarding the need for an exchange of information among the governments, as well as the need for them to furnish such information to the Council of the Organization.

2. There is some cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, among certain governments.

3. It is desirable that such cooperation be extended to include all of the American countries.

4. Certain obstacles have been present, and still exist, to prevent a greater measure of cooperation up to now; but it is believed that these can be overcome by setting up a system for cooperation and coordination within the institutional framework of the Organization of American States.

5. The proper organizations in the various countries for establishing the necessary cooperation are the security and intelligence agencies specializing in anti-Communist action.

In the preceding chapter we have noted the principal efforts made by the Organization of American States in the fight against international communism. The question arises as to whether the OAS has yet done all that it can at the level of international cooperation or whether it still should continue its efforts toward this end. The Committee believes that the Organization could do much more to achieve this goal.

In fact, up to the present its efforts have been directed only toward encouraging cooperation among the American countries, as it has stated on a number of occasions. It is now up to the Organization of American States to direct the action that will permit the realization, on the widest possible scale, of this necessary goal.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security has constantly borne in mind the advisability of holding a meeting of the heads of security and intelligence agencies specializing in anti-Communist action, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, in order to establish the basis for real and effective collaboration and cooperation among the said states. Analyzing the problem again in the light of recent manifestations of communism, and being familiar with the organization and operations of certain intelligence services, the Committee now believes that it would be highly advisable to call, at the earliest possible date, a meeting at the ministerial level, in order to establish the basis for obtaining the required cooperation and to insure that the measures adopted in each country are fully effective.

V. CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the Special Consultative Committee on Security considers it a duty to make known to the Organization of American States that it would be advisable to convoke a specialized inter-American conference at the ministerial level, through the proper

organ and as soon as possible, for the purpose of establishing the most appropriate methods for increasing cooperation among the American countries in their struggle against the international Communist movement and, if it is deemed necessary, creating a specialized inter-American organization responsible for the coordination of the individual action carried out by the various governments.

APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

The ninth meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, serving as organ of consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Having seen the report of the investigating committee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as organ of consultation, and

Considering:

That the said report establishes among its conclusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare," and

That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, conflict with the principles and aims of the Inter-American system,

Resolves:

1. To declare that the acts verified by the investigating committee constitute an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states.

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela.

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures:

(a) That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;

(b) That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and

(c) That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted in the present resolution at such time as the Government of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the organ of consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.

6. To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the United Nations Security Council the text of the present resolution, in accordance with the provisions of article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

APPENDIX II

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAS

CONTENTS

- I. Object of the study.
- II. Summary of background facts.
- III. The Chinese Communists in America.
 - A. Their general activities.
 - B. Influence of the conflict on certain Communist Parties in the Americas.
 - C. Considerations.
- IV. Reflections on the effect of the conflict on international Communist activities, particularly subversive activities.
- V. General conclusion.

I. OBJECT OF THE STUDY

For several years there has been worldwide interest in the Sino-Soviet conflict, but in recent months that interest has increased owing to the intensity that has characterized the dispute, which reached its climax with the events in Soviet Russia that put an end to the "Khrushchev Era."

The development of the conflict, which has been commented on fully in various publications, has created a climate of optimism in certain parts of the West, including the Americas, that is promoting the advance of communism.

Most assuredly, recent events in Russia can have a great effect on the future development of the conflict. However, at this time, the situation is at an impasse, which it is deemed will not soon be overcome owing to the intensity of the conflict and the need of the Soviet Government now in power to consolidate its position both at home and in its relations with the Communist Parties of other countries. It is natural to think that so long as the impasse exists, the activities of the groups in both camps will continue in all their intensity, inasmuch as each one will want to establish itself on a more solid base awaiting the time when the impasse is broken.

In view of this situation, it has been considered desirable and opportune to study the influence the conflict is having on the activities of international communism in the Americas, particularly Latin America, owing to the special characteristics of the countries of that region.

Therefore, the Special Consultative Committee on Security wishes to call attention to the problem, to point out its possible consequences, and hopes that this paper will serve as a basis for the continuing study of the effects and manifestations of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Americas.

II. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND FACTS

It would take too long to enumerate the factors that have helped cause the Sino-Soviet conflict to materialize. However it would be well to mention that from the beginning, its origin has been especially economic, historical, and racial. It is not the purpose of this paper to list the various aspects that have caused its present form nor to indicate what its future development will be, since the real and positive fact is that the conflict does exist.

The dispute is expressed chiefly in what appear to be ideological terms and is focused on differences in the methods that should be used to impose communism on others. Basically, however, it involves matters of greater importance within the international Communist movement. These matters involve, in particular, the alleged right of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to maintain its hegemony over the Communist Parties of the world, intervene in their internal affairs, and exercise control of those parties in order to impose its decisions on the congresses and meetings of international communism and obtain *ex post facto* approval by the other parties of actions taken unilaterally by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

With reference to the methods of subversion, a topic that is specifically within the Committee's terms of reference, Russia recognizes that violent revolutions may be inevitable in certain situations, but at the same time it maintains that the revolutionary objectives may be achieved at less cost and with less risk if other tactics are used. To that end, it is skillfully exploiting so-called peaceful coexistence, along with constant agitation and infiltration in all spheres of activity of each country, as well as making constant efforts to strengthen the ranks of the Communist Parties and their effectiveness.

This does not by any means prevent the Soviet Union from carrying out its own clandestine campaign of violence in many countries to supplement the subversive activity being carried on by the "local" Communists in those countries.

For its part, China maintains that violence is the most effective, immediate procedure for establishing communism in the world, and, consequently, it urges the application of all the tactics of Communist struggle in accordance with that principle.

The specific criticism that Communist China aims at the policy of the Soviet Union may be summed up in two accusations:

(a) "Soviet flexibility" will, in the long run, deprive the Communists of the trust and determination needed for an effective revolutionary work; and

(b) Soviet policy oscillates dangerously and erratically between risky maneuvers and shameful withdrawals before the determination of the West.

In this connection and as far as any speculation about the future is concerned, we should bear in mind one of the thoughts expressed by President John F. Kennedy, in referring to the dispute between China and the Soviet Union, when he stated as follows:

What comfort can we take from the increasing strains and tensions within the Communist bloc? Here hope must be tempered with caution. For the Soviet-Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends. A dispute over how to bury the West is no grounds for Western rejoicing.

III. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN AMERICA

A. THEIR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

In recent years, the Chinese Communists have been intensifying their independent operations in Latin America, gradually eliminating or replacing those efforts that had been initiated in cooperation with Moscow.

Their activity is characterized chiefly by an intensive propaganda, political, and subversive nature, which also tends to weaken the posi-

tion of Moscow within the Communist Parties and other leftist circles of Latin America. For that purpose, in May 1960, China set up the Sino-Latin American Cultural & Friendship Association in Peiping, which is also used by the Castro movement to carry out its own subversive program in the Americas. The New China News Agency and the pro-Chinese persons who make up the international front organizations supplement its action.

Beginning in 1963, the activity of the Chinese Communists increased, and it is worth noting that in December 1963, the assistant director of the department of propaganda of the central committee of the Communist Party declared that Latin America was one of the places in the world where political parties that truly represent the proletariat will necessarily arise. The pro-Chinese Communist groups were therefore urged to seize the leadership of their various parties.

Parallel with that activity, economic support was given those groups, and an intensive campaign was begun to strengthen cultural ties, characterized by trips by Communist elements and Chinese sympathizers to Peiping. In this connection, invitations for "cultural" purposes were issued to parliamentarians, politicians, newspapermen, writers, artists, labor leaders and students, and, at the same time, their program of sending their own "cultural" missions to various Latin American countries was intensified. This Chinese Communist penetration program was especially well received by the Communist and intellectual youth groups.

In their efforts to penetrate these countries, the Chinese Communists have used these sympathizers and with their help have established and developed a number of "binational" organizations. Up to the present, the following are known:

Argentina: Sociedad Cultural Chino-Argentina (Chinese-Argentine Cultural Society).

Bolivia: Centro de Amistad Boliviano-Chino-Soviético (Sino-Soviet Bolivian Friendship Center).

Brazil: Sociedad Cultural Chino-Brasileña (Chinese-Brazilian Cultural Society).

Colombia: Asociación de Amigos de China Popular (Association of Friends of the People's Republic of China).

Chile: Instituto Chileno-Chino de Cultura (Chinese-Chilean Cultural Institute).

Mexico: Sociedad de Amistad con China Popular (Society for Friendship With the People's Republic of China).

Peru: Asociación de Amigos de China Popular (Association of Friends of the People's Republic of China).

Uruguay: Sociedad para la Amistad y el Intercambio con China Popular (Society for Friendship and Trade with the People's Republic of China).

Venezuela: Sociedad de Amistad Chino-Venezolana (Chinese-Venezuelan Friendship Society).

The above list, which covers only the period since Communist China began giving added impetus to its relations with Latin America, clearly shows the intensity of its efforts at penetration. However, in some cases, the above-mentioned organizations are actually dominated by Communists and other leftist elements sympathizers of Moscow.

It should be pointed out that in 1963-64, Communist China has made progress in its efforts to increase trade with various countries. It has held trade fairs in several of them, and has set up commercial representatives in others. In this way it has even succeeded in establishing official relations with Latin American countries.

B. INFLUENCE OF THE CONFLICT ON CERTAIN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE AMERICAS

Argentina

With respect to the conflict existing between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the Argentine Communist Party officially announced that it favored the policy supported and upheld by the Soviet Union, through its Secretary General Victorio Codovilla, and outlined its position in the leaflet entitled "Open Letter From the Argentine Communist Party Regarding the Sino-Soviet Ideological Conflict."

Among the considerations given in favor of "world Communist" leadership by Russia, the following are deemed important:

The "Chinese comrades uphold positions that have nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism."

Russia has established its "pro-peace, peaceful coexistence, and disarmament" policies throughout the world.

The Argentine Communist Party is completely in agreement with the statements of the Communist workers parties in 1957 and 1960 and the documents of the XX, XXI, and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

However, this pronouncement did not have the unanimous support of all Communist elements. Therefore, the party is now attempting to find a solution to the problem which, while not serious, is already causing divisions that are making party unity difficult.

The Argentine Communist Party has accused the People's Republic of China of conduct and attitude "that are inadmissible owing to its interference in the affairs of the sister Communist Parties."

Support for the position of Communist China has grown within the Argentine Communist Party and, even though its sympathizers are not numerous there are various groups who favor it, among them:

Communist youth groups, who are considered very important, not because of their total number, but because they constitute the party's reserve.

Infiltrated Trotskyites who support the Chinese policy in the present ideological dispute and are attempting to win over other dissident groups, in order to rise to higher positions within the party.

"Luis E. Recabarren" school, directed by three former members and composed of about 60 persons, most of whom are students, expelled from the party for misbehavior and because they favor Red China. It is believed that this school may try to form a parallel Communist Party as was done in a similar situation in Brazil.

In view of the situation caused by party elements who disagree with the pro-Russian line, the Argentine Communist Party decided to take a number of measures to neutralize the activities of the dissident sections that were aggravating the existing conflict. They, therefore, adopted several measures, the most important of which are the following:

Strict control of the propaganda material being circulated in Communist circles, especially that coming into Argentina from Cuba, which supports the line of the People's Republic of China;

Authorizing the youth segment to discuss basic problems existing in the leadership of world communism from the ideological standpoint, permitting it also to form "revolutionary organizations, but under strict party control in order to prevent any excesses or violence that might develop or any departure from the policy line laid down by the party;

The top party leadership, forced by the pressure of a dissident group (that had the support of Brazilian pro-Chinese elements), authorized the use of violence during "agitation week" (August 1963), using certain elements of the Communist Youth Federation. This shift in policy had been ordered to satisfy the dissident elements who advocate violence and who, if controlled, may be used in those violent actions that tactically are favorable to the Communist Party and also, because it was considered that in this way, the revolutionary fervor so often preached by the top party leaders would not be lost;

A campaign of reeducation in order to prevent party moral decay, which would bring with it the disciplinary relaxation of leaders, members, and sympathizers;

Expulsion of several members owing to their "provocative, disintegrating" activities. This resolution, adopted by the Central Committee of the Federal Capital, was intended to neutralize action by pro-Chinese sympathizing groups;

Wide distribution of the letter addressed by the Soviet Union to Communist China, through its party organs, supplementing the letter with doctrinary concepts for the purpose of making the position of the Argentine Communist Party clear, thereby rechanneling and stabilizing future party activity;

With respect to the policy existing between the Soviet Union and the United States, to spread propaganda to show that such a policy is a necessary tactic for "the time being," and that the Soviet Union is pursuing the same objectives as China, and that therefore the unity of the two is perfectly insured.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) continues to follow the Moscow line. At the Second National Congress in March and April 1964, the Party confirmed pro-Soviet figures as leaders of the Central Committee against a pro-Chinese minority and approved a resolution condemning the dissention of the Chinese Communists. The new Central Committee is made up chiefly of followers of Mario Monje Molina, First Secretary of the pro-Soviet party. Although there is a strong tendency in favor of violent action among Bolivian Communists, which is contrary to the desires of their leader Monje, only a few persons and small groups, both within the party and the Communist youth organization, openly support the Chinese.

The Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) favors the Chinese position. One faction of that badly split group, the "Masas," headed by Guillermo Lora, has made a public statement of open support of the Chinese attitude. Another group of the POR, headed by Hugo González, is allied with the European Fourth International, which tends to approve, on a selective basis, certain aspects of both

the Soviet and Chinese lines. Several other youth groups also strongly support a violent strategy for gaining power. Although they are considered Communist organizations, they are not part of the Bolivian Communist youth organization.

Brazil

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has traditionally maintained very close ties with Moscow, and its leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, has constantly aligned the party with that position. However, there are great differences of ideology and tactics between the PCB and the Brazilian dissident Communist Party (CPB). The leaders of the dissident party maintain that "revisionist concepts" have come to dominate the PCB, and that Prestes and his followers commit sins of "rightist deviationism." In turn, the Prestes group calls the dissident party "divisionist" and "antiparty." The dissidents maintain that they are fighting revisionism and are promoting the class struggle as the only means of "crushing the domination of the present ruling class" in Brazil. They are wholeheartedly opposed to any collaboration with "bourgeois" elements and have accused Khrushchev of being a revisionist, since his doctrine of peaceful co-existence contradicts Marx and Lenin.

The dissidents have systematically attempted to avoid the "error of leftist opportunism, which would isolate the proletariat" and to support the concept of a united front with other revolutionary organizations, while they establish ties with the masses. In this, they, as well as other genuine pro-Chinese Communists, have attempted to separate themselves from the Trotskyites and, as a political tactic, from the leftists as well, even though these latter have supported the revolutionary tactics, and even the basic ideas, of "Che" Guevara. Unlike the PCB, which attributes importance to elections "as a means of attracting the popular forces," the dissidents maintain that the peaceful road, even though desirable, is not possible. To them, the solution of national problems cannot be found through the polls, and elections can be useful in attaining the goals of the revolution only when the appeal to the masses can be made "at a time when the masses are seeking political solutions."

Cuba and Communist China have encouraged the dissidents in different ways, promoting guerrilla attacks, acts of violence in rural areas, and agitation among the masses in the cities. In addition, the CPB cooperated with the peasant leagues organized by Francisco Julião.

Toward the end of 1963, it was announced that the dissident party had declared complete, all-out loyalty to the Chinese line and had released a document harshly criticizing the Soviet attitude. The document stated:

The concessions made by Soviet revisionism and that of the workers' parties compelled to follow this erroneous policy are a halt in the struggle being waged by the peoples of the world to obtain their social emancipation and national freedom. Such concessions are in truth a betrayal of the working class and in Latin America represent, in the last analysis, a contribution to the conservative and reactionary forces against the spontaneous revolution of the masses.

The Chinese Communists have demonstrated that they are willing to accept the Brazilian dissident Communist Party and the official Chinese news organ, People's Daily recently published an article recognizing the leaders of the CPB as the Marxist leaders in Brazil.

It is believed that the article in question was utilized by Prestes, the leader of the PCB, who declared that a crisis had arisen in the relations between his party and the Chinese Communist Party. Earlier, in a communication to Mao Tse-tung, Prestes had emphasized the need for the Communist movement to remain united, as an essential condition for Communist victory, and that measures should be taken to reach an understanding between Brazilian and Chinese Communists.

Reports of the results of recent contacts between Communist China and the leaders of the CPB indicate that Prestes' efforts failed. During those visits undoubtedly the strategy that the CPB ought to follow with respect to the Goulart government and its relations with Prestes' PCB was discussed. Apparently, that was when the decision was made to concentrate the efforts of the dissident party on building an organization of the masses and trying to undermine the PCB position in the leftist movement. That being the case, the Chinese may have repeated the advice they had been giving the leaders of the Communist Parties since 1959, urging them to concentrate a good part of their efforts on organizing a secret apparatus, parallel to this party, which would operate clandestinely along with the regular party under legal or illegal conditions.

The founders of the Communist dissident organization were several ex-members of the Presidium and the PCB Central Committee who were expelled from the regular party for having questioned the leadership of Prestes and the gradualist policy of the PCB. When the new party was organized, the name Brazilian Communist Party was retained and it was proclaimed to be the true Communist Party. In February 1962, the dissident party held a national conference and elected a central committee of 13 members; a little later, a monthly publication, *A Classe Operaria*, was established. This publication has been engaged in a sharp dispute with the PCB official organ, *Novos Rumbos*.

The dissidents are stronger in the States of São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro), which are the bases of operations of the party leaders. The CPB has about 1,000 members, and its leaders are dyed-in-the-wool revolutionaries, convinced that Prestes will be rejected in due course, and that they will be asked to lead the Communist movement in Brazil. The CPB has called attention to events relating to the fall of President Goulart and the ineffectiveness demonstrated by the PCB at that time as proof that its policy is the only one that can succeed. The most important leaders of the CPB are Calil Chadde, João Amazonas, Mauricio Grabois, and Pedro Pomar.

Colombia

The problems arising from the Sino-Soviet conflict began to appear at the Third National Communist Youth Conference, held on September 29 and 30 and October 1, 1961, in the course of which two tendencies, the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet, developed. The former prevailed in the resolutions of the conference, as was reflected in a wave of violence in the rural areas and against North American companies.

This situation reached a crisis at the Fifth Communist Youth Plenary where the pro-Chinese elements demanded that those members who had been expelled as "fractionalists" by the dominant pro-Soviet elements in the leadership of the Colombian Communist Party

be vindicated and reinstated and that the official policy of the Communist Party, both domestic and international, be reformed. The disagreement reached such a point that the fractions held two separate meetings. The result was a division of the officers of the youth organization into two groups:

1. The pro-Chinese Colombian Communist Youth (JCC), which appointed its own authorities and announced its complete separation from the leadership of the Communist Party, which it accused of having betrayed the Marxist-Leninist principles and having prevented the young people from playing their primary role in the revolutionary and "liberation" process of Colombia.

The resolutions of this fraction proclaim their full support of the Chinese in their dispute with the Russians and urge the revolutionary organizations and movements to join their ranks in order to form the national liberation front whose goal would be "power for the popular classes." This document was widely distributed through the New China News Agency, while the Soviet press did the same with the charges by the Communist Party against the dissident group.

2. The Colombian Communist Youth Organization (JUCO), which was headed by orthodox Communists, who hastened to confirm that they were the legitimate representatives of youth and appeal to the fractions to remain loyal to its directives. The four officers of the JCC were expelled and removed from their positions on the Central Committee.

The conclusions of the fifth plenary confirm repudiation of the methods used by the Chinese comrades, affirming that "they are not in line with either the spirit or the letter of the declaration of 81 Communist Parties" and, in addition, they attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the foreign parties, stimulating divisive activity. However, with respect to the domestic level, despite the fact that 1964 had been announced as "the year of self-defense," Communist youth was encouraged to move from the defensive to the offensive.

This is a good example of how, if necessary, the Soviet line can be interpreted to justify preparation for violent struggle.

At the end of February 1964, the national plenary held in Colombia unequivocally affirmed party loyalty to Moscow.

Costa Rica

The conflict between China and the Soviet Union has caused differences in the Communist ranks and the division into two camps, headed by Adolfo Herrera García and Manuel Mora Valverde, the former in support of the Peiping leadership and the latter, the leadership of Moscow.

At its plenary session in August 1963, the People's Vanguard Party (Partido Vanguardia Popular) came out officially in favor of the Soviet Union, accusing the Chinese of trying to hide the consequences of a thermonuclear war and of leading the "Socialist camp" into economic isolation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the magazine *China Today* is being circulated in Costa Rica, and in a short time has obtained more than 1,000 subscribers.

Chile

In the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Chile categorically adopted the Moscow line, issuing a num-

ber of statements and accusations against the Chinese Communist Party and reiterating its full support of the Khrushchev line.

Luis Corvalán, secretary of the Communist Party, made a number of statements to the effect that the party was unquestionably in accord with the Soviet position, and that it is a firm supporter of peaceful coexistence, thereby seeking to maintain a national climate that would enable the Communist Party to continue the political struggle for power.

In a celebration of the anniversary of the Chinese revolution, several events were held with the support of dissident sectors of the Communist Party and leaders of the revolutionary popular action front. The central committee reacted violently, stating that such acts would have repercussions on Allende's candidacy and ordered party militants not to attend other similar events. Disobedience of this order led to the expulsion of several activists.

Undoubtedly, in view of Chile's political situation and the opportunities afforded the Communist Party by that situation, it will not at present shift its line of full support of Moscow and so called peaceful coexistence. Although the defeat of the presidential candidate of the Communist Party at the last elections provides the pro-Chinese dissidents with new and convincing arguments that they can use in their struggle against the leadership of Corvalán, the Communist Party is firmly determined to demonstrate by deed, rather than by polemics, that its general strategy is correct and advantageous.

Ecuador

There is profound dissension in the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) between the group that favors the gradualist traditional leadership, which follows Moscow, that is to say, the secretary General of the party and the national executive committee with its headquarters in Guayaquil, and the group that favors violence whose principal nucleus is the Provincial Committee of Pichincha in Quito. Personal and regional rivalries contribute to the differences between the two groups, but the principal point of friction stems from the differing concepts of the tactics the party should employ. The gradualist group alleges that good results can be attained by peaceful means through penetration of leadership circles and mobilization of the masses, while the group that favors violence insists on the need for immediate armed insurrection. Both groups maintain that they are the legitimate Communist Party, and each one has expelled the other.

The group that favors the "hard" line is composed at present of a sizable minority of the PCE and has obtained the support of the principal Communist and pro-Communist youth and or student groups as well as of other extreme leftist revolutionary groups. The Soviet group has, for its part, been active for several years in the labor movement, in student and teacher organizations, in universities, and in cultural institutions.

The leaders of the group that favors violence, who began to appear in 1959 and 1960, have been visiting Communist China ever since 1956 and possibly even earlier. In May 1963, an Ecuadoran Communist leader was arrested in Quito, upon his return from Communist China, with \$25,000 that he was attempting to bring into the country apparently for subversive purposes. Despite the insurrection aims they pursue, the activities of the group have thus far been limited.

They appear to have participated in sporadic sabotage actions in the cities of Quito and Guayaquil. The former office of the New China News Agency in Ecuador served as a means of communication between China and the Ecuadoran Communists until it was closed by order of the military junta in 1963.

British Guiana

In this country the Popular Progressive Party, of Communist tendency, in general maintains a neutral line with respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

According to the policy of Jagan, his platform is in harmony with the Soviet thesis of "united fronts," including the middle class, through which a "national democratic government of national liberation," as the Soviet doctrine indicates, should be established. There is a sector of marked pro-Chinese tendency, which is promoted by Jagan's own wife, Janet.

Guatemala

Two trends stand out in the Guatemalan Communist picture, that is to say:

1. The "Maoist," which agrees with the position of Havana and supports the use of violence;

2. The "Khrushchevist," which, although it agrees with the above, advocates strengthening the party, through its "leftist front" program with the various sectors.

The conflict was the subject of special attention during the preparations for the fourth congress, which according to party regulations should have been held in 1963, but the tactical line of the party has adapted itself faithfully to the development of local events. An indication of this is the declaration of the Central Committee in April 1963 regarding the need to give all possible assistance to the armed struggle, which was followed (after the coup d'etat against Ydigoras Fuentes) by an appeal for moderation, based on the fact that the guerrilla operations were not yet sufficiently strong to bring success to a revolutionary movement.

In commenting on the nuclear test ban treaty, the Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist) followed the example of other similar Central American parties, condemning the "disgraceful position of the Chinese" in their dispute with the Soviet Union. In September 1963, Communist propaganda stated that all the avenues to peace were closed to the Guatemalan people, and that there was no way out except to flee to the mountains and continue their struggle there.

It should be noted that in that same month of September, a "week of solidarity with the Guatemalan people," was celebrated in Havana, followed by a seminar headed by José Manuel Fortuny, a member of the Central Committee of the party, where a combination of the two theses was achieved: The impetus of revolutionary action through the unity of leftist opposition.

Nicaragua

Nicaraguan communism fully identified itself with the general line that advocates the desirability of supporting peaceful coexistence as a means of accelerating and creating a local atmosphere favorable to a possible revolution. It severely criticized the Chinese argument, but in the last analysis, its activities are aimed at the seizure of power by violent means.

Panama

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have demonstrated that they are very much interested in Panama. The Soviet Union, in particular, has provided training and guidance facilities for members of the People's Party and other Panamanian extremists. Soviet propaganda has consistently alleged that the Panama Canal treaties are an example of imperialist exploitation. Both Communist countries wasted no time in allying themselves with Panama during the anti-U.S. demonstrations in January 1964. Moscow pointed out the "great danger" to world peace constituted by the imperialist military bases on foreign soil. Peiping mobilized all its propaganda forces to denounce alleged acts of aggression by the United States in Panama and to make known China's support of Panamanian demands regarding sovereignty in the Canal Zone.

The People's Party (PDP) has been a strong supporter of the Moscow policy, and its relations with Communist China have been diminishing as the split between China and the Soviets has widened. Loyalty to Moscow has placed the party in a situation of bitter rivalry with the National Action Vanguard (VAN), a Marxist Party that favors Cuba. Both groups have attempted to influence the extremist elements that have been advocating a revolution in Panama for more than 3 years. The PDP resents the fact that VAN has obtained more help from Castro than it has, even though both groups cooperated in the anti-U.S. riots in January 1964. Afterward, these groups joined forces with extremist elements to exert pressure on President Chiari to stand firm in his requests for renegotiation of the basic Panama Canal Treaty signed with the United States.

VAN considers revolution by force and violence the only way to get the United States out of the Canal Zone and overthrow the "oligarchy." A firm supporter of Cuba and Communist China, it also favors the establishment in Panama of a government of the Castro type. Many of its activities are concentrated on obtaining and training converts for the "inevitable revolution." VAN is composed, for the most part, of young Marxist extremists. It lacks a complete administrative structure, but that fact has not caused it any insuperable obstacles. Like PDP, although VAN attracts students and the organized worker, it also has the support of the farmers.

Paraguay

The Chinese-Soviet split has caused a division in the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP). Although the major forces of the party support the Soviet Union, a group that supports Peiping has formed the so-called Paraguayan Leninist Communist Party, which has a base in Montevideo and possibly in Argentina and which is trying to extend its operations to its own country.

Peru

A section of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), which favors the Chinese Communist line, since it advocates violent revolution and also supports Cuba, has caused a split in the party. At a so-called national congress held by this group in January 1964, it "expelled" nine orthodox members of the PCP, including Secretary General Raúl Acosta, on the grounds that they were political traitors and immoral persons. Acosta immediately called the dissidents "antiparty

rebels" and accused them of usurping the name of the Central Committee. The new self-appointed leader of the dissident PCP, Saturnino Paredes, has declared that his group will adopt a severely independent line in the policy to be followed with the present government. He has also stated that the National Farm Confederation, of which he is the legal adviser, has ordered the farmers to invade large land holdings.

It is not yet clear what support the pro-Chinese group in the PCP has, but it is likely to have increased its influence on the leaders who favor the Soviets. Although it is difficult to appraise the exact strength of the rival factions, there are indications that the pro-Chinese group is dominant in almost all the regional organizations of the party, including the Departmental Committee of Lima. Probably the bulk of the members of the old guard of the urban area of Lima and Callao itself remains loyal to the orthodox Moscow-oriented leaders. This last group can probably count on almost all the Communist element in the large organizations. However, the faction that favors Peiping and is under the control of Paredes appears to be more active at present, whether or not it speaks for the majority of the party members. The orthodox party leaders appear to be having difficulty in taking effective measures to prevent being removed from office by those who propose to seize power by violent means.

Nearly all the other Peruvian extreme leftist organizations favor violence, defined according to Peiping policy. The Communist youth group is following that line. These forces have pledged to use guerrilla and terrorist methods against the Government and to wage the social revolution. The activist approach appears to be directed toward creating unstable situations in the rural areas to destroy the established institutions. The Castro model and Cuban and Communist Chinese support in the form of economic aid and training are important to this group.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Communist leaders are in exile in Cuba and are spreading the pro-Soviet line. Within the country, the 14th of June Party and the Dominican Popular Movement adhere to Chinese policy, while the Popular Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Nationalist Party follow the Moscow line.

Uruguay

The Communist Party of Uruguay has traditionally followed the general line issuing from Moscow. This was categorically reaffirmed at the annual departmental conference in Montevideo, held by the Communist Party in the first half of August 1964, at which time it condemned the "revisionist positions of Marxism-Leninism upheld by the Chinese leaders * * *."

It should be emphasized that the activities of terrorist groups have already been manifested in thefts of weapons and explosives, and armed attacks on banking institutions which, when discussed, have been defended by political, labor, and student groups. An important role in these activities has been played by the Revolutionary Labor Party, a Trotskyite movement that does not yet have a political organization of any significance, but does have abundant economic resources, and, in its organization, a number of cells that are deter-

mined to carry on acts of terrorism and sabotage, apparently following the violent tactic favored by the Peiping Communists.

Consequently, although the Communist movement in Uruguay continues to follow Moscow, the sporadic acts of violence reveal the existence of Communist currents that support the Chinese line or show that the Uruguayan Communist Party has found it desirable at this time to use violent methods as part of its tactics, which, however, does not in any way contradict its traditional support of Moscow.

Venezuela

The Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), which now has three divergent currents of opinion, began the policy it is now following at the end of 1960 when the Chinese-Soviet differences had just begun to affect other parties. The policy of armed conflict, which is being carried out through the National Liberation Front at the political level and the Armed Forces of National Liberation at the combat level, was adopted by the party at its third congress in 1961.

Like certain other parties (the Indonesian and Vietnamese, for example), the PCV is concerned lest a widening of the Chinese-Soviet rift injure its revolutionary prospects, its local alliances, and its internal unity. Dedicated since 1961 to violent conflict, the PCV and its principal ally, the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) did not experience any serious internal problems until it became obvious that there was very little likelihood that their efforts to overthrow the Government would succeed.

Especially enlightening are the conclusions reached by the Central Committee of the PCV as expressed at a meeting on April 26, 1964, between representatives of the PCV and the MIR:

(a) The primary objective of the Venezuelan Communist Party is to regain the support and cooperation of the masses. To that end, all terrorist acts in the cities will be suspended for the time being, while an intensive campaign of propaganda and recruiting is carried out. In the rural areas, the primary task of the guerrillas will be to win the support of the farmers.

(b) The suspension of the terrorist campaign will pave the way for the rehabilitation of the party. Consequently, weapons will be used only to repel aggression without provoking the police or security forces.

(c) Nevertheless, the fundamental method of conducting the revolution in Venezuela continues to be armed conflict. The members of the party should be prepared to resume armed conflict whenever the conditions are favorable. This may be in "15 days or 15 years." In the meantime, the bands of guerrillas in the rural areas will be reinforced, and their lines of communication improved.

Despite the existence of three divergent currents of opinion within the PCV, there has been no public split up to the present, nor has any disciplinary action been taken. One group, the one in favor of the "soft line" or "peaceful coexistence," which is present in both parties (PCV and MIR), is anxious to remove the National Liberation Front from armed struggle at any cost and, if necessary, going back on decisions made previously, separate those leaders who are definitely identified with that policy. The second and, up to now, the dominant group continues a policy of urban terrorism and active guerrilla

fighting on the premise that this kind of action is the only means whereby a revolutionary situation will be created. This group is particularly strong owing to its support of the Castro regime and its subversive program, especially as formulated by "Che" Guevara. The third group, whose attitude is the closest to the Chinese views, argues that armed conflict may be suspended but not repudiated, and that there should be no letup in efforts to strengthen the FLN among the farmers and laborers. To that end, they advocate intensifying agitation to obtain local economic demands in order to create a climate favorable for the reconstruction of their basic organization and thus later the resumption of frankly political agitation.

It is significant that the PCV—the only party in Latin America that has refused to take a position on the Sino-Soviet dispute and that follows closely the attitude of the Castro Communists—has not thus far revealed any open internal splits or expulsions. Of equal importance is the evidence that the dissension and factional currents noted within the PCV and the MIR are caused by the urgent need to adopt new policies in view of the defeats suffered at the hands of the Venezuelan people and Government. Lastly, the case of Venezuela demonstrates that it would be an oversimplification to conclude that the pro-Soviet elements exclude armed conflict as an appropriate course of action, and that the pro-Chinese are dedicated to a policy of immediate armed action everywhere and at any time.

C. CONSIDERATIONS

The study of the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict, especially among the members of the Communist Parties mentioned, leads us to the following considerations:

1. The majority of the top leaders of the Communist Parties in the Latin American countries continue to favor the Soviet position.
2. The efforts of the pro-Chinese Communists to seize the leadership of the Communist political forces have been most successful in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil.
3. Division and damage to unity within the Communist Parties have been most evident when the party leaders have taken sides in the dispute.
4. The Chinese argument that the violent revolutionary struggle is still the only realistic way to overthrow existing regimes has been widely accepted among young Communists and intellectuals.
5. The most convincing Chinese Communist arguments relating to the best means of preparing the groundwork for establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" are being used in a long-range effort within and against the Communist Parties to discredit and eliminate the pro-Soviet leaders of the Communist movement in Latin America and, ultimately, obtain the support of those parties for the Chinese viewpoint in the international movement.

It should be mentioned that, up to now, only the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the Communist movement has been analyzed. It would be interesting to be able to reach conclusions concerning how that influence, in turn, affects the activities—particularly the subversive activities—of international communism in the Americas. The following chapter deals with that subject.

IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

It should be borne in mind, in the course of the reflections herein set forth, that although the conflict is manifested primarily in two well-known catch phrases: "peaceful coexistence" by Russia and the "use of force" by Communist China, there is only one objective—to establish the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat.

It should also be remembered that within the group of countries that make up the Organization of American States, a marked distinction should be made, when discussing the possible consequences the conflict between China and the Soviet Union may have on Communist subversive activity, between the United States and the Latin American countries, where the Communist Parties have, for many years, had greater possibilities for development.

As a matter of fact, it should be pointed out that the United States, in addition to being a member of the Organization of American States, is in a very special situation because it bears the heaviest responsibility in the confrontation with international communism. This special situation of the United States will not be analyzed here, since it is beyond the limits of this paper. However, it should be noted that this situation may indirectly influence the effects of the conflict on the rest of the American countries.

The United States of America is politically, economically, and socially established on firm bases. The very national character of its people rejects the ways of communism. However, even though there are U.S. citizens who are active Communists, the people are not a favorable receptacle for the Communist action they attempt to carry out, whether on the basis of the Soviet policy or the Chinese thesis.

That is to say, because of this situation of greater internal immunity, it is feasible for the United States to conduct its own policy toward the Communist bloc, whether represented by the Russian policy or the Chinese policy, since neither one appears to represent any immediate danger on its home front, as stated above.

This special position of the United States, and its independence in developing its own policy, can have an effect on the rest of the American countries by contributing to the formation of a false concept of the "peaceful coexistence" advocated by Russia.

In effect, the Soviet line, by opposing the Chinese Communist line in favor of the use of force, would appear to imply that Russia has renounced the use of force, whereas the truth is that Russian communism continues its efforts toward world domination regardless of methods. This is an aspect that favors communism politically, since in countries not politically and legally constituted so as to cope with the present world situation, Russia finds that its well-known policy of "united fronts" facilitates penetration.

Likewise, we must bear in mind, in this analysis of the effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Americas, the manner in which international communism has consistently acted. In this connection, its activity has always been manifested by an open party action and by a parallel clandestine action definitely subversive in character. Even accepting in good faith the Russian line of "peaceful coexistence,"

we find that in practice communism acts in accordance with that policy, on the one hand, and, on the other, in a subversive manner by the use of force in all its forms as advocated by Communist China. Does this change the picture of Communist activities in Latin America? The daily account of the violent action perpetrated by communism in this part of the world makes the answer unmistakable.

We must consider that, in general, in Latin America there exists a socioeconomic situation whose deficiencies form substantially one of the basic aspects of the problem. The result of this situation is that there is a large mass of discontented people ready to accept any apparent solution of their problems, including the Communist solution, often presented in a "sugar coated" form, with a claim of obtaining better living conditions on the basis of an elementary, though erroneous, rationalization that any change will bring these people more favorable living conditions. Considering both the Chinese and Russian formulas for obtaining solutions, the apparent road selected by Russia may be longer for them and, consequently, the Chinese line has already won over groups of opinion and action, as stated in the preceding chapter.

We have seen in that chapter Communist China's great interest in Latin America. Basing ourselves on the premise that Russia has by no means ceased to maintain its hegemony over the Communist movements of the various countries, we find ourselves facing the fact that Latin America will continue to be a vast arena in which both Peiping and Moscow will continue fighting for supremacy. It is believed that this power struggle will create new factors of disturbance, especially in labor circles, where both groups will continue a competition characterized by revolutionary action, each one trying to demonstrate that it is capable of obtaining greater benefits and creating labor problems that, in the last analysis, have nothing to do with the workers and their true needs.

In line with these arguments, we must also consider what the manifestations of Communist activities, especially subversive activities, in Latin America are. Could it be said that they obey Moscow or Peiping? Or are such manifestations usually Castro-Communist in character?

The Sino-Soviet conflict has philosophical facets. The vast majority of the Latin American masses are still living, politically and culturally speaking, in the "caudillo" era, and it is not being rash to say that the conflict, with its problems of Marxist dialectics, has not yet had any impact on them. The fact that the Chinese Communist effort is directed chiefly toward the intellectual and youth element and toward the leaders of the Communist Parties corroborates this affirmation.

What has been said concerning the "caudillo" tradition of the Latin American masses has, since the beginning, been understood by Russia, which has skillfully exploited the figure of Fidel Castro, exalting his image through its extraordinary propaganda machinery, to such a point that in Latin America communism is acquiring another name, "Castro communism." The dominant role that Castro communism is playing in the Americas permits one to predict that at the meetings of international communism, Cuba and its United Party of the Socialist Revolution may have a unifying effect on the tendencies that have thus far appeared within the Communist movement in this hemisphere.

V. GENERAL CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters certain considerations and reflections have been set forth that implicitly contain their own appropriate conclusions. As a corollary, after establishing that Communist subversion continues to increase in Latin America, the Special Consultative Committee on Security deems it advisable to state as a general conclusion that the dispute between China and the Soviet Union has not diminished the subversive activities of international communism in the Americas, but that, on the contrary, it has, and does, constitute, in many countries, a greater incentive for the use of methods of violence.

FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN STATES

Submitted at the Fourth Plenary Session (closed) held on
May 7 and 8, 1965

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics adopted a resolution establishing a special committee, composed of representatives of five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama, for the purpose and with the powers set forth by the resolution in the following terms [the Tenth Meeting of Consultation]:

2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:

(a) To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:

i. A cease-fire; and

ii. The orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and

(b) To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this meeting;

3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible;

4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the committee; * * *

The Special Committee referred to in the resolution of May 1, 1965, quoted in part above, was made up as follows:

MEMBERS

Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina.

Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, Representative of Brazil.

Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.

Ambassador Carlos García Bauer, Representative of Guatemala.

Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., Representative of Panama.

CIVILIAN ADVISERS

Dr. Federico Carlos Barttfeld, Argentina.
Mr. Regis Novaes de Oliveira, Brazil.
Mr. Julio Mérida, Guatemala.
Mr. Miguel Corro, Panama.

MILITARY ADVISERS

Col. Juan Giró Tapper, Argentina.
Col. Lannes de Souza Caminha, Brazil.
Maj. Gen. César A. Cabrera, Colombia.
Maj. Federico Abundio Maldonado, Guatemala.
Col. Francisco Aued, Panama.

SECRETARIAT

Dr. Roberto E. Quirós, Adviser of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.
Mr. Miguel Aranguren, Director, Department of Public Information.
Mr. Modesto Lucero, Secretary.
Mr. Jorge Zamorano, Assistant.
Mr. Orlando García, Assistant.

In accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and in view of the urgency of the situation in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee decided to install itself immediately and unanimously elected as its Chairman Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina. The Committee also decided to depart for the capital of the Dominican Republic that same night, in order to lose no time in beginning its difficult work. It therefore left Washington, D.C., at 5 a.m. on Sunday, May 2.

II. THE SITUATION IN SANTO DOMINGO

From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city on a war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding bloody incidents in various parts of the city.

The Special Committee set up its center of activities and its secretariat in the Hotel Embajador, and early Sunday afternoon, May 2, it began to make contact with the diplomatic corps and the various authorities and military commands existing in the capital, in order to

obtain more precise information on what had happened and to achieve a cease fire.

III. A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

The Special Committee unanimously decided to lose no time in taking steps to obtain a cease-fire and to comply with the objectives of its mission set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

According to telephone conversations between the Secretary General of the Organization and the Pan American Union, as reported in document OEA/Ser.G/V/ C-d-1312 (English) of April 30, 1965, the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, was in contact with many leaders of all factions. He had spoken to Colonel Benoit of the Dominican armed forces, headquartered in San Isidro, and with Colonel Caamaño, chief of the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista"; with other groups in the New City, with Mr. José Rafael Molina Urueña, and with Mr. Juan Bosch, the latter in Puerto Rico.

The dean of the diplomatic corps acted promptly on the anxious request of the Council of the Organization, contained in its cable of April 29, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/VI/C/INF-571 (English)], which read:

To His Excellency Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Santo Domingo:

Deeply disturbed by the intense struggle that has desolated the sister Dominican Republic and desirous of preventing a further shedding of blood, the Council of the Organization has instructed me to convey to you, as dean of the diplomatic corps in that capital, and through you to the diplomatic representatives of the American Republics, to the Dominican authorities, to the political parties of whatever tendency, and to the Dominican people, its strong desire that all armed action or hostilities be suspended.

The Council has requested me to make this humanitarian message known, in the assurance that it will be possible for the Dominican people to decide their national destinies in peace and with the protection of the institutions of the Inter-American System. I request that, in view of the urgent circumstances, you advise me as soon as possible regarding the situation in the country and the prospects for achieving an immediate cease-fire, for the purpose of informing the Council of the Organization, which remains attentive to the development of events.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Dr. José A. Mora,

Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

On April 30, a preliminary cease-fire agreement between the two conflicting factions was negotiated by the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps, on the following terms:

1. [That] assurance is given to save the lives of all persons, regardless of their ideology or of the faction they are defending, including prisoners and asylees.
2. That an Organization of American States commission shall agree to serve as arbitrator in the conflict [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1312 (English)].

Nevertheless, in spite of this preliminary agreement signed by the two conflicting factions, the situation on the afternoon of May 2 continued very serious in the Dominican capital.

This was the judgment of the Special Committee, and it was shared by the dean of the diplomatic corps and by the Ambassadors and chargés d'affaires of the American states in Santo Domingo. No one in that tortured city had any doubt whatsoever that it was essential to conclude another agreement, more comprehensive than the earlier cease-fire agreement. The action of the Special Committee was hopefully anticipated and willingly accepted by all who had been awaiting our arrival.

The Special Committee thus lost no time in making contact with the two conflicting factions, the one in the New City and the one headquartered in San Isidro. This was extremely difficult because of the complete lack of communications in the city and because the Committee had no guarantee of safety in its travel through the streets. Consequently, it had to use a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter to go to San Isidro and then ask the dean of the diplomatic corps to take the Committee in his car to the New City, where it met with the command then headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño. These interviews took place on Monday, May 3; it was physically impossible to hold them on Sunday night, because in addition to the lack of transportation, the capital city had no telephone service, and the interviews had to be conducted by emissaries of each of the factions of the strife-ridden city.

IV. CONFERENCES WITH BOTH SIDES

On Monday morning, May 3, the members of the Special Committee went with the dean of the diplomatic corps in his car to the general headquarters of the forces under the command of Col. Francisco Caamaño in the New City.

All the Committee members and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States attended the conference. Attending for the command were Col. Francisco Caamaño, Dr. Héctor Aristy, Lt. Col. R. Augusto Giménez Herrera, and other individuals, who, with the ones named, claimed to represent the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista." The conference began at 11 a.m. and was held in the place designated by that command. The meeting was held in a tense atmosphere, and continual firing could be heard through the windows.

The Special Committee explained its terms of reference as set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965, adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and, manifesting intense concern for the Dominican people, it said that it was absolutely necessary to reaffirm the initial cease-fire, which had been agreed to but only incompletely carried out.

Dr. Héctor Aristy explained the position of the command, making the following principal points:

(a) The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño complained that it had not been consulted regarding the establishment in the city of Santo Domingo of a zone guarded by the Armed Forces of the United States.

(b) This command believed that the Armed Forces of the United States were constantly expanding this zone and penetrating the city further and further.

(c) The command believed, according to Dr. Héctor Aristy's own words, that "General Wessin's troops and those of the CEFA (Training Center of the Dominican Armed Forces) are entering the city close behind the American troops."

(d) The command attributed the incidents that had occurred in the last few days to snipers of General Wessin's forces.

(e) Above all, the command wanted a clarification and a guarantee regarding the zone occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Special Committee immediately made the following explanation to Colonel Caamaño and to his spokesman:

(a) The zone guarded by the Armed Forces of the United States was the same as the one referred to in the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization on April 30, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1310 (English)], and had the purpose defined in paragraph 2 thereof, which reads as follows:

To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safehaven.

(b) The aim of the Special Committee was to come to agree with the interested parties on a precise demarcation of the zone, including therein all the diplomatic missions, in order to prevent incidents due to ignorance of its boundaries.

As spokesman for Col. Francisco Caamaño and his command, Dr. Héctor Aristy, raised the question of the establishment of an access or communications corridor between the zone and the San Isidro sector, which cut the command's forces into two parts. Indeed, on the night of May 2, the Armed Forces of the United States had felt it necessary to establish a communications route, using San Juan and Teniente Amado García Streets up to the right bridgehead of Juan Pablo Duarte Bridge, for the purpose, they said, of transporting food, medicine, and provisions from the base at San Isidro to the center of the city.

The Special Committee explained to Dr. Héctor Aristy the reasons that, in their understanding, existed for the establishment of that communications route. Dr. Héctor Aristy said that the command he represented wanted that corridor or communications route, if maintained, to be under the supervision of a military police guard made up of men from its own forces and from United States forces. On behalf of the command, he expressed the wish that if this proposal were not accepted, then the U.S. Armed Forces should place no personnel other than military police there.

This request regarding supervision of the corridor or access route was also transmitted by the Special Committee to the Ambassador of the United States.

Finally, during the course of this conference on the morning of May 3, Dr. Héctor Aristy, as spokesman for the command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño, made a specific request: That in no event should the new cease-fire agreement or any other agreement sponsored by the Special Committee be signed on behalf of the Military Junta led by Colonel Benoit with headquarters at San Isidro by any of the following seven generals:

1. Gen. Elías Wessin y Wessin.
2. Gen. de los Santos Céspedes.
3. Gen. Belisario Peguero Guerrero.
4. Gen. Salvador Augusto Montez Guerrero.
5. Gen. Atila Luna.
6. Gen. Marco Aníbal Rivera Cuesta.
7. Comodoro Rivera Caminero.

The command headed by Col. Francisco Caamaño emphatically and specifically excluded General Wessin y Wessin from any understanding whatsoever.

In the course of the interview Col. Francisco Caamaño and his companions furnished additional information. The forces of this command had taken 500 prisoners of the combat forces of General Wessin y Wessin. These prisoners were mainly soldiers and police agents, some of whom, according to Colonel Caamaño, wanted to fight in his own units. He had opposed this in order that it might not be said that it was on his orders, adding that if the Organization of American States wished to take charge of those prisoners he would accede to that. He also reported that the same units had captured 21 tanks during the course of the fighting in the city of Santo Domingo that occurred on the preceding days.

Three additional questions were cleared up during this interview with Colonel Caamaño: the acceptance by that command of complete protection to the embassies, with enlargement of the safety zone sufficiently to include the premises of the diplomatic missions in the city of Santo Domingo; similar acceptance of the departure of the asylees or refugees in the various embassies of that city who wished to leave by their own decision; and of the facilities of every kind that should be agreed upon for the Special Committee and the International Red Cross for the distribution of food and medicine and the installation of hospital equipment for the Dominican people without distinction of any kind.

The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called Constitutional Military Command to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in a loud voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you doing here?" The person replied: "I am André Rivière; my nationality is French; I fought in the French Army in Indochina; and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." While he took no part in the conversations, Rivière was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious. Some information obtained later regarding this soldier was to the effect that he was an instructor of frogmen who had arrived at Santo Domingo during the Trujillo regime.

The interview ended with the promise by Col. Francisco Caamaño and his companions to accept the mediation of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and by the Committee that it would maintain the contacts to reach a specific cease-fire agreement after learning the conditions and reasons of the Military Junta of Colonel Benoit.

Meanwhile the situation in the capital was becoming more acute and threatening as the afternoon wore on. From both parties reports reached the Committee regarding incidents that each attributed to its adversary, and the chiefs of mission of the embassies accredited in Santo Domingo were becoming anxious for prompt ratification of the cease-fire. All of this gave a decisive character to these conversations.

The Special Committee, for physical reasons of communication with the San Isidro base, was unable to get as far as the headquarters of the Military Junta headed by Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit until the night of Monday, May 3. That night the Special Committee and the Military Junta held a conference, attended on the part of the Junta by its members: Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President of the Junta, Col. Enrique A. Casado Saladin, and Navy Captain Olgo M. Santana Carrasco. During the last part of the interview, General Wessin y Wessin was present, at the request of the Committee.

The Special Committee, in the presence of the dean of the diplomatic corps and of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, opened the interview in the same way and in the same terms as those used with the command of Colonel Caamaño; that is, by reference to the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation and to the concern caused to it by the state of the strife in Santo Domingo.

The Military Junta directed by Colonel Benoit is installed at the base of San Isidro, where at the time of our interview a considerable part of the U.S. military force also was located.

Throughout the interview its President, Colonel Benoit, spoke on behalf of the Military Junta, while his two companions remained silent. No other officer or person except the members of the Junta was present.

Colonel Benoit spoke at length of the happenings that befell the Junta of Government presided over by Mr. Donald Reid Cabral, and told how the insurrection of April 24 had been suddenly shifted from its initial objectives to degenerate into the most complete anarchy. The initial authors of the military coup against Mr. Reid Cabral lost control of the movement and were without authority and without power of any kind. Therefore, Colonel Benoit stated, the movement that was aimed at restoring former President Bosch or, failing this, Dr. Rafael Molina Ureña to power had failed, but that what remained was a situation fraught with danger and that demanded a prompt solution.

Colonel Benoit likewise said he had not wished to order an attack on the city of Santo Domingo, where the forces commanded by Colonel Caamaño were located, out of respect for the lives of innumerable persons, but that he had enough forces to do so. In the same manner, he stated that the junta he headed accepted the security zone, with expansion of it so as to include all the diplomatic missions; the measures essential for the protection of those missions in Santo Domingo with the extension of that zone; and, likewise, cooperation in the distribution of food and medicine and the establishment of health teams.

The Special Committee endeavored to ascertain whether it was true that the action of U.S. military forces in Dominican territory had been requested. To this end, during the interview held on the night of Monday, May 3, it requested any information on the matter that Colonel Benoit or the members of the junta that he headed could supply.

Colonel Benoit explained that the deterioration of public order in the city of Santo Domingo, which started on the day that the movement against Mr. Reid Cabral began, and the conditions of anarchy and complete disorder that prevailed in the capital of the country had led him to request the aid of U.S. armed forces in order to give pro-

tection to the diplomatic missions and foreign persons and entities in general. Colonel Benoit added that he had received an urgent request from the diplomatic missions for protection that he was not able to provide.

Colonel Benoit also stated that the request had been made to the United States in a note, a copy of which was transmitted later to the Special Committee, which read literally and in full, as follows:

Seal of the Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
Dominican Air Force
Office of the Chief of Staff
Base Aérea "19 de Noviembre"
San Isidro, Distrito Nacional

APRIL 28, 1965.

The AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES,
United States Embassy,
Santo Domingo.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Regarding my earlier request I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide adequate protection, I therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order in this country.

Truly yours,

PEDRO BARTOLOME BENOIT,
*Colonel, Presidente de la Junta Militar del
Gobierno de la República Dominicana.*

The result of this interview was a promise made by the Military Junta, composed of Colonel Benoit, Col. Casado Saladín, and Navy Capt. Santana Carrasco, to accept the authority of the Special Committee, primarily for the essential and undelayable purpose of obtaining a cease-fire.

The Special Committee informed Colonel Benoit and the persons accompanying him of the decision of the other side, that is, Colonel Caamaño's command, not to enter into any agreement in which the seven generals mentioned earlier in this report participated in any manner whatsoever.

V. RATIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

In accordance with the resolution adopted on May 1, 1965, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and on the basis of conversations held with the two factions involved in the conflict, the Special Committee made a careful study of the conditions under which a new agreement supplementary to that of April 3, might be reached, for ratifying and expanding the cease-fire.

To this end, it convoked the authorized representatives of the two conflicting factions for the purpose of informing them of a draft agreement prepared by the Committee, whose principal points were as follows:

(a) Acceptance of an act that would expressly ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30, 1965.

(b) Acceptance of a safety zone marked off within the limits that would be indicated in a map officially agreed to by both parties and appended to that act.

(c) Respect for the safety zone and a guarantee of adequate protection for any persons within that zone.

(d) Facilities needed by the International Red Cross, or the international agency designated by the Organization of American States, for the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment for the Dominican people.

(e) Guarantees for the evacuation of asylees in the foreign embassies or diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo.

(f) Respect for the diplomatic missions, their staffs, and for any persons who have taken refuge or asylum in those missions.

(g) Full and explicit recognition of the competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

In order to prepare the fulfillment of the agreement—as soon as the conflicting parties consented thereto—the Special Committee, through the dean of the diplomatic corps, convoked the chiefs of missions for the purpose of asking them which of them were interested in obtaining the evacuation of asylees or refugees. This meeting took place in the Papal Nunciature on Tuesday, May 4, around noon. The Special Committee received an oral report from the chiefs of missions on this matter. The Committee informed the members of the diplomatic corps of the conversations held with the two parties on this matter, and of the mandate it had received from the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and requested them to provide a list of their asylees and refugees in order to help solve the problem of the evacuees. As a result of the action of the Special Committee, several embassies began to make arrangements for the departure of refugees and asylees who wished to leave under the guarantee of the Organization of American States. At the same time, the Special Committee was informed of the imminent arrival of hospital teams, medicine, and food supplies that had been requested, as an aircraft had arrived from Colombia on May 5. We understand that many asylees and refugees who were at the Colombian Embassy in Santo Domingo left for that country on the same aircraft.

Moreover, the Special Committee requested the military advisers of each of its members to make a reconnaissance visit to the safety zone and to arrange with the military authorities of the United States in Santo Domingo the details of the expansion of that zone to include all the embassies. This task was completed and the military advisers immediately began to prepare and draw up an official map.

Likewise, in order to prepare all the measures for the application of the cease-fire, the Special Committee informed the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the urgent need for obtaining a shipment of food, medicine, and medical personnel immediately. The following cable was sent for the the same purpose:

SANTO DOMINGO, May 3, 1965.

Ambassador GUILLERMO SEVILLA SACASA
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation,
Washington, D.C.

Number One.

The Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation wishes to extend emphatically, through you, to the Tenth Meeting and to each of the member states, a most urgent appeal that cognizance be taken of the dramatic situation existing in this country because of the armed strife, and to emphasize the urgent necessity for them, within the spirit of fraternity and solidarity with the Dominican people, immediately to send foodstuffs, medicine, and medical personnel.

The Committee is convinced that this is the most urgent of the serious problems being faced, in order to prevent the possibility of epidemics and other calamities that could make the situation of the Dominican people even more difficult.

Ambassador COLOMBO,
Chairman of the Committee.

We have learned that the Meeting of Consultation approved a resolution on this matter, based on the humanitarian gesture of the Special Committee.

VI. REPORTS TO THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION

On May 4, 1965, the Special Committee reported to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the status of negotiations for agreeing upon the cease-fire and replied to a telephone message from the General Secretariat in Washington concerning various aspects of its labors.

The cablegram from the Special Committee to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation mentioned above reads:

SANTO DOMINGO, 4 May 1965.

Ambassador GUILLERMO SEVILLA SACASA,
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation,
Washington, D.C.

Number Two.

Replying telephone communications received today, I wish to report the following:

First: All contacts have been made with groups represented by the following persons: Constitutional Military Command: Col. Francisco Caamaño, Lt. Col. Manuel Montes Arache, Maj. Héctor E. Lachapelle Díaz, Mr. Héctor Aristy, Maj. Fabio C. Restano, Lt. Col. Augusto Jiménez, and Lt. Col. Pedro Alvarez Olguín. Members of the Military Junta: Col. Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President; Col. Enrique A. Casado; Navy Capt. Olgo Manuel Santana Carrasco, and Gen. Elías M. Wessin y Wessin, Director of the Armed Forces Training Center. Likewise, with members of the diplomatic corps, especially all those of Latin America, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassador of the United States.

Second: Committee, in addition to interviews mentioned above, has been in constant touch with the aforesaid groups, and at present, the Committee is awaiting the formalization of the points that have already been accepted by both parties, which are: Confirmation cease-fire, demarcation and enlargement of security zone to include all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population without regard to parties. We have thus far encountered a good attitude on the part of both parties.

Third: Committee will return as soon as it obtains the results of the negotiations it is conducting. Possibly tomorrow.

Fourth: Both parties have accepted the enlargement of the security zone to include all Latin American embassies and we are working to fix a boundary for it. U.S. forces established an access corridor between San Isidro and the security zone.

Fifth: We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member states that are in a position to do so to establish a combined inter-American military force under the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives that are set by the Meeting of Consultation.

Sixth: With reference to the question by the Ambassador of Colombia, the only airport capable of receiving planes is the one at the San Isidro airbase, which is under the authority of the Military Junta presided over by Colonel Benoit.

Ambassador COLOMBO,
Chairman of the Committee.

VII. ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

As a result of the conversations held by the Committee with the parties an agreement was finally reached referring to the points covered in this report.

The text of the document known as the "Act of Santo Domingo," signed on May 5, 1965, is as follows:

ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned, respectively, the Military Junta of Government and the "Constitutional Government" hereby place on record that they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discussions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose members also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry out.

1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30 last.

2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries indicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the same Parties who sign the present Act.

3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the

Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of refuge.

4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or to the international agency that the Organization of American States may designate to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities required by the Organization of American States so that medical and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, to perform their services.

5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or diplomatic missions who so request of them.

6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein.

7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the present document, which shall be known as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall be for the files of the Committee.

The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall transmit certified copies to each of the member states.

MAY 5, 1965

For the Military Junta of Government:

Colonel PEDRO BARTOLOMÉ BENOIT

Dominican Armed Forces

Colonel ENRIQUE A. CASADO SALADÍN

National Army

Captain OLGO N. SANTANA CARRASCO

Navy

For the Constitutional Government:

Colonel FRANCISCO CAAMAÑO DEÑO

Constitutional President

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. R. AUGUSTO JIMÉNEZ HERRERA

Colonel RAMÓN MANUEL MONTES

Major HÉCTOR ACHAPELL

Dr. HÉCTOR ARISTY

Minister of the Presidency

For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States:

Ambassador RICARDO COLOMBO

Representative of Argentina

Chairman of the Committee

Ambassador ILMAR PENNA MARINHO

Representative of Brazil

Ambassador ALFREDO VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA

Representative of Colombia

Ambassador CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER

Representative of Guatemala

Ambassador FRANK MORRICE, JR.

Representative of Panama

VIII. EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE UNITED STATES

Before reaching an agreement with the conflicting parties concerning the ratification and expansion of the cease-fire, the Special Committee studied the question relating to the cooperation of the armed forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic with the Committee within the objectives indicated by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

On the night of May 3 the Special Committee had an interview with the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic. The results of this interview and the precise opinion of the Special Committee were set forth in a memorandum delivered personally to that diplomatic representative, which read as follows:

MEMORANDUM

As a result of the meeting that was held on the night of May 3, 1965, the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, has the honor to state the following to the Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic:

1. The Committee has had the steadfast purpose of attaining the confirmation and effectiveness of the cease-fire agreement already agreed upon.

2. To achieve this end, the Committee has today held long conversations with the commanders of the Command headed by Colonel Caamano and of the Military Junta headed by Colonel Benoit. Both have given their consent to participate jointly with the Committee in formal negotiations, for the purpose of arriving at a supplementary and amplifying agreement on the cease-fire, which the Committee believes indispensable and which should include among its principal clauses, in addition to others:

a. The demarcation and enlargement of the safety zone to include the embassies that are present outside this zone.

b. The cooperation of both parties with a Committee of the Organization of American States for supervising and applying the cease-fire.

c. Cooperation for humanitarian aid.

d. Departure from the country of Dominican refugees or asylees in the embassies who wish to leave.

3. The Committee would like to know whether, in the event that a supplementary and amplifying agreement of this nature can be signed by both parties, the United States military forces in the Dominican Republic could receive precise instructions for cooperating in carrying out the agreement.

4. The Committee feels that without the essential cooperation of the United States, the aforementioned agreement could not be carried out.

5. The Committee believes that the foregoing corresponds to the terms of its instructions contained in the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Meeting of Consultation, especially with what is stated in paragraph 2.a, concerning the cease-fire, and the content of paragraph 4, which states:

[The Tenth Meeting of Consultation:]

"requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee."

After the Act of Santo Domingo was signed, by which the cease-fire of April 30, 1965, was ratified and amplified, the Special Committee sent to the Ambassador of the United States in the Dominican Republic a note in which it expressly requested the cooperation of the government of that country in applying the stipulations of that document. The note from the Special Committee and the reply from the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, are transcribed below:

SANTO DOMINGO, May 5, 1965.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, a certified copy of the Act of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, respectively, "Military Junta of Government" and "Constitutional Government."

As item 4 of the Resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation "requests the American governments to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee," this Committee hopes that your government will cooperate with it in observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

RICARDO M. COLOMBO,
*Representative of Argentina,
Chairman of the Committee.*

The Honorable W. TAPLEY BENNETT,
*Ambassador of the United States of America to the Dominican Republic,
Santo Domingo de Guzman, Dominican Republic.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, May 7, 1965.

EXCELLENCY:

I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic of Your Excellency's communication to him of May 5, transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and expressing the hope that the United States Government will cooperate in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Washington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you.

I have the honor to express my government's gratitude for and support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the boundaries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge as it now exists is shown on the map.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK.

His Excellency Dr. RICARDO M. COLOMBO.

Representative of Argentina on the Council of the Organization of American States.

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In presenting this report to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Special Committee has desired only to give an account of its activities from May 1 to 5, 1965, that is, during the visit to the city of Santo Domingo.

The Special Committee achieved, under truly dramatic circumstances, the main objectives set forth in the previously mentioned resolution with respect to cease-fire, the orderly evacuation of persons who have taken asylum or refuge, and humanitarian assistance to the Dominican people without any distinction as to parties or conflicting factions. The Special Committee also achieved the demarcation of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo in accordance with the map officially drawn up by its military advisers. This map was transmitted to both parties, and the original is at the disposal of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

As the representatives will note, the Act of Santo Domingo and the results thus far obtained by the Special Committee constitute the first stage of a process of restoring peace and normality in the Dominican Republic, which requires the Inter-American System to take several steps toward consolidation.

Among the measures we believe could be adopted at once by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, we suggest the following:

1. Designation of a permanent technical military group in the city of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire and other measures agreed upon by the parties in the Act of Santo Domingo.

2. Designation of another qualified group to organize humanitarian aid to the Dominican people and evaluation of the most urgent needs with regard to food, medicine, and hospital equipment.

3. Study and planning of the Inter-American Force created by the Resolution of May 6, 1965 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, in order to assure it the best conditions of operation and efficiency.

4. To empower the Special Commission to establish coordination among all these elements and activities in the Dominican Republic in order to attain the goals set forth in the resolutions approved by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 7, 1965.

RICARDO M. COLOMBO
Ambassador of Argentina
Chairman

ILMAR PENNA MARINHO
Ambassador of Brazil

ALFREDO VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA
Ambassador of Colombia

CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER
Ambassador of Guatemala

HUMBERTO CALAMARI G.
Ambassador of Panama

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